When ESDP confronts ENP: security sector reform as a bridge in the EU’s foreign policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy’s birth has taken place in parallel with the renewed momentum of the European Security and Defence Policy, which has launched 14 operations since 2003. Both policies’ instruments have converged in the neighbouring area covered by ENP: Georgia, in the East and the Palestinian Territories in the South. In both cases, the Security Sector Reform strategies have been the main focus for ESDP and an important objective for ENP. In this paper, two objectives are pursued: first, to assess the EU’s involvement in both cases in SSR terms; and second, to analyse whether the convergence of ESDP operations with a broader EU neighbourhood policy implies that the former has become an instrument for the a EU external action.

Bargaining failures and merger policy

In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.

Shocking policy coefficients

This paper proposes an empirical framework to study the effects of a policy regime change defined as an unpredictable and permanent change in the policy parameters. In particular I show how to make conditional forecast and perform impulse response functions and counterfactual analysis. As an application, the effects of changes in fiscal policy rules in the US are investigated. I find that discretionary fiscal policy has become more countercyclical over the last decades. In absence of such a change, surplus would have been higher, debt lower and output gap more volatile but only until mid 80s. An increase in the degree of counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy has a positive effect on output gap in periods where the level of debt-to-GDP ratio is low and a zero or negative effect when the ratio is high. This explains why a more countercylical stance of the systematic fiscal policy taking place in 2008:II is predicted to be rather ineffective for recovering from the crisis.

The Role of Parliaments in European foreign policy

This book addresses the debate on the democratic deficit of European foreign and defence policies. This debate revolves around two dimensions. The first one has to do with the accountability of CFSP institutions. Is the current degree of parliamentary oversight of these policies the most appropriate? Has the disengagement of national parliaments regarding European foreign policy been counterbalanced by giving sufficient powers to the European Parliament? And, regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), are national parliaments effectively controlling it? The second dimension of the debate is related to the wider question of whether the European Parliament is capable of legitimising EU policy outcomes. In the absence of a Europe-wide demos and of a true party system, what interests do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent when dealing with foreign policy issues? Are there transnational cleavages in foreign policy or are they mainly national? Furthermore, is the European Parliament developing a transnational, autonomous stance on foreign policy issues, different from that of the Council or the Commission? The present volume is the result of the 2nd Meeting of the FORNET Working Group on “Evolution and Accountability of CFSP Institutions” organised by the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (Research line of the Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus), which took place in Barcelona, the 4 and 5 March 2005.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Rethinking study and management of agricultural systems for policy design

There is a concern that agriculture will no longer be able to meet, on a global scale, the growing demand for food. Facing such a challenge requires new patterns of thinking in the context of complexity and sustainability sciences. This paper, focused on the social dimension of the study and management of agricultural systems, suggests that rethinking the study of agricultural systems entails analyzing them as complex socio-ecological systems, as well as considering the differing thinking patterns of diverse stakeholders. The intersubjective nature of knowledge, as studied by different philosophical schools, needs to be better integrated into the study and management of agricultural systems than it is done so far, forcing us to accept that there are no simplistic solutions, and to seek a better understanding of the social dimension of agriculture. Different agriculture related problems require different policy and institutional approaches. Finally, the intersubjective nature of knowledge asks for the visualization of different framings and the power relations taking place in the decision-making process. Rethinking management of agricultural systems implies that policy making should be shaped by different principles: learning, flexibility, adaptation, scale-matching, participation, diversity enhancement and precaution hold the promise to significantly improve current standard management procedures.

Empowering local democracy in Catalonia: tools and policy domains to implement a top-down solution

This article is the result of an ongoing research into a variety of features of Spanish local government. It aims, in particular, at providing a profile of the tools implemented by local authorities to improve local democracy in Catalonia. The main hypothesis of the work is that, even though the Spanish local model is constrained by a shared and unique set of legal regulations, local institutions in Catalonia have developed their own model of local participation. And the range of instruments like these is still now increasing. More specifically, the scope of this research is twofold. On the one hand, different types of instruments for public deliberation in the Catalan local administration system are identified and presented, based on the place they take in the policy cycle. On the other hand, we focus on policy domains and the quality of the decision-making processes. Researching the stability of the participation tools or whether local democracy prefers more 'ad hoc' processes allows us to analyze the boundaries/limits of local democracy in Catalonia. The main idea underlying this paper is that, despite the existence of a single legal model regulating municipalities in Catalonia, local authorities tend to use their legally granted selfmanagement capacities to design their own instruments which end up presenting perceivable distinct features, stressing democracy in different policy domains, and in diverse policy cycles. Therefore, this paper is intended to identify such models and to provide factors (variables) so that an explanatory model can be built.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.