20 resultados para Shapley value
em Université de Montréal, Canada
Resumo:
We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.
Resumo:
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency.
Resumo:
We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.
Resumo:
Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal
Resumo:
Rapport de stage (maîtrise en finance mathématique et computationnelle)
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.
Resumo:
Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.
Resumo:
Rapport de recherche
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.
Resumo:
Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.
Resumo:
Dans cet article je considère un récent défi à l’égalitarisme développé par Michael Huemer. Le challenge de Huemer prend la forme d’un dilemme : les égalitaristes peuvent être soit atomistes soit holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur de l’égalité. S’ils sont atomistes, alors ils doivent acceptés que l’égalité n’ait pas de valeur intrinsèque ; s’ils sont holistes, alors leur point ce vue est inconsistant avec une intuitive mais très plausible forme de conséquentialisme. Je montre que ce dilemme ne doit pas perturber les égalitaristes. Ils peuvent être holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur et adhérer en même temps au conséqeuntialisme.