Stereological analysis of the rat and monkey amygdala

The amygdala is part of a neural network that contributes to the regulation of emotional behaviors. Rodents, especially rats, are used extensively as model organisms to decipher the functions of specific amygdala nuclei, in particular in relation to fear and emotional learning. Analysis of the role of the nonhuman primate amygdala in these functions has lagged work in the rodent but provides evidence for conservation of basic functions across species. Here we provide quantitative information regarding the morphological characteristics of the main amygdala nuclei in rats and monkeys, including neuron and glial cell numbers, neuronal soma size, and individual nuclei volumes. The volumes of the lateral, basal, and accessory basal nuclei were, respectively, 32, 39, and 39 times larger in monkeys than in rats. In contrast, the central and medial nuclei were only 8 and 4 times larger in monkeys than in rats. The numbers of neurons in the lateral, basal, and accessory basal nuclei were 14, 11, and 16 times greater in monkeys than in rats, whereas the numbers of neurons in the central and medial nuclei were only 2.3 and 1.5 times greater in monkeys than in rats. Neuron density was between 2.4 and 3.7 times lower in monkeys than in rats, whereas glial density was only between 1.1 and 1.7 times lower in monkeys than in rats. We compare our data in rats and monkeys with those previously published in humans and discuss the theoretical and functional implications that derive from our quantitative structural findings.

Evolution of decision-making and learning under fluctuating social environments

The capacity to learn to associate sensory perceptions with appropriate motor actions underlies the success of many animal species, from insects to humans. The evolutionary significance of learning has long been a subject of interest for evolutionary biologists who emphasize the bene¬fit yielded by learning under changing environmental conditions, where it is required to flexibly switch from one behavior to another. However, two unsolved questions are particularly impor¬tant for improving our knowledge of the evolutionary advantages provided by learning, and are addressed in the present work. First, because it is possible to learn the wrong behavior when a task is too complex, the learning rules and their underlying psychological characteristics that generate truly adaptive behavior must be identified with greater precision, and must be linked to the specific ecological problems faced by each species. A framework for predicting behavior from the definition of a learning rule is developed here. Learning rules capture cognitive features such as the tendency to explore, or the ability to infer rewards associated to unchosen actions. It is shown that these features interact in a non-intuitive way to generate adaptive behavior in social interactions where individuals affect each other's fitness. Such behavioral predictions are used in an evolutionary model to demonstrate that, surprisingly, simple trial-and-error learn¬ing is not always outcompeted by more computationally demanding inference-based learning, when population members interact in pairwise social interactions. A second question in the evolution of learning is its link with and relative advantage compared to other simpler forms of phenotypic plasticity. After providing a conceptual clarification on the distinction between genetically determined vs. learned responses to environmental stimuli, a new factor in the evo¬lution of learning is proposed: environmental complexity. A simple mathematical model shows that a measure of environmental complexity, the number of possible stimuli in one's environ¬ment, is critical for the evolution of learning. In conclusion, this work opens roads for modeling interactions between evolving species and their environment in order to predict how natural se¬lection shapes animals' cognitive abilities. - La capacité d'apprendre à associer des sensations perceptives à des actions motrices appropriées est sous-jacente au succès évolutif de nombreuses espèces, depuis les insectes jusqu'aux êtres hu¬mains. L'importance évolutive de l'apprentissage est depuis longtemps un sujet d'intérêt pour les biologistes de l'évolution, et ces derniers mettent l'accent sur le bénéfice de l'apprentissage lorsque les conditions environnementales sont changeantes, car dans ce cas il est nécessaire de passer de manière flexible d'un comportement à l'autre. Cependant, deux questions non résolues sont importantes afin d'améliorer notre savoir quant aux avantages évolutifs procurés par l'apprentissage. Premièrement, puisqu'il est possible d'apprendre un comportement incorrect quand une tâche est trop complexe, les règles d'apprentissage qui permettent d'atteindre un com¬portement réellement adaptatif doivent être identifiées avec une plus grande précision, et doivent être mises en relation avec les problèmes écologiques spécifiques rencontrés par chaque espèce. Un cadre théorique ayant pour but de prédire le comportement à partir de la définition d'une règle d'apprentissage est développé ici. Il est démontré que les caractéristiques cognitives, telles que la tendance à explorer ou la capacité d'inférer les récompenses liées à des actions non ex¬périmentées, interagissent de manière non-intuitive dans les interactions sociales pour produire des comportements adaptatifs. Ces prédictions comportementales sont utilisées dans un modèle évolutif afin de démontrer que, de manière surprenante, l'apprentissage simple par essai-et-erreur n'est pas toujours battu par l'apprentissage basé sur l'inférence qui est pourtant plus exigeant en puissance de calcul, lorsque les membres d'une population interagissent socialement par pair. Une deuxième question quant à l'évolution de l'apprentissage concerne son lien et son avantage relatif vis-à-vis d'autres formes plus simples de plasticité phénotypique. Après avoir clarifié la distinction entre réponses aux stimuli génétiquement déterminées ou apprises, un nouveau fac¬teur favorisant l'évolution de l'apprentissage est proposé : la complexité environnementale. Un modèle mathématique permet de montrer qu'une mesure de la complexité environnementale - le nombre de stimuli rencontrés dans l'environnement - a un rôle fondamental pour l'évolution de l'apprentissage. En conclusion, ce travail ouvre de nombreuses perspectives quant à la mo¬délisation des interactions entre les espèces en évolution et leur environnement, dans le but de comprendre comment la sélection naturelle façonne les capacités cognitives des animaux.

The handaxe and the microscope: individual and social learning in a multidimensional model of adaptation

When individuals learn by trial-and-error, they perform randomly chosen actions and then reinforce those actions that led to a high payoff. However, individuals do not always have to physically perform an action in order to evaluate its consequences. Rather, they may be able to mentally simulate actions and their consequences without actually performing them. Such fictitious learners can select actions with high payoffs without making long chains of trial-and-error learning. Here, we analyze the evolution of an n-dimensional cultural trait (or artifact) by learning, in a payoff landscape with a single optimum. We derive the stochastic learning dynamics of the distance to the optimum in trait space when choice between alternative artifacts follows the standard logit choice rule. We show that for both trial-and-error and fictitious learners, the learning dynamics stabilize at an approximate distance of root n/(2 lambda(e)) away from the optimum, where lambda(e) is an effective learning performance parameter depending on the learning rule under scrutiny. Individual learners are thus unlikely to reach the optimum when traits are complex (n large), and so face a barrier to further improvement of the artifact. We show, however, that this barrier can be significantly reduced in a large population of learners performing payoff-biased social learning, in which case lambda(e) becomes proportional to population size. Overall, our results illustrate the effects of errors in learning, levels of cognition, and population size for the evolution of complex cultural traits. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Social and individual learning of helping in humans and other species.

Helping behaviors can be innate, learned by copying others (cultural transmission) or individually learned de novo. These three possibilities are often entangled in debates on the evolution of helping in humans. Here we discuss their similarities and differences, and argue that evolutionary biologists underestimate the role of individual learning in the expression of helping behaviors in humans.

The motivation to learn as a self-presentation tool among Swiss high school students : The moderating role of mastery goals' perceived social value on learning

Although it has been assumed that the motivation to learn - or mastery goal endorsement - positively predicts learning achievement, most empirical findings fail to demonstrate this relationship. In the present research, conducted in a Swiss high school, we adopted a social value approach to test the hypothesis that adolescent students' mastery goals do in fact predict learning, but only if these goals are perceived as highly useful for scholarly success (high social utility), and are not endorsed as a means to be appreciated by the teachers (low social desirability), a finding that has previously been observed among college students and on teacher-graded achievement measures only. Results demonstrate that in spite of potential peculiarities of an adolescent population, individual differences in mastery goals' perceived social utility and desirability moderate the mastery goal endorsement-learning achievement relation. Findings are discussed with regard to both theory development and educational practice.

Policy learning in Europe : social policy and labour market reforms in 11 countries

This report compares policy learning processes in 11 European countries. Based on the country reports that were produced by the national teams of the INSPIRES project, this paper develops an argument that connects problem pressure and politicization to learning in different labor market innovations. In short, we argue that learning efforts are most likely to impact on policy change if there is a certain problem pressure that clearly necessitates political action. On the other hand, if problem pressure is very low, or so high that governments need to react immediately, chances are low that learning impacts on policy change. The second part of our argument contends that learning impacts on policy change especially if a problem is not very politicized, i.e. there are no main conflicts concerning a reform, because then, solutions are wound up in the search for a compromise. Our results confirm our first hypothesis regarding the connection between problem pressure and policy learning. Governments learn indeed up to a certain degree of problem pressure. However, once political action becomes really urgent, i.e. in anti-crisis policies, there is no time and room for learning. On the other hand, learning occurred independently from the politicization of problem. In fact, in countries that have a consensual political system, learning occurred before the decision on a reform, whereas in majoritarian systems, learning happened after the adoption of a policy during the process of implementation.

A behavioral study of alpha-1b adrenergic receptor knockout mice: increased reaction to novelty and selectively reduced learning capacities.

Knockout mice lacking the alpha-1b adrenergic receptor were tested in behavioral experiments. Reaction to novelty was first assessed in a simple test in which the time taken by the knockout mice and their littermate controls to enter a second compartment was compared. Then the mice were tested in an open field to which unknown objects were subsequently added. Special novelty was introduced by moving one of the familiar objects to another location in the open field. Spatial behavior and memory were further studied in a homing board test, and in the water maze. The alpha-1b knockout mice showed an enhanced reactivity to new situations. They were faster to enter the new environment, covered longer paths in the open field, and spent more time exploring the new objects. They reacted like controls to modification inducing spatial novelty. In the homing board test, both the knockout mice and the control mice seemed to use a combination of distant visual and proximal olfactory cues, showing place preference only if the two types of cues were redundant. In the water maze the alpha-1b knockout mice were unable to learn the task, which was confirmed in a probe trial without platform. They were perfectly able, however, to escape in a visible platform procedure. These results confirm previous findings showing that the noradrenergic pathway is important for the modulation of behaviors such as reaction to novelty and exploration, and suggest that this is mediated, at least partly, through the alpha-1b adrenergic receptors. The lack of alpha-1b adrenergic receptors in spatial orientation does not seem important in cue-rich tasks but may interfere with orientation in situations providing distant cues only.

Emotional intelligence: On definitions, neuroscience, and marshmallows

In his timely article, Cherniss offers his vision for the future of "Emotional Intelligence" (EI). However, his goal of clarifying the concept by distinguishing definitions from models and his support for "Emotional and Social Competence" (ESC) models will, in our opinion, not make the field advance. To be upfront, we agree that emotions are important for effective decision-making, leadership, performance and the like; however, at this time, EI and ESC have not yet demonstrated incremental validity over and above IQ and personality tests in meta-analyses (Harms & Credé, 2009; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). If there is a future for EI, we see it in the ability model of Mayer, Salovey and associates (e.g, Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000), which detractors and supporters agree holds the most promise (Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009; Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2008). With their use of quasi-objective scoring measures, the ability model grounds EI in existing frameworks of intelligence, thus differentiating itself from ESC models and their self-rated trait inventories. In fact, we do not see the value of ESC models: They overlap too much with current personality models to offer anything new for science and practice (Zeidner, et al., 2008). In this commentary we raise three concerns we have with Cherniss's suggestions for ESC models: (1) there are important conceptual problems in both the definition of ESC and the distinction of ESC from EI; (2) Cherniss's interpretation of neuroscience findings as supporting the constructs of EI and ESC is outdated, and (3) his interpretation of the famous marshmallow experiment as indicating the existence of ESCs is flawed. Building on the promise of ability models, we conclude by providing suggestions to improve research in EI.

The normative dimension of social life from a second-person perspective

This thesis argues that insofar as we want to account for the normative dimension of social life, we must be careful to avoid construing that normative dimension in such a way as to exclude that which the second-person perspective reveals is important to social life and our ability to participate in it.¦The second-person perspective reveals that social life ought to be understood as a mix or balance of the regular and the irregular, where, in addition, those one interacts with are always to some extent experienced as other in a way that is neither immediately, nor perhaps ultimately, understandable. For persons to be able to participate in social life, conceived of in this way, they must have abilities that allow them to be, to some extent, hesitant and tentative in their relations with others, and thus tolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty and unpredictability, and responsive to and capable of learning from the otherness of others in the course of interacting with them.¦Incorporating the second-person perspective means we have to make some changes to the way we think about the normative in general, and the normative dimension of social life in particular. It does not mean giving up on the distinction between the normative and the regular - that continues to be fundamentally important but it does mean not excluding, as part of social life and as worthy of explanation, all that which is irregular. A radical way of putting it would be to say that there must be a sense in which the irregular is part of the normative. A less radical way, and the way adopted by this thesis, is to say that any account of the normative dimension of social life must not be such as to exclude the importance of irregularity from social life. This will mean 1) not characterising conventions, norms and rules as determinants of appropriateness and inappropriateness; 2) not thinking of them as necessary; 3) not thinking of them as necessarily governing minds; and 4) not thinking of them as necessarily shared.¦-¦L'argument principal de la thèse est que, pour rendre compte de la dimension normative de la vie sociale, il faut veiller à ne pas exclure la perspective de la deuxième personne - une perspective importante pour comprendre la vie sociale et la capacité requise pour y participer.¦Cette perspective nous permet d'imaginer la vie sociale comme un mélange ou un équilibre entre le régulier et l'irrégulier, l'interaction entre des individus pouvant être appréhendée comme l'expérience de chaque personne avec «l'autre» d'une manière qui n'est pas immédiatement compréhensible, et qui ne peut pas, peut-être, être ultimement comprise. Pour participer à la vie sociale, l'on doit avoir la capacité de rester hésitant et «réactif» dans ses relations avec les autres, de rester ouvert à leur altérité et de tolérer l'ambiguïté, l'incertitude et l'imprévisibilité des interactions sociales.¦Adopter une perspective «à la deuxième personne» conduit à une autre manière de penser la normativité en général, et la dimension normative de la vie sociale en particulier. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il faut abandonner la distinction entre le normatif et le régulier - une distinction qui garde une importance fondamentale - mais qu'il faut reconnaître l'irrégulier comme faisant partie de la vie sociale et comme étant digne, en tant que tel, d'être expliqué. Une conception radicale pourrait même concevoir l'irrégulier comme faisant partie intégrante de la normativité. Une approche moins radicale, qui est celle adoptée dans cette thèse, est de dire que tout compte-rendu de la dimension normative de la vie sociale doit prendre en considération l'importance de l'irrégularité dans la vie sociale. Une telle approche implique que les conventions, normes et règles (1) ne déterminent pas ce qui est approprié ou inapproprié; (2) ne sont pas toujours nécessaires ; (3) ne gouvernent pas le fonctionnement de l'esprit ; et (4) ne sont pas nécessairement partagées.