La Ucrania post-soviética: geopolítica de un estado bipolar

El propósito de la presente monografía es analizar los elementos geopolíticos que dan cuenta de la fragmentación interna de Ucrania entre la élite y la población durante la posguerra fría. De esta forma, una interpretación divergente del espacio genera, por una parte, una división geográfica de la población (oriente/occidente), situación que ha impedido la consolidación de “una sola nación” y, por otra, la fragmentación entre las élites políticas que se encuentran en constante rotación, ha imposibilitado el surgimiento de una organización sólida e independiente. El resultado de esta doble tensión es la eclosión de un Estado bipolar que es justamente la característica definitoria de Ucrania en la posguerra fría. Con la idea de Estado bipolar se pretende realizar un aporte a la comprensión geopolítica en la era post-soviética, articulando una serie de elementos de orden teórico-analítico que permitan interpretar la circunstancia particular de la nación eslava.

Poor people and risky business

We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.