Le climat social des écoles secondaires, les problèmes de comportement en classe et les comportements antisociaux

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Influences du soutien social et du stress sur le comportement maternel d'adolescentes en interaction avec leur enfant de 24 mois : une analyse longitudinale et transactionnelle

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Intervention de groupe auprès d'enfants présentant des comportement sexuels problématiques : étude exploratoire

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Énergétique des vortex et comportement magnétique de la supraconductivité SO(5)

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Comportement et rendement scolaire au début du primaire : les attributions causales et d'intentions, des processus en jeu?

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Impacts potentiels d'une hausse des concentrations atmosphériques des gaz à effet de serre sur le comportement hydrologique de trois bassins versants du Québec

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

La relation entre l'utilisation du temps et le comportement des élèves en classe de musique au premier cycle du secondaire

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Stress périnatal : conséquences sur le comportement cognitif et émotionnel de la progéniture chez le rat

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Reported Job Satisfaction : What Does It Mean?

By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an \"economic\" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The \"posterior choice\" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural-Change Models

In a recent paper, Bai and Perron (1998) considered theoretical issues related to the limiting distribution of estimators and test statistics in the linear model with multiple structural changes. In this companion paper, we consider practical issues for the empirical applications of the procedures. We first address the problem of estimation of the break dates and present an efficient algorithm to obtain global minimizers of the sum of squared residuals. This algorithm is based on the principle of dynamic programming and requires at most least-squares operations of order O(T 2) for any number of breaks. Our method can be applied to both pure and partial structural-change models. Secondly, we consider the problem of forming confidence intervals for the break dates under various hypotheses about the structure of the data and the errors across segments. Third, we address the issue of testing for structural changes under very general conditions on the data and the errors. Fourth, we address the issue of estimating the number of breaks. We present simulation results pertaining to the behavior of the estimators and tests in finite samples. Finally, a few empirical applications are presented to illustrate the usefulness of the procedures. All methods discussed are implemented in a GAUSS program available upon request for non-profit academic use.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Sector-Specific Training and Mobility in Germany

This article studies mobility patterns of German workers in light of a model of sector-specific human capital. Furthermore, I employ and describe little-used data on continuous on-the-job training occurring after apprenticeships. Results are presented describing the incidence and duration of continuous training. Continuous training is quite common, despite the high incidence of apprenticeships which precedes this part of a worker's career. Most previous studies have only distinguished between firm-specific and general human capital, usually concluding that training was general. Inconsistent with those conclusions, I show that German men are more likely to find a job within the same sector if they have received continuous training in that sector. These results are similar to those obtained for young U.S. workers, and suggest that sector-specific capital is an important feature of very different labor markets. In addition, they suggest that the observed effect of training on mobility is sensible to the state of the business cycle, indicating a more complex interaction between supply and demand that most theoretical models allow for.