Uncovering Financial Markets Beliefs About Inflation Targets

This paper exploits the term structure of interest rates to develop testable economic restrictions on the joint process of long-term interest rates and inflation when the latter is subject to a targeting policy by the Central Bank. Two competing models that econometrically describe agents’ inferences about inflation targets are developed and shown to generate distinct predictions on the behavior of interest rates. In an empirical application to the Canadian inflation target zone, results indicate that agents perceive the band to be substantially narrower than officially announced and asymmetric around the stated mid-point. The latter result (i) suggests that the monetary authority attaches different weights to positive and negative deviations from the central target, and (ii) challenges on empirical grounds the assumption, frequently made in the literature, that the policy maker’s loss function is symmetric (usually a quadratic function) around a desired inflation value.

Economic Development under Alternative Trade Regimes

How does openness affect economic development? This question is answered in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, where countries have technological differences that are both sector-neutral and specific to the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark case of trade in credit markets only, consider (i) a complete restriction of trade, and (ii) a full liberalization of trade. The first change decreases the cross-sectional dispersion of incomes only slightly, and produces a relatively small welfare loss. The second change, instead, decreases dispersion by a significant amount, and produces a very large welfare gain.

Jumps in the Volatility of Financial Markets.

Recent work suggests that the conditional variance of financial returns may exhibit sudden jumps. This paper extends a non-parametric procedure to detect discontinuities in otherwise continuous functions of a random variable developed by Delgado and Hidalgo (1996) to higher conditional moments, in particular the conditional variance. Simulation results show that the procedure provides reasonable estimates of the number and location of jumps. This procedure detects several jumps in the conditional variance of daily returns on the S&P 500 index.

The role of financial markets in the stabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon.

Rapport de recherche

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

Finance and Growth : Empirical Evidence from Developing Countries, 1960-1990

This paper examines the empirical relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth using cross-country and panel data regressions for 69 developing countries for the 1960-1990 period. The main results are : (i) financial development is a significant determinant of economic growth, as it has been shown in cross-sectional regressions; (ii) financial markets cease to exert any effect on real activity when the temporal dimension is introduced in the regressions. The paradox may be explained, in the case of developing countries, by the lack of an entrepreneurial private sector capable to transform the available funds into profitable projects; (iii) the effect of financial development on economic growth is channeled mainly through an increase in investment efficiency.

On the Individual Optimality of Economic Integration

Ce document est une version antérieure du document "On the Individual Optimality of Economic Integration", nov. 2015 : http://hdl.handle.net/1866/12794

La réglementation des risques associés à la gouvernance des régimes complémentaires de retraite.

Dans un univers financier en turbulence, les régimes de retraite privés gèrent une part importante de l’épargne-retraite des Québécois en conciliant les intérêts divergents de différents acteurs : employeurs, participants actifs, retraités, autres intervenants à la gestion. Considérant la complexité des techniques et des instruments financiers, la gestion des régimes de retraite est devenue, pour les administrateurs de régime, un exercice périlleux. Dans ce contexte, la réglementation des risques associés à la gouvernance des régimes de retraite constitue aujourd’hui un enjeu socio-économique important pour assurer leur pérennité dans notre système de retraite. Le cadre légal et réglementaire applicables aux régimes de retraite découle essentiellement de la Loi sur les régimes complémentaires de retraite et ses règlements ainsi que du Code civil du Québec. En s’appuyant sur des études économiques et financières, cette étude analyse le régime juridique du fonctionnement et de la gouvernance des régimes de retraite par les comités de retraite et propose des améliorations en utilisant une approche fondée sur le risque. À titre préliminaire, pour situer dans le temps la problématique actuelle, cette étude présente l’évolution des régimes de retraite privés de l’origine à nos jours en se concentrant sur les règles affectant leur administration. Ensuite, dans une première partie, le cadre théorique sur lequel s’appuie notre étude est exposé. Les régimes de retraite privés y sont présentés comme un intermédiaire opérant sur les marchés financiers par le biais d’autres intermédiaires : les gestionnaires de portefeuilles, les courtiers en valeurs et les gardiens de valeurs. Il s’applique aux régimes de retraite des principes de gouvernance d’entreprise particuliers fondés sur les risques encourus par l’organisation. Cette partie conduit au développement d’une théorie de l’agence des régimes de retraite privés impliquant notamment des relations fondamentales entre l’employeur, les participants et bénéficiaires et le(s) gestionnaire(s) de portefeuille. Dans la seconde partie, l’environnement légal et réglementaire de la gouvernance applicable des régimes de retraite privés est présenté et la structure incitative des règles analysée à la lumière de travaux économiques théoriques et empiriques. Après avoir expliqué les principaux contrats du régime de retraite, un examen de certains mécanismes légaux est effectué : les devoirs généraux des administrateurs, les règles de composition, le fonctionnement interne et l’obligation de rendre compte. Cette étude permet de proposer une série de recommandations visant à améliorer la gouvernance et le fonctionnement des régimes de retraite privés.

On the individual optimality of economic integration

Which countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. Consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union solves both frictions among member countries. We uncover conditions on initial incomes and net foreign assets of potential union members such that forming a union is welfare-improving over standing alone in the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, unions in our model occur (i) relatively infrequently, and (ii) emerge more likely among homogeneous countries, and (iii) rich countries.

On the individual optimality of economic integration

Ce document est une version mise-à-jour du document "On the individual optimality of economic integration", mars 2011 : http://hdl.handle.net/1866/4829