Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care


Autoria(s): Martínez Giralt, Xavier; Barros, Pedro Pita
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica

Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Data(s)

09/05/2006

Resumo

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

Formato

29

313796 bytes

application/pdf

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1980

Idioma(s)

eng

Relação

Working papers; 467.00

Direitos

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Palavras-Chave #Planificació sanitària #Economia de la salut
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper