Does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers? evidence from a field experiment

We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers’ productivity under a welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers conditional or unconditional, increases workers’ productivity. Second, we find that productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra nonmonetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work.

Gender differences in time allocation of poor children in Colombia

This paper studies the effect of credit constraints and constraints on transfers between parents and children, on differences in labor and schooling across children within the same household, with an application to gender. When families are unconstrained in these respects, differences in labor supply or education are driven by differences in wages or returns to education. If the family faces an imperfect capital market, the labor supply of each child is inefficient, but differences across children are still driven by comparative advantage. However, if interfamily transfers are constrained so that parents cannot offset inequality between their children, they will favor the human capital accumulation of the more disadvantaged child -generally the one who works more as a child. We use our theory to examine the gender gap in child labor. Using a sample of poor families in Colombia, we conform our predictions among rural households, although this is less clear for urban households. The gender gap is largely explained by the wage gap between girls and boys. Moreover, families with the potential to make capital transfers to adult children (e.g. those with large animals), can compensate adult sons for their greater child labor and reduced educational attainment. In such families, as predicted, the male/female labor gap is greater.

Investment in transport capacity and regulation of regional monopolies in natural gas commodity markets

This paper develops a model of the regulator-regulated firm relationship in a regional natural gas commodity market which can be linked to a competitive market by a pipeline. We characterize normative policies under which the regulator, in addition to setting the level of the capacity of the pipeline, regulates the price of gas, under asymmetric information on the firm’s technology, and may (or may not) operate (two-way) transfers between consumers and the firm. We then focus on capacity and investigate how its level responds to the regulator’s taking account of the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints. The analysis yields some insights on the role that transport capacity investments may play as an instrument to improve the efficiency of geographically isolated markets.

Una aproximación al financiamiento de un sistema de protección social en Colombia

El documento hace una revisión de las principales fuentes de protección social que hay en Colombia y las características de los sistemas de protección de otros países. Se encuentra que gran parte de lo que se conoce como gasto social se destina al tema pensional y que los resultados de los fondos de solidaridad son muy pequeños frente a la autoprotección de los hogares. Se propone tener en cuenta los esfuerzos individuales y privados que hay en Colombia al diseñar un sistema de protección social, pues de lo contrario se estarían desincentivando estos esfuerzos.

Contribuciones de la banca al desarrollo: aportes y dificultades en el caso del programa de transferencias condicionadas "familias en acción" de Colombia por parte del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo [BID] y del banco mundial [BM] durante el periodo 2001-2013.

El interés de este estudio de caso es explicar el rol del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo [BID] y el Banco Mundial [BM] en el programa de transferencias condicionadas Familias en Acción de Colombia durante el 2001-2013. Se identificará cómo a través de estos programas el BID y el BM han contribuido con Familias en Acción para la reducción de la pobreza, la desigualdad de ingresos y el desarrollo del capital humano de familias vulnerables con el fin de evitar la pobreza inter-generacional. La importancia y crecimiento de la cooperación internacional por mejorar los aspectos sociales y económicos de países en vías desarrollo es indispensable para generar progreso entre las naciones con la finalidad de hacer un sistema internacional más equitativo e inclusivo.

Works Councils: An Agency Perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in whichworks councils are supposed to monitor manager's information on behalf of the workforce,but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we considerthat workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In orderto deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they canbe expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusionmakes contingent payments costly and reduces workers' payoffs. Second, when elections areused to align works councils' interest only well compensated representatives would face aninter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's transfers at first period and losingrents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behaviour withmanagement and works councils will try to behave on the employees' interest.

Movilidad intergeneracional en educación en las ciudades y regiones de Colombia

En el presente documento se explora la movilidad intergeneracionalen educación desde una perspectiva regional. La pregunta central es ¿en qué ciudades y regiones la educación de los individuos depende menos de la de sus padres? Además, se estudia si los migrantes tuvieron mayor o menor movilidad. Para abordar el tema se emplean siete índices de movilidad y dos encuestas diferentes. Los resultados son sensibles a los índices, lo que confirmaque en las investigaciones sobre movilidad es indispensable construir varios.Hay razones para creer que los resultados de algunos índices son más confiables. De acuerdo con aquéllos, hubo mayor movilidad en las ciudades y regiones endonde más aumentó el promedio de educación.

Works councils: an agency perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager’s information on behalf of the workforce, but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we consider that workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In order to deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they can be expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusion makes contingent payments costly and reduces workers’ payoffs. Second, when elections are the exclusive mechanisms to align works councils’ interest, only well compensated representatives would face an intertemporal tradeoff between accepting management’s transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behavior with management and works councils will try to behave on the employees’ interest.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.

Natural resources, redistribution and Human capital formation

How do resource booms affect human capital accumulation? We exploit time and spatial variation generated by the commodity boom across local governments in Peru to measure the effect of natural resources on human capital formation. We explore the effect of both mining production and tax revenues on test scores, finding a substantial and statistically significant effect for the latter. Transfers to local governments from mining tax revenues are linked to an increase in math test scores of around 0.23 standard deviations. We find that the hiring of permanent teachers as well as the increases in parental employment and improvements in health outcomes of adults and children are plausible mechanisms for such large effect on learning. These findings suggest that redistributive policies could facilitate the accumulation of human capital in resource abundant developing countries as a way to avoid the natural resources curse.