Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

2010 Horizon Report: Iberoamerican Edition

The series of Horizon Reports is the most tangible outcome of the New Media Consortium's Horizon Project, a qualitative research endeavour launched in 2002 which identifies and describes the emergingtechnologies with the greatest potential to have an impact on teaching, learning, research and creative expression in the global education field. This volume,the 2010 Horizon Report: Iberoamerican Edition, focuses on research in countries of the iberoamerican region (including the whole of Latin America, Spainand Portugal) and in the field of higher education. The 2010 Horizon Report: Iberoamerican Edition is the first to offer this regional contextualization and hasbeen produced by the NMC and the eLearn Center of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC).

Relatório Horizon : edição Ibero-americana 2010

La sèrie d'informes Horizon és el resultat més tangible del Projecte Horizon del New Media Consortium, un esforç de recerca qualitativa iniciat el 2002, que identifica i descriu les tecnologies emergents amb més potencial d'impacte en l'ensenyament, l'aprenentatge, la recerca i la expressió creativa en l'àmbit educatiu global. Aquest volum, l'Informe Horizon 2010: Edició Iberoamericana, se centra en la investigació en els països de la regió Iberoamericana (incloent-hi tota Llatinoamèrica, Espanya i Portugal) i en l'àmbit de l'educació superior. L'Informe Horizon 2010: Edició Iberoamericana és el primer que ofereix aquesta contextualització regional i ha estat produït per l'NMC i el eLearn Center de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya.

Informe Horizon : edición iberoamericana 2010

La serie de Informes Horizon es el resultado más tangible del Proyecto Horizon del New Media Consortium, un esfuerzo de investigación cualitativa iniciado en 2002, que identifica y describe las tecnologías emergentes con mayor potencial de impacto en la enseñanza, el aprendizaje, la investigación y la expresión creativa en el ámbito educativo global. Este volumen, elInforme Horizon 2010: Edición Iberoamericana, centra la investigación en los países de la región Iberoamericana (incluyendo a toda Latinoamérica, España y Portugal) y en el ámbito de la educación superior. ElInforme Horizon 2010: Edición Iberoamericana es el primero que ofrece esta contextualización regional y ha sido producido por el NMC y el eLearn Center de laUniversitat Oberta de Catalunya.

Informe Horizon : edició iberoamericana 2010

La sèrie d'informes Horizon és el resultat més tangible del Projecte Horizon del New Media Consortium, un esforç de recerca qualitativa iniciat el 2002 que identifica i descriu les tecnologies emergents amb més potencial d'impacte en l'ensenyament, l'aprenentatge, la recerca i la expressió creativa en l'àmbit educatiu global. Aquest volum, l'Informe Horizon 2010: Edició Iberoamericana, se centra en la investigació en els països de la regió Iberoamericana (incloent-hi tota Llatinoamèrica, Espanya i Portugal) i en l'àmbit de l'educació superior. L'Informe Horizon 2010: Edició Iberoamericana és el primer que ofereix aquesta contextualització regional i ha estat produït per l'NMC i el eLearn Center de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya.

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case

This paper derives the HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation for sophisticated agents in a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem with non-constant discounting in a continuous setting, by using a dynamic programming approach. A simple example is used in order to illustrate the applicability of this HJB equation, by suggesting a method for constructing the subgame perfect equilibrium solution to the problem.Conditions for the observational equivalence with an associated problem with constantdiscounting are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the case of free terminal time. Strotz¿s model (an eating cake problem of a nonrenewable resource with non-constant discounting) is revisited.

D-String on near horizon geometries and infinite conformal symmetry

We show that the symmetries of effective D-string actions in constant dilaton backgrounds are directly related to homothetic motions of the background metric. In the presence of such motions, there are infinitely many nonlinearly realized rigid symmetries forming a loop (or looplike) algebra. Near horizon (antideSitter) D3 and D1+D5 backgrounds are discussed in detail and shown to provide 2D interacting field theories with infinite conformal symmetry.

Non-constant discounting in finite horizon: The free terminal time case

This paper derives the HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation for sophisticated agents in a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem with non-constant discounting in a continuous setting, by using a dynamic programming approach. A simple example is used in order to illustrate the applicability of this HJB equation, by suggesting a method for constructing the subgame perfect equilibrium solution to the problem.Conditions for the observational equivalence with an associated problem with constantdiscounting are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the case of free terminal time. Strotz¿s model (an eating cake problem of a nonrenewable resource with non-constant discounting) is revisited.

Com afecten als investigadors i als centres de recerca les noves polítiques d’accés obert del programa Horizon 2020?

La Institució CERCA organitza una sessió amb Ignasi Labastida, cap de l’Oficina de Difusió del Coneixement de la UB, per conèixer millor les implicacions que la política d’accés obert té sobre investigadors i centres de recerca.

Improving the risk concept: a revision of Arrow-Pratt theory in the context of controlled dynamic stochastic environments

In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic �complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Optimal feedback control rules sensitive to controlled endogenous risk-aversion

The objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the theoretical literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (see, Jacobson, 1973, Karp, 1987 and Whittle, 1981, 1989, 1990, among others) or to the classic context of risk-neutral decision-makers (see, Chow, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1993). More realistic and attractive, this new approach is placed in the context of a time-varying endogenous risk-aversion which is under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong qualitative implications on the agent's optimal policy during the entire planning horizon.

Emissions distribution in post-Kyoto international negotiations: a policy

An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future participation of developing countries in international environmental policies will depend on their amount of pay offs inside and outside specific agreements. These studies are aimed at analyzing coalitions stability typically through a game theoretical approach. Though these contributions represent a corner stone in the research field investigating future plausible international coalitions and the reasons behind the difficulties incurred over time to implement emissions stabilizing actions, they cannot disentangle satisfactorily the role that equality play in inducing poor regions to tackle global warming. If we focus on the Stern Review findings stressing that climate change will generate heavy damages and policy actions will be costly in a finite time horizon, we understand why there is a great incentive to free ride in order to exploit benefits from emissions reduction efforts of others. The reluctance of poor countries in joining international agreements is mainly supported by historical responsibility of rich regions in generating atmospheric carbon concentration, whereas rich countries claim that emissions stabilizing policies will be effective only when developing countries will join them.Scholars recently outline that a perceived fairness in the distribution of emissions would facilitate a wide spread participation in international agreements. In this paper we overview the literature about distributional aspects of emissions by focusing on those contributions investigating past trends of emissions distribution through empirical data and future trajectories through simulations obtained by integrated assessment models. We will explain methodologies used to elaborate data and the link between real data and those coming from simulations. Results from this strand of research will be interpreted in order to discuss future negotiations for post Kyoto agreements that will be the focus of the next. Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. A particular attention will be devoted to the role that technological change will play in affecting the distribution of emissions over time and to how spillovers and experience diffusion could influence equality issues and future outcomes of policy negotiations.