On the individual optimality of economic integration


Autoria(s): Castro, Rui; Koumtingué, Nelnan
Data(s)

17/12/2015

17/12/2015

01/11/2015

Resumo

Ce document est une version mise-à-jour du document "On the individual optimality of economic integration", mars 2011 : http://hdl.handle.net/1866/4829

Which countries find it optimal to form an economic union? We emphasize the risk-sharing benefits of economic integration. Consider an endowment world economy model, where international financial markets are incomplete and contracts not enforceable. A union solves both frictions among member countries. We uncover conditions on initial incomes and net foreign assets of potential union members such that forming a union is welfare-improving over standing alone in the world economy. Consistently with evidence on economic integration, unions in our model occur (i) relatively infrequently, and (ii) emerge more likely among homogeneous countries, and (iii) rich countries.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/1866/12794

Idioma(s)

en

Relação

Cahier de recherche #2015-07;

http://hdl.handle.net/1866/4829

Palavras-Chave #Incomplete markets #Endogenous borrowing constraints #Risk sharing #Economic integration
Tipo

Article