Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Fairness under uncertainty with indivisibilities

I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually playthe equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study theconvergence and stability properties of Sj\"ostr\"om's (1994) mechanism, onthe assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibriumusing monotonic learning dynamics and also with fictitious play. Thismechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environmentsusing as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominatedstrategies (only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies isneeded). There are, however, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payoffs maybe very different from those desired by the social choice function. Withmonotonic dynamics we show that many equilibria in all the sets ofequilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that havecompletely mixed initial conditions. The initial conditions that lead tothese equilibria need not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore,even if the dynamics converge to the ``right'' set of equilibria, it stillcan converge to quite a poor outcome in welfare terms. With fictitious play,if the agents have completely mixed prior beliefs, beliefs and play convergeto the outcome the planner wants to implement.

Clarke critical values of subanalytic Lipschitz continuous functions

We prove that any subanalytic locally Lipschitz function has the Sard property. Such functions are typically nonsmooth and their lack of regularity necessitates the choice of some generalized notion of gradient and of critical point. In our framework these notions are defined in terms of the Clarke and of the convex-stable subdifferentials. The main result of this note asserts that for any subanalytic locally Lipschitz function the set of its Clarke critical values is locally finite. The proof relies on Pawlucki's extension of the Puiseuxlemma. In the last section we give an example of a continuous subanalytic function which is not constant on a segment of "broadly critical" points, that is, points for which we can find arbitrarily short convex combinations of gradients at nearby points.

Self-selection consistent functions

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.

Calibration of CES functions for real-world multisectoral modeling

We show how to calibrate CES production and utility functions when indirect taxation affecting inputs and consumption is present. These calibrated functions can then be used in computable general equilibrium models. Taxation modifies the standard calibration procedures since any taxed good has two associated prices and a choice of reference value units has to be made. We also provide an example of computer code to solve the calibration of CES utilities under two alternate normalizations. To our knowledge, this paper fills a methodological gap in the CGE literature.

The domain and interpretation of utility functions: An exploration

This paper proposes an exploration of the methodology of utilityfunctions that distinguishes interpretation from representation. Whilerepresentation univocally assigns numbers to the entities of the domainof utility functions, interpretation relates these entities withempirically observable objects of choice. This allows us to makeexplicit the standard interpretation of utility functions which assumesthat two objects have the same utility if and only if the individual isindifferent among them. We explore the underlying assumptions of suchan hypothesis and propose a non-standard interpretation according towhich objects of choice have a well-defined utility although individualsmay vary in the way they treat these objects in a specific context.We provide examples of such a methodological approach that may explainsome reversal of preferences and suggest possible mathematicalformulations for further research.

Transformation kernel density estimation of actuarial loss functions

[cat] Es presenta un estimador nucli transformat que és adequat per a distribucions de cua pesada. Utilitzant una transformació basada en la distribució de probabilitat Beta l’elecció del paràmetre de finestra és molt directa. Es presenta una aplicació a dades d’assegurances i es mostra com calcular el Valor en Risc.

Transformation kernel density estimation of actuarial loss functions

[cat] Es presenta un estimador nucli transformat que és adequat per a distribucions de cua pesada. Utilitzant una transformació basada en la distribució de probabilitat Beta l’elecció del paràmetre de finestra és molt directa. Es presenta una aplicació a dades d’assegurances i es mostra com calcular el Valor en Risc.

Binding energy and momentum distribution of nuclear matter using Green's functions methods

The influence of hole-hole (h-h) propagation in addition to the conventional particle-particle (p-p) propagation, on the energy per particle and the momentum distribution is investigated for the v2 central interaction which is derived from Reid¿s soft-core potential. The results are compared to Brueckner-Hartree-Fock calculations with a continuous choice for the single-particle (SP) spectrum. Calculation of the energy from a self-consistently determined SP spectrum leads to a lower saturation density. This result is not corroborated by calculating the energy from the hole spectral function, which is, however, not self-consistent. A generalization of previous calculations of the momentum distribution, based on a Goldstone diagram expansion, is introduced that allows the inclusion of h-h contributions to all orders. From this result an alternative calculation of the kinetic energy is obtained. In addition, a direct calculation of the potential energy is presented which is obtained from a solution of the ladder equation containing p-p and h-h propagation to all orders. These results can be considered as the contributions of selected Goldstone diagrams (including p-p and h-h terms on the same footing) to the kinetic and potential energy in which the SP energy is given by the quasiparticle energy. The results for the summation of Goldstone diagrams leads to a different momentum distribution than the one obtained from integrating the hole spectral function which in general gives less depletion of the Fermi sea. Various arguments, based partly on the results that are obtained, are put forward that a self-consistent determination of the spectral functions including the p-p and h-h ladder contributions (using a realistic interaction) will shed light on the question of nuclear saturation at a nonrelativistic level that is consistent with the observed depletion of SP orbitals in finite nuclei.

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Urban population density functions : the case of the Barcelona region

L'anàlisi de la densitat urbana és utilitzada per examinar la distribució espacial de la població dins de les àrees urbanes, i és força útil per planificar els serveis públics. En aquest article, s'estudien setze formes funcionals clàssiques de la relació existent entre la densitat i la distancia en la regió metropolitana de Barcelona i els seus onze subcentres.

Some remarks on the class of continuous (Semi-) strictcly quasiconvex functions

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