Demand- side resistance to creative destruction in schumpeterian growth theory

The Schumpelerian model of endogeno~s growlh is generalized with lhe introduction of stochastic resislance. by agenls other Ihan producers. to lhe innovations which drive growth. This causes a queue to be formcd of innovations, alrcady discovered, bUI waiting to be adopled~ A slationary stochastic equilibrium (SSE) is obtained when the queue is stable~ It is shown that in the SSE, such resistance will always reduce lhe average growth iate hut it may increa~e wclfare in certain silualions. In an example, Ihis is when innovatiuns are small anti monopoly power great. The cont1icl hetween this welfare motive for resistance and those of rent-seeking innovalors.may well explain why growth rates differ.

Effects on school enrollment and performance of a conditional transfers program in Mexico

We study the effects of a conditional transfers program on school enrollment and performance in Mexico. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the dynamic educational decision and process inc1uding the endogeneity and uncertainty of performance (passing grades) and the effect of a conditional cash transfer program for children enrolled at school. Careful identification of the program impact on this model is studied. This framework is used to study the Mexican social program Progresa in which a randomized experiment has been implemented and allows us to identify the effect of the conditional cash transfer program on enrollment and performance at school. Using the mIes of the conditional program, we can explain the different incentive effects provided. We also derive the formal identifying assumptions needed to provide consistent estimates of the average treatment effects on enrollment and performance at school. We estimate empirically these effects and find that Progresa had always a positive impact on school continuation whereas for performance it had a positive impact at primary school but a negative one at secondary school, a possible consequence of disincentives due to the program termination after the third year of secondary school.

Demand-pull stagflation

This paper explores the possibility of stagflation emanating exc1usively from monetaJy sbocks, without concurrent supply shocks or shifts in potential output. This arises in connection with a tight money paradox. in the context of a fiscal theory of the price leveI. The paper exhibits perfect foresight equilibria with output and inflation fluctuating in opposite direetions as a consequence of small monetary shocks, and also following changes in monetaJy policy regime that launch the economy into hyperinflation or that produce dramatic stabilization of already high inflation. For that purpose, an analytically convenient dynamic general equilibrium macro model is deve10ped wbere nominal rigidities are represented by a cross between staggered two-period contracts and state dependent price adjustment in the presence of menu costs.

Uncertainty of aid inflows and the growth relationship

This paper contributes to the literature on aid and economic growth. We posit that it is not the levei of aid flows per se but the stability of such flows that determines the impact of aid on economic growth. Three measures of aid instability are employed. One is a simple deviation from trend, and measures overall instability. The other measures are based on auto-regressive estimates to capture deviations from an expected trend. These measures are intended to proxy for uncertainty in aid receipts. We posit that such uncertainty will influence the relationship between aid and investment and how recipient governments respond to aid, and will therefore affect how aid impacts on growth. We estimate a standard cross-country growth regression including the leveI of aid, and find aid to be insignificant (in line with other results in the literature). We then introduce measures of instability. Aid remains insignificant when we account for overall instability. However, when we account for uncertainty (which is negative and significant), we find that aid has a significant positive effect on growth. We conduct stability tests that show that the significance of aid is largely due to its effect on the volume of investment. The finding that uncertainty of aid receipts reduces the effectiveness of aid is robust. When we control for this, aid appears to have a significant positive influence on growth. When the regression is estimated for the sub-sample of African countries these findings hold, although the effectiveness of aid appears weaker than for the full sample.

Demand and supply: price elasticities and corporate performance in the UK

This paper investigates the relationship between consumer demand and corporate performance in several consumer industries in the UK, using two independent datasets. It uses data on consumer expenditures and the retail price index to estimate Almost Ideal Demand Systems on micro-data and compute timevarying price elasticities of demand for disaggregated commodity groups. Then, it matches the product definitions to the Standard Industry Classification and uses the estimated elasticities to investigate the impact of consumer behaviour on firm-level profitability equations. The time-varying household characteristics are ideal instruments for the demand effects in the firms' supply equation. The paper concludes that demand elasticities have a significant and tangible impact on the profitability of UK firms and that this impact can shed some light on the relationship between market structure and economic performance.

The effects of uncertainty about the timing of deals on consumer behavior

I examine the effects of uncertainty about the timing of de aIs (i.e. temporary price cuts or sales) on consumer behavior in a dynamic inventory model of consumer choice. I derive implications for purchase behavior and test them empirically, using two years of scanner data for soft drinks. I fmd that loyal consumers' decisions, both about the allocation of their purchases over time and the quantity to be purchased in a particular deal, are affected by the uncertainty about the timing of the deal for the product. Loyal consumers buy a higher fraction of their overall purchases during de ais as the uncertainty decreases. This effect increases with an increase in the product' s share of a given consumer' s purchase in the same category or if the consumer stockpiles (i.e., is a shopper). During a particular deal, loyal shoppers increase the quantity they purchase the more time that has passed since the previous de aI, and the higher the uncertainty about the deals' timing. For the non-Ioyal consumers these effects are not significant. These results hold for products that are frequently purchased, like soft-drinks and yogurt, but do not hold for less frequentIy purchased products, such as laundry detergents. The fmdings suggest that manufacturers and retailers should incorporate the effects of deals' timing on consumers' purchase' decisions when deriving optimal pricing strategies.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Phase transition of demand explained by the heterogeneity of consumers' intrinsic preferences

In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.

Nonlinear pricing beyond the demand profile approach

Wilson [16] introduced a general methodology to deal with monopolistic pricing in situations where customers have private information on their tastes (‘types’). It is based on the demand profile of customers: For each nonlinear tariff by the monopolist the demand at a given level of product (or quality) is the measure of customers’ types whose marginal utility is at least the marginal tariff (‘price’). When the customers’ marginal utility has a natural ordering (i.e., the Spence and Mirrlees Condition), such demand profile is very easy to perform. In this paper we will present a particular model with one-dimensional type where the Spence and Mirrlees condition (SMC) fails and the demand profile approach results in a suboptimal solution for the monopolist. Moreover, we will suggest a generalization of the demand profile procedure that improves the monopolist’s profit when the SMC does not hold.