The Effectiveness of Golden Handcuffs

Executive compensation includes components intended to acquire and retain executives as well as to align their goals with those of shareholders. This paper focuses on retention compensation, commonly known as "golden handcuffs", including stock options, long-term incentive plans and restricted stock. The extant literature examines CEOs that change jobs despite their golden handcuffs, and argues that such compensation is not an effective means of executive retention. In this paper, I compare the golden handcuffs of a set of CEOs who change jobs to a matched set of those who do not in order to determine the efficacy of such compensation for executive retention. I find that restricted stock is positively related to CEO turnover whereas stock options are negatively related.

Addressing Compensation Rates Below Market Value

Strategies for Recruiting and Retaining Faculty and Staff (Business Affairs Forum, attached): Many institutions face limitations on the salary rates they can offer faculty and staff due to decreases in state funding, which can create challenges in recruitment and retention of qualified employees. This brief explores strategies institutions use to lessen the impact of budget limitations on faculty and staff salaries and to recruit and retain faculty in spite of limited salary offerings.

Evaluating Department Chair and Program Director Compensation

This brief examines compensation policies for department chairs and program directors at public institutions, with a particular focus on the factors that determine compensation. The report includes an analysis of department chairs and program director responsibilities, monetary compensation, and non-monetary compensation.