Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.

Estimation of dynamic latent variable models using simulated nonparametric moments

Given a model that can be simulated, conditional moments at a trial parameter value can be calculated with high accuracy by applying kernel smoothing methods to a long simulation. With such conditional moments in hand, standard method of moments techniques can be used to estimate the parameter. Since conditional moments are calculated using kernel smoothing rather than simple averaging, it is not necessary that the model be simulable subject to the conditioning information that is used to define the moment conditions. For this reason, the proposed estimator is applicable to general dynamic latent variable models. Monte Carlo results show that the estimator performs well in comparison to other estimators that have been proposed for estimation of general DLV models.

Improving the risk concept: a revision of Arrow-Pratt theory in the context of controlled dynamic stochastic environments

In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic �complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous.

Improving the effort concept: a revision of the traditional approach in the context of controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments

The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision-maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The presence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. The traditional approach (see, Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1993, Salanie, B., 1997, Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D, 2002, among others) does not take into account the potential effect of the system dynamics on the agent's behavior to effort over time. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to allocate a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not incite the agent to invest a good effort. This explains why, some effici

RADIC II: a fault tolerant architecture with flexible dynamic redundancy

The demand for computational power has been leading the improvement of the High Performance Computing (HPC) area, generally represented by the use of distributed systems like clusters of computers running parallel applications. In this area, fault tolerance plays an important role in order to provide high availability isolating the application from the faults effects. Performance and availability form an undissociable binomial for some kind of applications. Therefore, the fault tolerant solutions must take into consideration these two constraints when it has been designed. In this dissertation, we present a few side-effects that some fault tolerant solutions may presents when recovering a failed process. These effects may causes degradation of the system, affecting mainly the overall performance and availability. We introduce RADIC-II, a fault tolerant architecture for message passing based on RADIC (Redundant Array of Distributed Independent Fault Tolerance Controllers) architecture. RADIC-II keeps as maximum as possible the RADIC features of transparency, decentralization, flexibility and scalability, incorporating a flexible dynamic redundancy feature, allowing to mitigate or to avoid some recovery side-effects.

Explaining High Economic Growth in Small Tourism Countries with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper shows that tourism specialisation can help to explain the observed high growth rates of small countries. For this purpose, two models of growth and trade are constructed to represent the trade relations between two countries. One of the countries is large, rich, has an own source of sustained growth and produces a tradable capital good. The other is a small poor economy, which does not have an own engine of growth and produces tradable tourism services. The poor country exports tourism services to and imports capital goods from the rich economy. In one model tourism is a luxury good, while in the other the expenditure elasticity of tourism imports is unitary. Two main results are obtained. In the long run, the tourism country overcomes decreasing returns and permanently grows because its terms of trade continuously improve. Since the tourism sector is relatively less productive than the capital good sector, tourism services become relatively scarcer and hence more expensive than the capital good. Moreover, along the transition the growth rate of the tourism economy holds well above the one of the rich country for a long time. The growth rate differential between countries is particularly high when tourism is a luxury good. In this case, there is a faster increase in the tourism demand. As a result, investment of the small economy is boosted and its terms of trade highly improve.

An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: equity Vs.tax compliance

Capital taxation is currently under debate, basically due to problems of administrative control and proper assessment of the levied assets. We analyze both problems focusing on a capital tax, the annual wealth tax (WT), which is only applied in five OECD countries, being Spain one of them. We concentrate our analysis on top 1% adult population, which permits us to describe the evolution of wealth concentration in Spain along 1983-2001. On average top 1% holds about 18% of total wealth, which rises to 19% when tax incompliance and under-assessment is corrected for housing, the main asset. The evolution suggests wealth concentration has risen. Regarding WT, we analyze whether it helps to reduce wealth inequality or, on the contrary, it reinforces vertical inequity (due to especial concessions) and horizontal inequity (due to the de iure and to de facto different treatment of assets). We analyze in detail housing and equity shares. By means of a time series analysis, we relate the reported values with reasonable price indicators and proxies of the propensity to save. We infer net tax compliance is extremely low, which includes both what we commonly understand by (gross) tax compliance and the degree of under-assessment due to fiscal legislation (for housing). That is especially true for housing, whose level of net tax compliance is well below 50%. Hence, we corroborate the difficulties in taxing capital, and so cast doubts on the current role of the WT in Spain in reducing wealth inequality.

Estimation of dynamic latent variable models using simulated nonparametric moments

Abstract. Given a model that can be simulated, conditional moments at a trial parameter value can be calculated with high accuracy by applying kernel smoothing methods to a long simulation. With such conditional moments in hand, standard method of moments techniques can be used to estimate the parameter. Because conditional moments are calculated using kernel smoothing rather than simple averaging, it is not necessary that the model be simulable subject to the conditioning information that is used to define the moment conditions. For this reason, the proposed estimator is applicable to general dynamic latent variable models. It is shown that as the number of simulations diverges, the estimator is consistent and a higher-order expansion reveals the stochastic difference between the infeasible GMM estimator based on the same moment conditions and the simulated version. In particular, we show how to adjust standard errors to account for the simulations. Monte Carlo results show how the estimator may be applied to a range of dynamic latent variable (DLV) models, and that it performs well in comparison to several other estimators that have been proposed for DLV models.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

WebQuest per a la Farmàcia Clínica i Atenció Farmacèutica : nova metodologia mitjançant moderna tecnologia

El projecte ha estat realitzat en la Unitat de Farmàcia Clínica i Farmacoteràpia de la Facultat de Farmàcia de la Universitat de Barcelona i ha estat a desenvolupar en dos anys. La finalitat del projecte ha estat oferir a l'alumne un material docent en suport digital, adaptat a una metodologia més creativa i de treball en grup, orientat a la millora de la seva formació, autonomia i rendiment acadèmic, en els aspectes relacionats amb la Farmàcia Clínica i Farmacoteràpia i l'Atenció Farmacèutica, i que consistirà en una primera aproximació a les directrius europees. Aquest material docent en suport digital són WebQuest (WQ) estructurades per temes i via Internet, la qual cosa possibilita un sistema dinàmic de fàcil retroalimentació i en constant actualització. Mitjançant la utilització d'aquest material docent es treballen aspectes com l'ús de metodologies docents centrades en l'alumne, autoaprenentatge a distància, aprenentatge seqüencial, treball en grup, participació activa i responsabilitat de l'alumne en el procés d'ensenyament aprenentatge i l'aproximació del mateix a la realitat professional entre altres, i tot això encaminat a promoure l'adaptació dels plans docents a l'Espai Europeu d'Educació Superior (EEES). En aquest sentit podem indicar que s'han elaborat cinc WQs, els títols del qual són Sistemes Personalitzats de Dosificació, Compliment terapèutic: el gran repte actual: informació al pacient, Compliment terapèutic: el gran repte actual: informació al professional sanitari, Dispensació activa en Diabetis mellitus tipus 2 i Dispensació activa en Hipertensión arterial. Cadascuna de les WQs elaborades consta dels apartats Introducció, Tasca, Procés, Recursos, Avaluació, Conclusió, Guia Didàctica i Crèdits. Les WQs estan allotjades en la pàgina web de la Unitat de Farmàcia Clínica i Farmacoteràpia, i a elles s'accedeix a través de l'adreça web http://www.ub.és/farcli/wp0.htm

Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results

General signaling results in dynamic Tullock contests have been missing for long. The reason is the tractability of the problems. In this paper, an uninformed contestant with valuation vx competes against an informed opponent with valuation, either high vh or low vl. We show that; (i) When the hierarchy of valuations is vh ≥ vx ≥ vl, there is no pooling. Sandbagging is too costly for the high type. (ii) When the order of valuations is vx ≥ vh ≥ vl, there is no separation if vh and vl are close. Sandbagging is cheap due to the proximity of valuations. However, if vh and vx are close, there is no pooling. First period cost of pooling is high. (iii) For valuations satisfying vh ≥ vl ≥ vx, there is no separation if vh and vl are close. Bluffing in the first period is cheap for the low valuation type. Conversely, if vx and vl are close there is no pooling. Bluffing in the first stage is too costly. JEL: C72, C73, D44, D82. KEYWORDS: Signaling, Dynamic Contests, Non-existence, Sandbag Pooling, Bluff Pooling, Separating