Contractive metrics for a Boltzmann equation for granular gases: diffusive equilibriaThe Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

We quantify the long-time behavior of a system of (partially) inelastic particles in a stochastic thermostat by means of the contractivity of a suitable metric in the set of probability measures. Existence, uniqueness, boundedness of moments and regularity of a steady state are derived from this basic property. The solutions of the kinetic model are proved to converge exponentially as t→ ∞ to this diffusive equilibrium in this distance metrizing the weak convergence of measures. Then, we prove a uniform bound in time on Sobolev norms of the solution, provided the initial data has a finite norm in the corresponding Sobolev space. These results are then combined, using interpolation inequalities, to obtain exponential convergence to the diffusive equilibrium in the strong L¹-norm, as well as various Sobolev norms.

Metrics on diagram groups and uniform embeddings in a Hilbert space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt".

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

On the boundedness on inhomogeneous Lipschitz spaces of fractional integrals, singular integrals and hypersingular integrals associated to non-doubling measures on metric spaces

In this paper we prove T1 type necessary and sufficient conditions for the boundedness on inhomogeneous Lipschitz spaces of fractional integrals and singular integrals defined on a measure metric space whose measure satisfies a n-dimensional growth. We also show that hypersingular integrals are bounded on these spaces.

Net spaces and boundedness of integral operators

In this paper we introduce new functional spaces which we call the net spaces. Using their properties, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the integral operators to be of strong or weak-type are obtained. The estimates of the norm of the convolution operator in weighted Lebesgue spaces are presented.

On uniform conjugators in torsion-free hyperbolic groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

An inequality for uniform deviations of sample averages from their means

We derive a new inequality for uniform deviations of averages from their means. The inequality is a common generalization of previous results of Vapnik and Chervonenkis (1974) and Pollard (1986). Usingthe new inequality we obtain tight bounds for empirical loss minimization learning.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Uniform estimates in the Poincare-Aronszajn theorem on the separation of singularities of analytic functions

We study the possibility of splitting any bounded analytic function $f$ with singularities in a closed set $E\cup F$ as a sum of two bounded analytic functions with singularities in $E$ and $F$ respectively. We obtain some results under geometric restrictions on the sets $E$ and $F$ and we provide some examples showing the sharpness of the positive results.

JPEG standard uniform quantization error modeling with applications to sequential and progressive operation modes

In this paper we propose a method for computing JPEG quantization matrices for a given mean square error or PSNR. Then, we employ our method to compute JPEG standard progressive operation mode definition scripts using a quantization approach. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to use a trial and error procedure to obtain a desired PSNR and/or definition script, reducing cost. Firstly, we establish a relationship between a Laplacian source and its uniform quantization error. We apply this model to the coefficients obtained in the discrete cosine transform stage of the JPEG standard. Then, an image may be compressed using the JPEG standard under a global MSE (or PSNR) constraint and a set of local constraints determined by the JPEG standard and visual criteria. Secondly, we study the JPEG standard progressive operation mode from a quantization based approach. A relationship between the measured image quality at a given stage of the coding process and a quantization matrix is found. Thus, the definition script construction problem can be reduced to a quantization problem. Simulations show that our method generates better quantization matrices than the classical method based on scaling the JPEG default quantization matrix. The estimation of PSNR has usually an error smaller than 1 dB. This figure decreases for high PSNR values. Definition scripts may be generated avoiding an excessive number of stages and removing small stages that do not contribute during the decoding process with a noticeable image quality improvement.