Modelling dependence in a ratemaking procedure with multivariate Poisson regression models

When actuaries face with the problem of pricing an insurance contract that contains different types of coverage, such as a motor insurance or homeowner's insurance policy, they usually assume that types of claim are independent. However, this assumption may not be realistic: several studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between types of claim. Here we introduce different regression models in order to relax the independence assumption, including zero-inflated models to account for excess of zeros and overdispersion. These models have been largely ignored to multivariate Poisson date, mainly because of their computational di±culties. Bayesian inference based on MCMC helps to solve this problem (and also lets us derive, for several quantities of interest, posterior summaries to account for uncertainty). Finally, these models are applied to an automobile insurance claims database with three different types of claims. We analyse the consequences for pure and loaded premiums when the independence assumption is relaxed by using different multivariate Poisson regression models and their zero-inflated versions.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

A mixed splicing procedure for economic time series

This note develops a flexible methodology for splicing economic time series that avoids the extreme assumptions implicit in the procedures most commonly used in the literature. It allows the user to split the required correction to the older of the series being linked between its levels and growth rates on the basis what he knows or conjectures about the persistence of the factors that account for the discrepancy between the two series that emerges at their linking point. The time profile of the correction is derived from the assumption that the error in the older series reflects the inadequate coverage of emerging sectors or activities that grow faster than the aggregate.

A way to play bankruptcy problems.

The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations. Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003), obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules. Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the convex combinations of bankruptcy rules. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure, Diminishing Claims mechanism, Piniles’ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Award errors and permanent disability benefits in Spain

There is a controversial debate about the effects of permanent disability benefits on labormarket behavior. In this paper we estimate equations for deserving and receiving disabilitybenefits to evaluate the award error as the difference in the probability of receiving anddeserving using survey data from Spain. Our results indicate that individuals aged between55 and 59, self-employers or working in an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it significantly higher than the rest of individuals. We also find evidence of gender discrimination since male have a significantly higher probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it. This seems to confirm that disability benefits are being used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for some individuals approaching the early retirement or those who do not have right to retire early. Taking into account that awarding process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some departments are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability benefits.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

A finite-population revenue management model and a risk-ratio procedure for the joint estimation of population size and parameters

Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.

The referent : a new referential methodology and procedure in live drawing

My research in live drawing and new technologies uses a combination of a human figure in live in composition, overlaid with a digital projection of a second human figure. The aim is to explore, to amplify and thoroughly analyse the search for distinctive identities and graphic languages of representation for live and projected models.

Using the HEGY Procedure When Not All Roots Are Present

Empirical studies have shown little evidence to support the presence of all unit roots present in the $^{\Delta_4}$ filter in quarterly seasonal time series. This paper analyses the performance of the Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (1990) (HEGY) procedure when the roots under the null are not all present. We exploit the Vector of Quarters representation and cointegration relationship between the quarters when factors $(1-L),(1+L),\bigg(1+L^2\bigg),\bigg(1-L^2\bigg) y \bigg(1+L+L^2+L^3\bigg)$ are a source of nonstationarity in a process in order to obtain the distribution of tests of the HEGY procedure when the underlying processes have a root at the zero, Nyquist frequency, two complex conjugates of frequency $^{\pi/2}$ and two combinations of the previous cases. We show both theoretically and through a Monte-Carlo analysis that the t-ratios $^{t_{{\hat\pi}_1}}$ and $^{t_{{\hat\pi}_2}}$ and the F-type tests used in the HEGY procedure have the same distribution as under the null of a seasonal random walk when the root(s) is/are present, although this is not the case for the t-ratio tests associated with unit roots at frequency $^{\pi/2}$.