Distortionary Taxation and Labor Supply: Evidence from Canada.

This paper examines empirically the effects of distortionary taxation on labor supply using a general equilibrium framework. The long-term relations predicted by the model are derived and tested using Canadian data between 1966 and 1993. While the cointegrating predictions of the model without taxation are rejected, the ones of the model with labor taxation are not. Persistent labor tax rate increases appear to play an important role in the observed downward trend in hours worked.

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Altruism, Intergenerational Transfers of Time and Bequests

This paper uses a standard two-period overlapping generation model to examine the behavior of an economy where both intergenerational transfers of time and bequests are available. While bequests have been examined extensively, time transfers have received little or no attention in the literature. Assuming a log-linear utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function, we derive an explicit solution for the dynamics and show that altruistic intergenerational time transfers can take place in presence of a binding non-negativity constraint on bequests. We also show that with either type of transfers capital is an increasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. However, while with time transfers the labor supply of the young increases with the degree of altruism, with bequests it may decrease

Méthodes d’inférence exactes pour un modèle de régression avec erreurs AR(2) gaussiennes

Ce texte propose des méthodes d’inférence exactes (tests et régions de confiance) sur des modèles de régression linéaires avec erreurs autocorrélées suivant un processus autorégressif d’ordre deux [AR(2)], qui peut être non stationnaire. L’approche proposée est une généralisation de celle décrite dans Dufour (1990) pour un modèle de régression avec erreurs AR(1) et comporte trois étapes. Premièrement, on construit une région de confiance exacte pour le vecteur des coefficients du processus autorégressif (φ). Cette région est obtenue par inversion de tests d’indépendance des erreurs sur une forme transformée du modèle contre des alternatives de dépendance aux délais un et deux. Deuxièmement, en exploitant la dualité entre tests et régions de confiance (inversion de tests), on détermine une région de confiance conjointe pour le vecteur φ et un vecteur d’intérêt M de combinaisons linéaires des coefficients de régression du modèle. Troisièmement, par une méthode de projection, on obtient des intervalles de confiance «marginaux» ainsi que des tests à bornes exacts pour les composantes de M. Ces méthodes sont appliquées à des modèles du stock de monnaie (M2) et du niveau des prix (indice implicite du PNB) américains

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Tests multiples simulés et tests de normalité basés sur plusieurs moments dans les modèles de régression

Cet article illustre l’applicabilité des méthodes de rééchantillonnage dans le cadre des tests multiples (simultanés), pour divers problèmes économétriques. Les hypothèses simultanées sont une conséquence habituelle de la théorie économique, de sorte que le contrôle de la probabilité de rejet de combinaisons de tests est un problème que l’on rencontre fréquemment dans divers contextes économétriques et statistiques. À ce sujet, on sait que le fait d’ignorer le caractère conjoint des hypothèses multiples peut faire en sorte que le niveau de la procédure globale dépasse considérablement le niveau désiré. Alors que la plupart des méthodes d’inférence multiple sont conservatrices en présence de statistiques non-indépendantes, les tests que nous proposons visent à contrôler exactement le niveau de signification. Pour ce faire, nous considérons des critères de test combinés proposés initialement pour des statistiques indépendantes. En appliquant la méthode des tests de Monte Carlo, nous montrons comment ces méthodes de combinaison de tests peuvent s’appliquer à de tels cas, sans recours à des approximations asymptotiques. Après avoir passé en revue les résultats antérieurs sur ce sujet, nous montrons comment une telle méthodologie peut être utilisée pour construire des tests de normalité basés sur plusieurs moments pour les erreurs de modèles de régression linéaires. Pour ce problème, nous proposons une généralisation valide à distance finie du test asymptotique proposé par Kiefer et Salmon (1983) ainsi que des tests combinés suivant les méthodes de Tippett et de Pearson-Fisher. Nous observons empiriquement que les procédures de test corrigées par la méthode des tests de Monte Carlo ne souffrent pas du problème de biais (ou sous-rejet) souvent rapporté dans cette littérature – notamment contre les lois platikurtiques – et permettent des gains sensibles de puissance par rapport aux méthodes combinées usuelles.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

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