Money with Bank Networks

Rio de Janeiro

Monetary union and productivity differences in mercosur countries

This paper investigates cross-country productivity convergence among Mercosur members plus associates (Chile and Bolivia) and Peru, during the period 1960-1999. The testing strategy is based on the definitions of time-series convergence by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), and applies sequentially the multivariate unit root tests proposed by Sarno and Taylor (1998), Flôres, Preumont and Szafarz (1995) and Breuer, Mc Nown and Wallace (1999). The last two tests allow to identify the countries that converge. Our results show evidence of convergence among the four Mercosur countries, using either Argentina or Brazil as benchmark. Weaker evidence of convergence is also found with Bolivia. The results point out that monetary union among the Southern Cone economies, though a far objective, is not without sense.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states

Radner (1968) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature.

Essays on the monetary aspects of the term structure of nominal interest rates

Interest rates are key economic variables to much of finance and macroeconomics, and an enormous amount of work is found in both fields about the topic. Curiously, in spite of their common interest, finance and macro research on the topic have seldom interacted, using different approaches to address its main issues with almost no intersection. Concerned with interest rate contingent claims, finance term structure models relate interest rates to lagged interest rates; concerned with economic relations and macro dynamics, macro models regress a few interest rates on a wide variety of economic variables. If models are true though simplified descriptions of reality, the relevant factors should be captured by both the set of bond yields and that of economic variables. Each approach should be able to address the other field concerns with equal emciency, since the economic variables are revealed by the bond yields and these by the economic variables.

Coordenação entre política fiscal monetária no regime de metas de inflação

Essa dissertação trata da coordenação entre política monetária e política fiscal. O trabalho visa testar a hipótese de que a demanda agregada é afetada pela política fiscal no Brasil entre 1995 e 2006. Com esse intuito, o trabalho estima uma curva IS para o Brasil nesse período, incluindo variáveis fiscais explicativas. O resultado é de que há evidência estatística de que o desvio do produto em relação ao produto potencial (de agora em diante gap do produto) seja dependente (positivamente) do nível de gastos do governo e (negativamente) da arrecadação do setor público. Além disso, conforme a teoria prevê, o gasto do governo tem um efeito (em módulo) mais intenso do que a arrecadação do governo, de modo que tanto o nível do superávit primário, quanto o tamanho do governo em proporção ao PIB têm impacto sobre a demanda agregada. Assim, assumindo que a convergência da taxa de câmbio real via paridade descoberta de taxa de juros tenha sido defasada no período sob análise, a política fiscal pode ter contribuído para manutenção da taxa de juros real acima do nível de equilíbrio no período em questão.

Análise do mecanismo de transmissão dos preços internacionais de commodities agrícolas sobre o comportamento da taxa de câmbio real no Brasil

This paper examined the transmission mechanism of international prices of agricultural commodities into the real exchange rate in Brazil for the period from January 2000 to February 2010. We used time series models (ARIMA Model, Transfer Model, Intervention Analysis, Johansen Cointegration Test) in determination of the short and long run elasticities. Transfer Function Model results show that changes in international prices of agricultural commodities are transmitted to the real exchange rate in Brazil in the short run, however, that transmission is less than unity, thus configuring the inelastic relationship. Johansen cointegration tests show that these variables are not co-integrated, no longer converge to the long-run equilibrium. These results are in agreement Cashim et al. (2004), which also found no long run relationship between real exchange rate and commodity prices in the case of Brazil. These results show that monetary shocks have greater weight on changes of the real exchange rate than real shocks.

Monetary policy and country risk

This article develops an econometric model in order to study country risk behavior for six emerging economies (Argentina, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia), by expanding the Country Beta Risk Model of Harvey and Zhou (1993), Erb et. al. (1996a, 1996b) and Gangemi et. al. (2000). Toward this end, we have analyzed the impact of macroeconomic variables, especially monetary policy, upon country risk, by way of a time varying parameter approach. The results indicate an inefficient and unstable effect of monetary policy upon country risk in periods of crisis. However, this effect is stable in other periods, and the Favero-Giavazzi effect is not verified for all economies, with an opposite effect being observed in many cases.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

A model is presented in which banks accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. Alt though theories about the coexistence of money and credit are inherently difficult, the model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are well monitored, and can credibly allow fiat-money withdraws to whom needs its, thus qualifying to become safe brokers of idle capital. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

Welfare characterization of monetary-applied models and three implications

This paper demonstrates that the applied monetary models - the Sidrauski-type models and the cash-in-advance models, augmented with a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services - imply trajectories which are Pareto-Optimum restricted to a given path of the real quantity of money. As a consequence, three results follow: First, Bailey’s formula to evaluate the welfare cost of inflation is indeed accurate, if the longrun capital stock does not depend on the inflation rate and if the compensate demand is considered. Second, the relevant money demand concept for this issue - the impact of inflation on welfare - is the monetary base. Third, if the long-run capital stock depends on the inflation rate, this dependence has a second-order impact on welfare, and, conceptually, it is not a distortion from the social point of view. These three implications moderate some evaluations of the welfare cost of the perfect predicted inflation.

Foreign funding to an emerging market: the Monetary Premium Theory and the Brazilian Case, 1991 - 1998

We develop a framework to explain the private capital flows between the rest of the world and an emerging economy. The model, based on the monetary premium theory, relates an endogenous supply of foreign capitals to an endogenous differential of interest rates; its estimation uses the econometric techniques initiated by Heckman. Four questions regarding the capital flows phenomenon are explored, including the statistical process that governs the events of default and the impact of the probability of default on the interest rate differential. Using the methodology, we analyse the dynamics of foreign capital movements in Brazil during the 1991- 1998 period.