The role of a prospective public health intervention study register in building public health evidence: proposal for content and use

Evidence-informed practice is a key component of public health and the focus of much discussion, of which the nature of evidence and how it is best gathered and appraised has formed a large part. Prospective registration of trials is now a key component of rigour and quality in clinical research and has been supported at an international level through the WHO International Clinical Trials Registry Program. This paper discusses the scope and benefits of trial registration in clinical research, including greater transparency and reduced publication bias. It then considers the potential for a Prospective Public Health Intervention Studies Register specific to the needs of public health and aspects to be included in such a register. It is argued that this initiative has the potential to facilitate increased global cooperation and efficiency in the production of high quality evidence and ultimately in improved health outcomes for populations.

Michael Polanyi, tacit cognitive relativist

Celebrated as a theorist of science, and a source of stimulating ideas for theologians and philosophers of religion, Michael Polanyi explicitly denied cognitive relativism. Yet cognitive relativism, this paper suggests, is implied by Polanyi's account of conceptual frameworks and intellectual controversies.

In 'The Stability of Beliefs' (1952) Polanyi understands conceptual frameworks (science, psychoanalysis, Azande witchcraft, Marxism) as embedded in, and as expressed in the use of, their own languages. The language-with-theory limits the range of discussable subjects, interprets relevant facts in its own terms, permits only certain questions to be asked, with answers to these questions serving to confirm the framework.

In Polanyi's masterwork, Personal Knowledge (1958), these ideas inform his discussion of controversies over scientific frameworks and frameworks vying to become part of science. In each controversy, frameworks are logically disconnected, Polanyi foreshadowing the incommensurability thesis

I argue that Polanyi's ideas satisfy recognised criteria of cognitive relativism. Perception is undetermined by objects and conditioned by language. Empirical propositions, in Polanyi's view, are accepted as true only within a conceptual framework. Polanyi regards supporters of logically disconnected frameworks as thinking differently, living in different worlds, speaking different languages and as experiencing communication failure. There is no framework-independent argument or evidence to distinguish any framework as the best available approximation to the truth. Frameworks are logically disconnected and incommensurable.

Two sources of Michael Polanyi`s prototypal notion of incommensurability: Evans-Pritchard on Azande witchcraft and St Augustine on conversion

Michael Polanyi argues in Personal Knowledge (1958) that conceptual frameworks involved in major scientific controversies are separated by a `logical gap'. Such frameworks, according to Polanyi (1958: 151), are logically disconnected: their protagonists think differently, use different languages and occupy different worlds. Relinquishing one framework and adopting another, Polanyi's scientist undergoes a `conversion' to a new `faith'. Polanyi, in other words, presaged Kuhn and Feyerabend's concept of incommensurability. To what influences was Polanyi subject as he developed his concept of the logical gap? The answer, as unfolded in this article, is twofold: Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande and the Confessions of St Augustine.

Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn: priority and credit

The article argues that Polanyi was a likely source of influence on the theory of science that Kuhn developed in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). The striking similarity between Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability and Polanyi’s rendering of scientific controversy in Personal Knowledge is featured here, and is used to expose a tension between Polanyi’s notions of scientific controversy and unfolding truth.

T.S. Eliot`s idea of the clerisy, and its discussion by Karl Mannheim and Michael Polanyi in the context of J.H. Oldham`s moot

In 1938, Joseph Oldham, a leading British Christian ecumenist, formed a discussion group that came to be known as the Moot. The Moot met in a retreat setting for several long weekends each year until early 1947, its discussions carefully organized and convened by Oldham. More than anything else, the discussions of the Moot revolved around the topic of order and, more particularly, around the problem of how order might be restored in British society and culture in the context of a ‘world turned upside down’. Oldham and most members of the group sought a central place for Christian ideas and ideals in British social life.

A striking feature of the Moot was the intellectual stature and the diversity of interests of its members. Among its 16 or so regular members were Oldham (1874-1969), his close friend T.S. Eliot (1888-1963) and Karl Mannheim (1893-1947). Among the later ‘visitors’ to Moot meetings was Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), who first came to the 20th Moot meeting in June of 1944.1

This article presents several papers that were produced for the Moot discussion of 15-18 December 1944 by Eliot, Mannheim and Polanyi. These papers have intrinsic and historical interest, and are published together for the first time here. The initial paper, written by Eliot, treats the role in society of ‘the clerisy’2 - a term borrowed from Samuel Taylor Coleridge that points to an intellectual elite or vanguard. Eliot requested that Oldham solicit responses to his paper from Mannheim and Polanyi. Mannheim’s response was a set of detailed answers to four questions that Eliot posed at the end of his essay. Polanyi’s response was a short, coherent essay, which he identified as ‘my own position with respect’ to Eliot’s discussion; his essay outlines a brief account of the role of the clerisy in science.3 Eliot wrote short comments on the responses of both Mannheim and Polanyi. These five pieces, which have a natural unity, should be of interest to anyone working in the history of social thought. We have abridged only Mannheim’s lengthy response and have eliminated a few lines of illustrative material from Eliot’s reply to Mannheim, but these excisions in no way detract from the clarity of the authors’ perspectives in this rich trilogue.

Conflict resolution and policy making mediation in the Mekong River Basin

The Mekong River serves China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam covering an area of approximately 795, 000 square kilometres and the Mekong River basin is a delicate eco-system rich in natural resources and bio-diversity. Competing demands for increasingly scarce supplies of water, the reciprocal impacts of land and water uses and inadequate governance arrangements have given rise to conflicts that has to be resolved by policy making to facilitate a process, whereby the main principles adopted in the Mekong River Agreement can be implemented.