Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

Strategy-proof tie-breaking

We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained efficient, matching. A priority structure for which these two requirements are compatible is called solvable. For the general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders,we introduce three simple necessary conditions on the priority structure. We show that these conditions completely characterize solvable environments within the class of indifferences at the bottom (IB) environments, where ties occur only at the bottom of the priority structure. This generalizes and unifies previously known results on solvable and unsolvable environments established in school choice, housing markets and house allocation with existing tenants. We show how the previously known solvable cases can be viewed as extreme cases of solvable environments. For sufficiency of our conditions we introduce a version of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with exogenous and preference-based tie-breaking.

Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying ‘individual rationality’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘strategy-proofness’, then for any problem for which the gamma-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a gamma-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the gamma-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.

On the design of customized risk measures in insurance, the problem of capital allocation and the theory of fluctuations for Lévy processes

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions quelques problèmes fondamentaux en mathématiques financières et actuarielles, ainsi que leurs applications. Cette thèse est constituée de trois contributions portant principalement sur la théorie de la mesure de risques, le problème de l’allocation du capital et la théorie des fluctuations. Dans le chapitre 2, nous construisons de nouvelles mesures de risque cohérentes et étudions l’allocation de capital dans le cadre de la théorie des risques collectifs. Pour ce faire, nous introduisons la famille des "mesures de risque entropique cumulatifs" (Cumulative Entropic Risk Measures). Le chapitre 3 étudie le problème du portefeuille optimal pour le Entropic Value at Risk dans le cas où les rendements sont modélisés par un processus de diffusion à sauts (Jump-Diffusion). Dans le chapitre 4, nous généralisons la notion de "statistiques naturelles de risque" (natural risk statistics) au cadre multivarié. Cette extension non-triviale produit des mesures de risque multivariées construites à partir des données financiéres et de données d’assurance. Le chapitre 5 introduit les concepts de "drawdown" et de la "vitesse d’épuisement" (speed of depletion) dans la théorie de la ruine. Nous étudions ces concepts pour des modeles de risque décrits par une famille de processus de Lévy spectrallement négatifs.

The berth allocation problem at port terminals : a column generation framework

Le problème d'allocation de postes d'amarrage (PAPA) est l'un des principaux problèmes de décision aux terminaux portuaires qui a été largement étudié. Dans des recherches antérieures, le PAPA a été reformulé comme étant un problème de partitionnement généralisé (PPG) et résolu en utilisant un solveur standard. Les affectations (colonnes) ont été générées a priori de manière statique et fournies comme entrée au modèle %d'optimisation. Cette méthode est capable de fournir une solution optimale au problème pour des instances de tailles moyennes. Cependant, son inconvénient principal est l'explosion du nombre d'affectations avec l'augmentation de la taille du problème, qui fait en sorte que le solveur d'optimisation se trouve à court de mémoire. Dans ce mémoire, nous nous intéressons aux limites de la reformulation PPG. Nous présentons un cadre de génération de colonnes où les affectations sont générées de manière dynamique pour résoudre les grandes instances du PAPA. Nous proposons un algorithme de génération de colonnes qui peut être facilement adapté pour résoudre toutes les variantes du PAPA en se basant sur différents attributs spatiaux et temporels. Nous avons testé notre méthode sur un modèle d'allocation dans lequel les postes d'amarrage sont considérés discrets, l'arrivée des navires est dynamique et finalement les temps de manutention dépendent des postes d'amarrage où les bateaux vont être amarrés. Les résultats expérimentaux des tests sur un ensemble d'instances artificielles indiquent que la méthode proposée permet de fournir une solution optimale ou proche de l'optimalité même pour des problème de très grandes tailles en seulement quelques minutes.

Le financement des municipalités par le gouvernement fédéral au Canada et aux États-Unis: transferts et facteurs d'allocation.

Rapport de recherche

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Consistent House Allocation

In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e. it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe- for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results

We survey recent axiomatic results in the theory of cost-sharing. In this litterature, a method computes the individual cost shares assigned to the users of a facility for any profile of demands and any monotonic cost function. We discuss two theories taking radically different views of the asymmetries of the cost function. In the full responsibility theory, each agent is accountable for the part of the costs that can be unambiguously separated and attributed to her own demand. In the partial responsibility theory, the asymmetries of the cost function have no bearing on individual cost shares, only the differences in demand levels matter. We describe several invariance and monotonicity properties that reflect both normative and strategic concerns. We uncover a number of logical trade-offs between our axioms, and derive axiomatic characterizations of a handful of intuitive methods: in the full responsibility approach, the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidyfree serial methods, and in the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method and the family of quasi-proportional methods.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.