Incidencia del gasto en educación sobre los hogares en Bogotá en 2003

Se evalúa el impacto redistributivo de las políticas educativas en Bogotá mediante el Análisis de Incidencia del Beneficio. A pesar que los hogares son autónomos con respecto a la elección entre la educación oficial y no oficial, la provisión pública de la educación genera fuertes impactos progresivos en el ingreso que se explayan hacia reducciones de pobreza y desigualdad, sin importar el cálculo del subsidio que se impute al ingreso.

Las prácticas de recursos humanos y su incidencia en el bienestar laboral de los empleados

El objetivo del presente trabajo es formular, mediante una profunda revisión documental, bibliográfica y empírica, una fundamentación teórica sobre si existe o no incidencia de las prácticas de recursos humanos sobre el bienestar laboral de los empleados, y el que grado en que esta se presenta sobre aspecto como el engagement y la satisfacción laboral. Se realizó la revisión de múltiples estudios empíricos que aportaran evidencia sobre la relación que se presenta entre las principales prácticas de recursos humanos – provisión de personal, formación y desarrollo, promoción de personal, evaluación de desempeño, compensación y pago, y balance trabajo-familia – y el bienestar laboral, representado en el engagement y satisfacción en el trabajo de los empleados. Los resultados de este trabajo indican la existencia de una relación e incidencia de las prácticas de recursos humanos, el bienestar laboral, el engagement y la satisfacción laboral. De igual forma se encontró que estas relaciones son principalmente de carácter positivo, lo cual indica que las organizaciones que desarrollan este tipo de prácticas en su interior, fomentan tanto el desarrollo y la presencia de bienestar laboral en sus empleados, como su perdurabilidad.

Impacto de la biología en los modelos de gestión y control organizacional

Desde el inicio de las organizaciones han existido modelos de control rígidos como los sistemas mecanicistas y formales en donde la perspectiva racional sobresale y no se tienen en cuenta los aspectos humanos en el diseño de los sistemas. Estos modelos de control rígidos, estandarizados y centralizados suponen un problema para el adecuado desarrollo estratégico y operativo de las organizaciones. Sin embargo, desde los sistemas biológicos se pueden observar aportes de autores que destacan la ausencia de control y su consecuente funcionamiento armónico a través de propiedades como la auto-organización y la emergencia. De esta forma, este artículo de revisión tiene como objetivo identificar las aproximaciones teóricas que se han realizado en torno a los principales aportes que los modelos biológicos han hecho a la gestión administrativa y específicamente al control organizacional mediante el análisis de la producción bibliográfica realizada en los últimos 10 años.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Do more decentralized local governments do better? an evaluation of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia

In this paper I evaluate the impact of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia. I use data from Colombia's municipalities. I look at the effect of the 2001 reform on enrolment in pre-college schools. While all municipalities received earnmarked national transfers, withthe reform some of then now have more responsabilities to provide education (deeper decen-tralization) than others. Particulary important, the reform entitle the more decentralizedmunicipalities to sign subsidy contracts with private school. Departments (the regional gov-ernments) are entitle to sign this type of contracts for the less decentralized municipalities.Since the rule for municipalities to receive more responsabilities follows and exogenous popu-lation threshold, I can implement Regression Discontinuity Design. Enrolment is measuredthrough two variables: the number of students enroled in public schools and the number of subsidized students enroled in private schools. Results sugest that more decentralized mu-nicipalities subsidize more students in private schools. The difference is significant at all thelevels of pre-college school for the period 2004-2006. In 2005, the difference accounts for20% of enrolment in private schools and 3% of population of school age. Besides, there are not significant differences among municipalities regarding enrolment in public schools.

Externalidades de red en una economía con tres idiomas

El documento estudia el impacto del aprendizaje de una lengua por parte de un grupo de personas sobre el bienestar individual y social. Seaborda el enfoque de economía de redes para incorporar las externalidades que aparecen en lenguaje. Se encuentra que el equilibrio alcanzado cuando se toman decisiones descentralizadas es inferior al que se obtendría al tomarlas de manera centralizada.