Optimisation de la préparation des infirmières œuvrant aux soins intensifs en vue de leur certification canadienne

Rapport de stage présenté à la Faculté des sciences infirmières en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître ès sciences (M.Sc.) en sciences infirmières option expertise-conseil en soins infirmiers

Financial Risk Management, Firm Structure & Valuation, an Empirical Analysis.

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Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

Explaining the Persistence of Commodity Prices

This paper extends the Competitive Storage Model by incorporating prominent features of the production process and financial markets. A major limitation of this basic model is that it cannot successfully explain the degree of serial correlation observed in actual data. The proposed extensions build on the observation that in order to generate a high degree of price persistence, a model must incorporate features such that agents are willing to hold stocks more often than predicted by the basic model. We therefore allow unique characteristics of the production and trading mechanisms to provide the required incentives. Specifically, the proposed models introduce (i) gestation lags in production with heteroskedastic supply shocks, (ii) multiperiod forward contracts, and (iii) a convenience return to inventory holding. The rational expectations solutions for twelve commodities are numerically solved. Simulations are then employed to assess the effects of the above extensions on the time series properties of commodity prices. Results indicate that each of the features above partially account for the persistence and occasional spikes observed in actual data. Evidence is presented that the precautionary demand for stocks might play a substantial role in the dynamics of commodity prices.

Uncovering Financial Markets Beliefs About Inflation Targets

This paper exploits the term structure of interest rates to develop testable economic restrictions on the joint process of long-term interest rates and inflation when the latter is subject to a targeting policy by the Central Bank. Two competing models that econometrically describe agents’ inferences about inflation targets are developed and shown to generate distinct predictions on the behavior of interest rates. In an empirical application to the Canadian inflation target zone, results indicate that agents perceive the band to be substantially narrower than officially announced and asymmetric around the stated mid-point. The latter result (i) suggests that the monetary authority attaches different weights to positive and negative deviations from the central target, and (ii) challenges on empirical grounds the assumption, frequently made in the literature, that the policy maker’s loss function is symmetric (usually a quadratic function) around a desired inflation value.

Jumps in the Volatility of Financial Markets.

Recent work suggests that the conditional variance of financial returns may exhibit sudden jumps. This paper extends a non-parametric procedure to detect discontinuities in otherwise continuous functions of a random variable developed by Delgado and Hidalgo (1996) to higher conditional moments, in particular the conditional variance. Simulation results show that the procedure provides reasonable estimates of the number and location of jumps. This procedure detects several jumps in the conditional variance of daily returns on the S&P 500 index.

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

The role of financial markets in the stabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon.

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