Le problème de la souveraineté politique chez Thomas Hobbes

Sur le rapport de Hobbes au monarchisme, les études hobbesiennes font largement consensus : tout au long de sa vie, le théoricien du Léviathan aurait été, disent-elles, un monarchiste convaincu, fidèle à la dynastie anglaise des Stuart. Or le présent travail cherche à ébranler la rigueur de cette thèse traditionnelle. Acquis aux recherches contextualistes de J. Collins, qui ont déjà montré les affinités hobbesiennes à l’égard des politiques anticléricales de Cromwell, il souhaite montrer que de telles affinités dissimulent une intention politique beaucoup plus profonde, celle de la réalisation politique des principes moraux de la loi naturelle. Dans cette perspective, Hobbes serait, sous l’impulsion de la méthode résolutive-compositive, non seulement l’inventeur du premier droit naturel subjectif dans l’histoire de la philosophie politique, mais aussi le théoricien d’une loi naturelle inédite, édifiée sur la rationalité des volontés individuelles. Ainsi, par la publication du Léviathan en 1651, Hobbes n’aurait pas exprimé ses affinités politiques pour la monarchie anglaise renversée : il aurait plutôt dévoilé son projet politique d’instituer une souveraineté politique qui repose sur le consentement rationnel de tous les sujets. Monarchiste dans sa jeunesse, Hobbes serait alors devenu, en élaborant sa science politique, partisan d’un régime politique que l’on pourrait nommer démocratie de la raison positive.

Political Sophistication and Vote Intention Switching

This article investigates the link between political sophistication and electoral volatility. Showing that there is disagreement in the literature on whether switching party preferences is related to low or high levels of political sophistication, it is then argued that the effect of sophistication on vote switching might differ depending on when switching is measured. The effect of timing on volatility is investigated by means of the Short-term panel of the 2009 German Longitudinal Election Study. Results indicate that timing indeed matters, while sophistication increases the probability of switching parties before the campaign, the effect of political sophistication becomes more negative as Election Day draws near.

Electoral Volatility, Political Sophistication, Trust and Efficacy

In this article we investigate voter volatility and analyze the causes and motives of switching vote intentions. We test two main sets of variables linked to volatility in literature; political sophistication and ‘political (dis)satisfaction’. Results show that voters with low levels of political efficacy tend to switch more often, both within a campaign and between elections. In the analysis we differentiate between campaign volatility and inter-election volatility and by doing so show that the dynamics of a campaign have a profound impact on volatility. The campaign period is when the lowly sophisticated switch their vote intention. Those with higher levels of interest in politics have switched their intention before the campaign has started. The data for this analysis are from the three wave PartiRep Belgian Election Study (2009).

Guide à l'intention du personnel enseignant et de recherche 2003

Guide des collections et services offerts par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

Rapport de recherche

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Guide à l'intention de la communauté enseignante et de recherche 2006

Guide des collections et services offerts à la communauté enseignante et de recherche par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

Rapport de recherche

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

Rapport de recherche

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.