The Effect of Agricultural Zoning on Land Prices, Quebec, 1975-1981

Dans Ce Texte Nous Examinons les Effets de la Loi du Zonage Agricole du Quebec, Proclame En Decembre 1978 Sur le Prix du Sol Dans une Banlieu de Montreal. a L'aide de Donnees Sur les Transactions Normales Faites a Carignan et Saint-Mathias de 1975 a 1981, Nous Estimons, a L'aide des Moindres Carrees Ordinaires, une Equation de Determination du Prix Par Acre Avec Comme Variables Independantes la Dimension du Lot, la Distance de Montreal, les Services Disponibles (Egouts,...) et le Zonage Agricole (Ou Non) du Sol. Nos Resultats Nous Indiquent Que le Zonage Agricole Reduit le Prix D'un Acre de Sol.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

A model of dynamic liquidity contracts

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when both parties are credit constrained. Borrowers repeatedly have projects to undertake and need external financing. Lenders can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers can renege any period. I show that equilibrium contracts feature interesting dynamics: the economy exhibits efficient investment cycles; absence of perfect enforcement and shortage of capital skew the cycles toward states of liquidity drought; credit is rationed if either the lender has too little capital or if the borrower has too little collateral. This paper's technical contribution is its demonstration of the existence and characterization of financial contracts that are solutions to a non-convex dynamic programming problem.

The reform of electronic consumer contracts in Europe: towards an effective legal framework?

Christine Riefa is a lecturer in Consumer Law and Intellectual Property Law at Brunel University in the UK. She is an elected board member of the International Association of Consumer Law and an academic correspondent to the Euro-American Chair for the legal protection of consumers (University of Cantabria, Spain). In 2009-2010, Dr Riefa is a Fulbright EU Scholar-in-Residence at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Ohio USA. A first version of this article was presented at the Summer School in Consumer Law, organised by the GREDICC (Groupe de recherche en droit international et comparé de la consummation), UQAM, Montréal, 29th June – 4th July 2009.

Adaptation of agriculture to climate change in Quebec : the co-construction of agricultural policies in the RCM of Haut-Richelieu

Les facteurs climatiques ainsi bien que les facteurs non-climatiques doivent être pris en considération dans le processus d'adaptation de l'agriculture aux changements et à la variabilité climatiques (CVC). Ce changement de paradigme met l'agent humain au centre du processus d'adaptation, ce qui peut conduire à une maladaptation. Suite aux débats sur les changements climatiques qui ont attiré l'attention scientifique et publique dans les années 1980 et 1990, l'agriculture canadienne est devenue un des points focaux de plusieurs études pionnières sur les CVC, un phénomène principalement dû à l’effet anthropique. Pour faire face aux CVC, ce n’est pas seulement la mitigation qui est importante mais aussi l’adaptation. Quand il s'agit de l'adaptation, c'est plutôt la variabilité climatique qui nous intéresse que simplement les augmentations moyennes des températures. L'objectif général de ce mémoire de maîtrise est d'améliorer la compréhension des processus d'adaptation et de construction de la capacité d'adaptation ai niveau de la ferme et de la communauté agricole à travers un processus ascendant, c’est-à-dire en utilisant l'approche de co-construction (qui peut également être considéré comme une stratégie d'adaptation en soi), pour développer une gestion et des outils de planification appropriés aux parties prenantes pour accroître ainsi la capacité d'adaptation de la communauté agricole. Pour y arriver, l'approche grounded theory est utilisée. Les résultats consistent de cinq catégories interdépendantes de codes élargis, conceptuellement distinctes et avec un plus grand niveau d'abstraction. La MRC du Haut-Richelieu a été choisie comme étude de cas en raison de plusieurs de ses dimensions agricoles, à part de ses conditions biophysiques favorables. 15 entrevues ont été menées avec les agriculteurs. Les résultats montrent que si certains agriculteurs ont reconnu les côtés positifs et négatifs des CVC, d’autres sont très optimistes à ce sujet comme se ils ne voient que le côté positif; d'où la nécessité de voir les deux côtés des CVC. Aussi, il y a encore une certaine incertitude liée aux CVC, qui vient de la désinformation et la désensibilisation des agriculteurs principalement en ce qui concerne les causes des CVC ainsi que la nature des événements climatiques. En outre, et compte tenu du fait que l'adaptation a plusieurs caractéristiques et types, il existe de nombreux types d'adaptation qui impliquent à la fois l'acteur privé et le gouvernement. De plus, les stratégies d'adaptation doivent être élaborées conjointement par les agriculteurs en concert avec d'autres acteurs, à commencer par les agronomes, car ils servent en tant que relais important entre les agriculteurs et d'autres parties prenantes telles que les institutions publiques et les entreprises privées.