The ex-Ante non-optimality of the Dempster-Schafer updating rule for ambiguous beliefs

The most widely used updating rule for non-additive probalities is the Dempster-Schafer rule. Schmeidles and Gilboa have developed a model of decision making under uncertainty based on non-additive probabilities, and in their paper “Updating Ambiguos Beliefs” they justify the Dempster-Schafer rule based on a maximum likelihood procedure. This note shows in the context of Schmeidler-Gilboa preferences under uncertainty, that the Dempster-Schafer rule is in general not ex-ante optimal. This contrasts with Brown’s result that Bayes’ rule is ex-ante optimal for standard Savage preferences with additive probabilities.

Term structure dynamics and no-arbitrage under the Taylor rule

A determinação da taxa de juros estrutura a termo é um dos temas principais da gestão de ativos financeiros. Considerando a grande importância dos ativos financeiros para a condução das políticas econômicas, é fundamental para compreender a estrutura que é determinado. O principal objetivo deste estudo é estimar a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros brasileiras, juntamente com taxa de juros de curto prazo. A estrutura a termo será modelado com base em um modelo com uma estrutura afim. A estimativa foi feita considerando a inclusão de três fatores latentes e duas variáveis ​​macroeconômicas, através da técnica Bayesiana da Cadeia de Monte Carlo Markov (MCMC).

Bailey's rule for the welfare of inflation: a theoretical foundation

This paper demonstrates that for a very general class of monetary models (the Sidrauski type models and the cash-in-advance models), Bailey’s rule to evaluate the welfare efect of infation is in deed accurate. The result applies for any technology or preference, if the long-run capital stock does not depend on the ination rate. In general, a dynamic version of Bailey’s rule is established. In particular, the result extends to models in which there is a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services. A dditionally, it is argued that the relevant money demand concept for this issue- the impact of in ination under welfare- is the monetary base.

Testing the optimality of aggregate consumption decisions: is there rule-of-thumb behavior?

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all. This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets. Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

Repensando a relação entre estado, direito e desenvolvimento: os limites do paradigma rule of law e a relevância das alternativas institucionais

Assumindo a primazia da abordagem institucionalista na agenda contemporânea do desenvolvimento, este artigo procurará discutir alguns de seus limites, descritivos e normativos, no que tange, em especial, ao sistema financeiro. Particularmente, procurar-se-á sugerir que os programas de difusão do rule of law têm se constituído em um paradigma estreito do papel exercido pelo direito, segundo a qual cabe ao ambiente jurídico cumprir, apenas e tão somente, a função de garantidor dos interesses de investidores privados, entendidos como atores centrais de um modelo de financiamento baseado em transações de mercado. O texto sugere que o paradigma rule of law, como estratégia de promoção do desenvolvimento, tem dificuldade em lidar com a existência de alternativas institucionais de organização econômica e financeira, para além de um modelo de mercado baseado em atores atomizados e carentes de segurança jurídica. Um exemplo disso, que escapa do instrumental tradicional, é o modelo brasileiro de financiamento, que, apesar de ter vivenciado inúmeras reformas institucionais, dedicadas a elevar o nível de proteção de investidores, ainda concentra em um banco de desenvolvimento – o BNDES – grande parte do financiamento de longo prazo do país. O artigo assume, portanto, que, sim, o direito e as instituições, de fato, importam para o desenvolvimento, mas há uma variedade de possibilidades e funções a serem exercidas pelos arranjos institucionais e ferramentas jurídicas – muito além do que supõem os programas de rule of law. Uma bem sucedida organização institucional baseada em um banco de desenvolvimento é um exemplo disso.

Approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space

This paper shows existence of approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space in an environment of incomplete markets. We prove that the approximate recursive equilibrium implements an approximate sequential equilibrium which is always close to a Magill and Quinzii equilibrium without short sales for arbitrarily small errors. This implies that the competitive equilibrium can be implemented by using forecast statistics with minimal state space provided that agents will reduce errors in their estimates in the long run. We have also developed an alternative algorithm to compute the approximate recursive equilibrium with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents through a procedure of iterating functional equations and without using the rst order conditions of optimality.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.

The Taylor rule under inquiry: Hidden states

This work empirically evaluates the Taylor rule for the US and Brazil using Markov-Switching Regimes. I find that the inflation parameter of the US Taylor rule is less than one in many periods, contrasting heavily with Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), and the same happens with Brazilian data. When the inflation parameter is greater than one, it encompasses periods that these authors considered they should be less than one. Brazil is used for comparative purposes because it experienced a high level inflation until 1994 and then a major stabilization plan reduced the growth in prices to civilized levels. Thus, it is a natural laboratory to test theories designed to work in any environment. The findings point to a theoretical gap that deserves further investigation and show that monetary policy in Brazil has been ineffective, which is coherent with the general attitude of population in relation to this measure.

Taylor rule with hidden states

This work evaluates empirically the Taylor rule for the US and Brazil using Kalman Filter and Markov-Switching Regimes. We show that the parameters of the rule change significantly with variations in both output and output gap proxies, considering hidden variables and states. Such conclusions call naturally for robust optimal monetary rules. We also show that Brazil and US have very contrasting parameters, first because Brazil presents time-varying intercept, second because of the rigidity in the parameters of the Brazilian Taylor rule, regardless the output gap proxy, data frequency or sample data. Finally, we show that the long-run inflation parameter of the US Taylor rule is less than one in many periods, contrasting strongly with Orphanides (forthcoming) and Clarida, Gal´i and Gertler (2000), and the same happens with Brazilian monthly data.

On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous

This paper investigates the optimality of the Friedman rule in a two-sector small open economy. That policy prescription is found to be a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. If a planner can select all conceivable distorting taxes, then, for some initial values of public debt, money balances and foreign assets, it is possible to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation. If the planner can select only some of these tax rates, then second-best policies may also satisfy the Friedman rule. However, this last result depends on the set of tax instruments the planner can choose from.

The time consistency of the Friedman rule

We consider the problem of time consistency of the Ramsey monetary and fiscal policies in an economy without capital. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983) we allow the government at date t to leave its successor at t + 1 a profile of real and nominal debt of all maturities, as a way to influence its decisions. We show that the Ramsey policies are time consistent if and only if the Friedman rule is the optimal Ramsey policy.