Metrics on diagram groups and uniform embeddings in a Hilbert space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt".

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

On uniform conjugators in torsion-free hyperbolic groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Optimization of floor cleaning coverage performance of a random path-planning mobile robot

Floor cleaning is a typical robot application. There are several mobile robots aviable in the market for domestic applications most of them with random path-planning algorithms. In this paper we study the cleaning coverage performances of a random path-planning mobile robot and propose an optimized control algorithm, some methods to estimate the are of the room, the evolution of the cleaning and the time needed for complete coverage.

An inequality for uniform deviations of sample averages from their means

We derive a new inequality for uniform deviations of averages from their means. The inequality is a common generalization of previous results of Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1974) and Pollard (1986). Usingthe new inequality we obtain tight bounds for empirical loss minimization learning.

Sports and journalism ethics: the coverage of 2012 London Olympics in the British, North-American and Spanish press

Sports and journalism ethics: the coverage of 2012 London Olympics in the British, North-American and Spanish press is a research focused on analysing the treatment that the quality press of three countries (United Kingdom, United States of America and Spain) will carry out in the London Olympic Games. Through a solid methodological approach based on the combination of the qualitative content analysis and qualitative indepth interviews, the investigation will study if the media provide a quality coverage,that is, if they adequate their pieces to the fundamental principles of journalistic deontology (truth, justice, freedom and social responsibility). Furthermore, the research will assess if the selected media comply with the prescriptions established in the ethical codes, stylebooks, newsroom statutes and national and international recommendations about journalism ethics, ranging from each media’s guidelines to key transnational codes established by the UNESCO, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) orthe Council of Europe.

Calculation of radio electrical coverage in Medium-Wave Frequencies

The aim of this project is to accomplish an application software based on Matlab to calculate the radioelectrical coverage by surface wave of broadcast radiostations in the band of Medium Wave (WM) all around the world. Also, given the location of a transmitting and a receiving station, the software should be able to calculate the electric field that the receiver should receive at that specific site. In case of several transmitters, the program should search for the existence of Inter-Symbol Interference, and calculate the field strenght accordingly. The application should ask for the configuration parameters of the transmitter radiostation within a Graphical User Interface (GUI), and bring back the resulting coverage above a map of the area under study. For the development of this project, it has been used several conductivity databases of different countries, and a high-resolution elevation database (GLOBE). Also, to calculate the field strenght due to groundwave propagation, it has been used ITU GRWAVE program, which must be integrated into a Matlab interface to be used by the application developed.

Coverage effects on the magnetism of Fe/MgO(001) ultrathin films

Different aspects of the structure-magnetism and morphology-magnetism correlation in the ultrathin limit are studied in epitaxial Fe films grown on MgO(001). In the initial stages of growth the presence of substrate steps, intrinsically higher than an Fe atomic layer, prevent the connection between Fe islands and hence the formation of large volume magnetic regions. This is proposed as an explanation to the superparamagnetic nature of ultrathin Fe films grown on MgO in addition to the usually considered islanded, or Vollmer-Weber, growth. Using this model, we explain the observed transition from superparamagnetism to ferromagnetism for Fe coverages above 3 monolayers (ML). However, even though ferromagnetism and magnetocrystalline anisotropy are observed for 4 ML, complete coverage of the MgO substrate by the Fe ultrathin films only occurs around 6 ML as determined by polar Kerr spectra and simulations that consider different coverage situations. In annealed 3.5 ML Fe films, shape or configurational anisotropy dominates the intrinsic magnetocrystalline anisotropy, due to an annealing induced continuous to islanded morphological transition. A small interface anisotropy in thicker films is observed, probably due to dislocations observed at the Fe¿MgO(001) interface.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus