International commodity prices, growth and the outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa

To learn more about the effect of economic conditions oncivil war, we examine whether Sub-Saharan civil wars aremore likely to start following downturns in the internationalprice of countries main export commodities. The data showa robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreakof civil wars. We also find that Sub-Saharan countries aremore likely to see civil wars following economic downturnsin their main OECD export destinations.

La Palma - Nova Classis: a Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus encampment during the Second Punic War in Iberia

This paper presents the discovery of the oldest Roman camp on the Iberian Peninsula, a camp from the Second Punic War situated in La Palma (Tarragona, Spain), by the mouth of the River Ebro. Although no structural remains have been found, the site's strategic in- terest along with many coins, arms and fragments of amphoras and other objects indicate that a military camp was established here between 218 and 209 BC. Written sources, mainly Polybius and Livy, suggest that La Palma was where the legions of Publius Cornelius Scipio gathered before the attack on Carthago Nova in 209 BC. The paper ends by suggesting that La Palma may be the Roman camp of Nova Classis mentioned by Livy during the events of the war in 217 BC.

Growth, Democracy, and Civil War

Does economic growth affect the likelihood of civil war? Answering this question requires dealing with reverse causation. Our approach exploits that international commodity prices have a significant effect on the income growth of Sub-Saharan African countries. We show that lower income growth makes civil war more likely in non-democracies. This effect is significantly weaker in democracies; as a result, we find no link between growth and civil war in these countries. Our reducedform results also indicate that lower international commodity price growth has no effect on civil war in democracies, but raises the likelihood of civil war incidence and onset in nondemocracies.

The aftermath of Civil War

Using an event-study methodology, this paper analyzes the aftermath of civil war in a cross-section of countries. It focuses on those experiences where the end of conflict marks the beginning of a relatively lasting peace. The paper considers 41 countries involved in internal wars in the period 1960-2003. In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the aftermath of war, the paper considers a host of social areas represented by basic indicators of economic performance, health and education, political development, demographic trends, and conflict and security issues. For each of these indicators, the paper first compares the post- and pre-war situations and then examines their dynamic trends during the post-conflict period. It conducts this analysis both in absolute and relative terms, the latter in relation to control groups of otherwise similar countries. The paper concludes that, even though war has devastating effects and its aftermath can be immensely difficult, when the end of war marks the beginning of lasting peace, recovery and improvement are indeed achieved.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

Psychosocial analysis of the collective processes in the United States after September 11

This article studies alterations in the values, attitudes, and behaviors that emerged among U.S. citizens as a consequence of, and as a response to, the attacks of September 11, 2001. The study briefly examines the immediate reaction to the attack, before focusing on the collective reactions that characterized the behavior of the majority of the population between the events of 9/11 and the response to it in the form of intervention in Afghanistan. In studying this period an eight-phase sequential model (Botcharova, 2001) is used, where the initial phases center on the nation as the ingroup and the latter focus on the enemy who carried out the attack as the outgroup. The study is conducted from a psychosocial perspective and uses "social identity theory" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) as the basic framework for interpreting and accounting for the collective reactions recorded. The main purpose of this paper is to show that the interpretation of these collective reactions is consistent with the postulates of social identity theory. The application of this theory provides a different and specific analysis of events. The study is based on data obtained from a variety of rigorous academic studies and opinion polls conducted in relation to the events of 9/11. In line with social identity theory, 9/11 had a marked impact on the importance attached by the majority of U.S. citizens to their identity as members of a nation. This in turn accentuated group differentiation and activated ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Ingroup favoritism strengthened group cohesion, feelings of solidarity, and identification with the most emblematic values of the U.S. nation, while outgroup discrimination induced U.S. citizens to conceive the enemy (al-Qaeda and its protectors) as the incarnation of evil, depersonalizing the group and venting their anger on it, and to give their backing to a military response, the eventual intervention in Afghanistan. Finally, and also in line with the postulates of social identity theory, as an alternative to the virtual bipolarization of the conflict (U.S. vs al-Qaeda), the activation of a higher level of identity in the ingroup is proposed, a group that includes the United States and the largest possible number of countries¿ including Islamic states¿in the search for a common, more legitimate and effective solution.

Psychosocial analysis of the collective processes in the United States after September 11

This article studies alterations in the values, attitudes, and behaviors that emerged among U.S. citizens as a consequence of, and as a response to, the attacks of September 11, 2001. The study briefly examines the immediate reaction to the attack, before focusing on the collective reactions that characterized the behavior of the majority of the population between the events of 9/11 and the response to it in the form of intervention in Afghanistan. In studying this period an eight-phase sequential model (Botcharova, 2001) is used, where the initial phases center on the nation as the ingroup and the latter focus on the enemy who carried out the attack as the outgroup. The study is conducted from a psychosocial perspective and uses "social identity theory" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) as the basic framework for interpreting and accounting for the collective reactions recorded. The main purpose of this paper is to show that the interpretation of these collective reactions is consistent with the postulates of social identity theory. The application of this theory provides a different and specific analysis of events. The study is based on data obtained from a variety of rigorous academic studies and opinion polls conducted in relation to the events of 9/11. In line with social identity theory, 9/11 had a marked impact on the importance attached by the majority of U.S. citizens to their identity as members of a nation. This in turn accentuated group differentiation and activated ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Ingroup favoritism strengthened group cohesion, feelings of solidarity, and identification with the most emblematic values of the U.S. nation, while outgroup discrimination induced U.S. citizens to conceive the enemy (al-Qaeda and its protectors) as the incarnation of evil, depersonalizing the group and venting their anger on it, and to give their backing to a military response, the eventual intervention in Afghanistan. Finally, and also in line with the postulates of social identity theory, as an alternative to the virtual bipolarization of the conflict (U.S. vs al-Qaeda), the activation of a higher level of identity in the ingroup is proposed, a group that includes the United States and the largest possible number of countries¿ including Islamic states¿in the search for a common, more legitimate and effective solution.

Infrastructure and Economic Growth in Spain, 1845-1935

Between the mid-nineteenth century and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, Spain undertook a sustained process of economic growth and structural change, but was unable to converge with the core European economies.1 The reasons behind Spain"s failure to converge have been a subject of debate among historians for decades. 2 This dissertation aims to analyze the role played by infrastructure in Spanish economic growth during that period, and tries to find out to what extent the potential shortage or inadequacy of the Spanish infrastructure endowment was one of the factors to blame for the country"s nonconvergence. The dissertation draws on recent research on the economic impact of infrastructure, and on the numerous attempts to measure that impact which have been undertaken in the wake of David Aschauer"s work on the United States.

The Catalan countries project (1931-1939)

In the evolution of Catalan nationalism, as much politician as cultural, the period of II Spanish Republic (1931-1939) was essential. The obtaining of the Statute of Autonomy (1931-1932) supposed the beginning of a stage of expansion in multiple aspects. One of them were the contacts with the Catalanists nuclei of the rest of the cultural space of Catalan language in which, at that time, it would begin to call Catalan Countries (Balearic Islands, Valencian Country, Andorra, Rosselló, to l'Alguer). On Those Collaborations between cultural organizations, political and particular parties Catalonia always will be the model to follow. The Increasing connections will be visualized on press, as well as on cultural celebrations, policy of parties and Constituent Courts. This evolution will be cut by the Franco victory in the Civil War in 1939.

The European Union Perception of Cuba: From Frustation to Irritation

On Friday May 16, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba summoned the newly-appointed charged’affairs of the European Commission in Havana and announced the withdrawal of the application procedure for membership in the Cotonou Agreement of the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, and in fact renouncing to benefit from European development aid.1 In a blistering note published in the Granma official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, the government blamed the EU Commission for exerting undue pressure, its alleged alignment with the policies of the United States, and censure for the measures taken by Cuba during the previous weeks.2 In reality, Cuba avoided an embarrasin flat rejection for its application. This was the anti-climatic ending for a long process that can be traced back to the end of the Cold War, in a context where Cuba has been testing alternative grounds to substitute for the overwhelming protection of the Soviet Union

Discourse, knowledge, power and politics: towards critical epistemic discourse analysis

Although both are fundamental terms in the humanities and social sciences, discourse and knowledge have seldom been explicitly related, and even less so in critical discourse studies. After a brief summary of what we know about these relationships in linguistics, psychology, epistemology and the social sciences, with special emphasis on the role of knowledge in the formation of mental models as a basis for discourse, I examine in more detail how a critical study of discourse and knowledge may be articulated in critical discourse studies. Thus, several areas of critical epistemic discourse analysis are identified, and then applied in a study of Tony Blair’s Iraq speech on March 18, 2003, in which he sought to legitimatize his decision to go to war in Iraq with George Bush. The analysis shows the various modes of how knowledge is managed and manipulated of all levels of discourse of this speech.

Recognition and political accommodation: from regionalism to secessionism. The Catalan case

Having lived through a bloody civil war in the 1930s followed by four decades of General Franco’s dictatorship, the Spanish state carried out a transition to a democratic system at the end of the 1970s. The 1978 Constitution was the legal outcome of this transition process. Among other things, it established a territorial model – the so-called “Estado de las Autonomías” (State of Autonomous Communities) – which was designed to satisfy the historical demands for recognition and self-government of, above all, the citizens and institutions of Catalonia and the Basque Country .In recent years support for independence has increased in Catalonia. Different indicators show that pro-independence demands are endorsed by a majority of its citizens, as well as by most of the political parties and organizations that represent its civil society. This is a new phenomenon. Those in favour of independence had been in the minority throughout the 20th century. Nowadays, however, demands of a pro-autonomy and pro-federalist nature, which until recently had been dominant, have gradually lost public support in favour of demands for self-determination and secession. This paper analyses the massive increase in support for secession in Catalonia during the early years of the 21st century. After describing the different theories of secession in plurinational liberal democracies (section 1), we analyse Catalonia’s political evolution over the past decade focusing on the shortcomings with regard to constitutional recognition and accommodation displayed by the Spanish political system. The latter have been exacerbated by the reform process of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy (2006) and the subsequent judgement of Spain’s Constitutional Court regarding the aforementioned Statute (2010) (section 2). Finally, we present our conclusions by linking the Catalan case with theories of secession applied to plurinational contexts

The Spatial Distribution of Spanish Transport Infrastructure between 1860 and 1930

The origin of Spanish regional economic divergence can be traced back at least until the seventeenth century, although its full definition took place during industrialisation. Historians have often included uneven regional infrastructure endowments among the factors that explain divergence among Spanish regions, although no systematic analysis of the spatial distribution of Spanish infrastructure and its determinants has been carried out so far. This paper aims at filling that gap, by offering a description of the regional distribution of the main Spanish transport infrastructure between the middle of the nineteenth century and the Civil War. In addition, it estimates a panel data model to search into the main reasons that explain the differences among the Spanish regional endowments of railways and roads during that period. The outcomes of that analysis indicate that both institutional factors and the physical characteristics of each area had a strong influence on the distribution of transport infrastructure among the Spanish regions.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

The three horsemen of riches: Plague, war and urbanization in early modern Europe

How did Europe escape the "Iron Law of Wages?" We construct a simple Malthusian model withtwo sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes andurbanization rates increased during the period 1350-1700. Productivity growth can only explain a smallfraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics changes of the birth and death schedules were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population cantrigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such ashock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, andurban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregatedeath rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues.In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced populationpressure. We show in a calibration exercise that our model can account for the sustained rise in Europeanurbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes in 1700, without technological change.Wars contributed importantly to the "Rise of Europe", even if they had negative short-run effects. We thustrace Europe s precocious rise to economic riches to interactions of the plague shock with the belligerentpolitical environment and the nature of cities.