Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Skill, Luck, Overconfidence, and Risk Taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We compare experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill alone and combinations of skill and luck. We find more risk taking with skill and luck as opposed to skill alone, particularly for males, and little overconfidence. Our data support an explanation based on differential attitudes toward luck by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making luck more important induces greater optimism for the former, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance.

When "hope springs eternal": The role of chance in risk taking

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrastexperimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed tocombinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by thosewhose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greateroptimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that highlevels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although weobserved excess entry (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not beattributed to overconfidence.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.

Risk Attitude And Wage Growth: Replication And Reconstruction

We replicate Shaw (1996) who found that individual wage growth is higher for individuals with greater preference for risk taking. Expanding her dataset with more American observations and data for Germany, Spain and Italy, we find mixed support for the earlier results. We present and estimate a new model and find that in particular the wage level is sensitive to attitudes towards risk taking. Comments given at the Labour Economics Conference in honour of Niels Westergaard (Nyborg, August 2008) and EALE 2008 (Amsterdam) and at seminars in Maastricht,Reus and Essen (RWI) are gratefully acknowledged. The authors also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant number SEJ2007-66318) and from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. JEL code: J24; J30. Key words: wage growth, risk, post-school investment.

Taxation of banks: a theoretical framework

The goal of this paper is to develop a model of financial intermediation analyze the impact of various forms of taxation. The model considers in a unified framework various functions of banks: monitoring, transaction services and asset transformation. Particular attention is devoted to conditions for separability between deposits and loans. The analysis focuses on: (i) competition between banks and alternative financial arrangements (investment funds and organized security markets), (ii) regulation, and (iii) bank's monopoly power and risk taking behavior.

Déficits y sesgos neurocognitivos y afectivos en la toma de decisiones de jugadores patológios y otros trastornos

Los déficits y sesgos tanto cognitivos como afectivos han sido fuente creciente de interés en el ámbito de la Neurociéncia de los Trastornos Mentales. En este proyecto, que se inicia en 2004 y finaliza a finales de 2008, se han estudiado los siguientes Trastornos Mentales: Juego Patológico (JP), Trastornos de la Conducta Alimentaria (TCA) y Trastornos Depresivos. En esta memoria nos centraremos en resumir parte de los resultados obtenidos en un estudio sobre JP y toma de decisiones (articulo en revisión y pendiente de aceptación) y otro de funcionamiento ejecutivo en JP y Bulimia Nerviosa (BN) (artículo en prensa). Resumiento el primer estudio los JP (N=32) muestran un proceso de toma de decisiones sesgado por la búsqueda de recompensa en forma de elevada toma de riesgos en comparación con Controles Sanos (CS). También se observan déficits en flexibilidad cognitiva pero no en control inhibitorio entre JP y CS. Los resultados descartan miopía conductual para lo toma de decisiones en JP, pero apuntan a un sesgo cognitivo-afectivo, en el que el control de los impulsos jugaría un papel relevante, en forma de ilusión de control, para los procesos de toma de decisiones con recompensa inmediata pero con castigo diferido, medidos por una prueba de toma de decisiones (IGT ABCD). En el segundo estudio, basándose en las vulnerabilidadades compartidas descritas entre JP y BN se comparó el funcionamiento ejecutivo de mujeres con JP y BN. Tras la administración del WCST y Stroop y ajustando el análisis por edad y educación, las JP mostraron mayor afectación, en concreto mayor porcentaje de errores perservaritvos, menor nivel de respuestas conceptuales y mayor número de ensayos administrados, mientras que el grupo de BN mostró mayor porcentaje de errores no persevarativos. Ambas, mujeres JP y BN mostraron disfunción ejecutiva en relación a los CS pero con diferentes correlatos específcos.

Taming SIFIs

We model a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) that is too big(or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision,the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessiverisk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance againstsystemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solutioninvolves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and moreimportantly establishing a Systemic Risk Authority endowed with special resolutionpowers, including the control of bankers' compensation packages during crisisperiods.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Transportation choices and the value of statistical life

This paper exploits an unusual transportation setting to estimate the value of a statistical life(VSL). We estimate the trade-offs individuals are willing to make between mortality risk andcost as they travel to and from the international airport in Sierra Leone (which is separated fromthe capital Freetown by a body of water). Travelers choose from among multiple transportoptions ? namely, ferry, helicopter, hovercraft, and water taxi. The setting and original datasetallow us to address some typical omitted variable concerns in order to generate some of the firstrevealed preference VSL estimates from Africa. The data also allows us to compare VSLestimates for travelers from 56 countries, including 20 African and 36 non-African countries, allfacing the same choice situation. The average VSL estimate for African travelers in the sample isUS$577,000 compared to US$924,000 for non-Africans. Individual characteristics, particularlyjob earnings, can largely account for the difference between Africans and non-Africans; Africansin the sample typically earn somewhat less. There is little evidence that individual VSL estimatesare driven by a lack of information, predicted life expectancy, or cultural norms around risktakingor fatalism. The data implies an income elasticity of the VSL of 1.77. These revealedpreference VSL estimates from a developing country fill an important gap in the existingliterature, and can be used for a variety of public policy purposes, including in current debateswithin Sierra Leone regarding the desirability of constructing new transportation infrastructure.

Conductes de risc en els joves-adults : Projecte YAGISSP

YAGISSP és un projecte europeu que estudia la vida dels joves-adults amb edats compreses entre 20 i 30 anys de les ciutats de Munic, Milà, Göteborg, Barcelona i Porto. Aquest projecte comprèn moltes dimensions del jove, com el seu ajustament psicològic, les formes i processos d’emancipació, les relacions de parella, la relació amb la família d’origen, etc., de manera que forma un conjunt de dades ampli i ric. La finalitat última del projecte és estudiar les diferències entre els joves de les diferents ciutats. En aquest article presentem els resultats sobre les conductes de risc dels joves, mesurat amb la Risk Taking Behaviour Scale, tant a nivell d’escala com a nivell d’ítems concrets, i el seu comportament diferenciat en relació a sis variables sociodemogràfiques, que són les següents: edat, sexe, estudis, parella, treball, i individuació. Els resultats han estat obtinguts a partir de l’anàlisi d’una mostra de 520 subjectes que viuen o treballen a Barcelona i la seva àrea metropolitana.

Conductes arriscades

Els adolescents tendeixen a prendre decisions que impliquen una recompensa immediata, malgrat que el seu valor sigui inferior.

Factores de riesgo psicosociales en el consumo de tabaco de los adolescentes: estados de ánimo negativos, grupo de iguales y estilos parentales

Existe una multiplicidad de factores que pueden afectar el riego del consumo de tabaco en la adolescencia. Mediante el análisis de estos factores de manera conjunta podemos desentrañar la relevancia específica que cada uno de ellos tiene en la conformación de la conducta individual de los adolescentes. El objetivo de esta investigación es profundizar en el conocimiento sobre la relación entre el consumo de tabaco en la adolescencia y variables socio-demográficas y socio-emocionales. Contamos con una muestra representativa de 2.289 adolescentes catalanes (15-18 años) que participaron en el Panel de Familias e Infancia. Se han realizado modelos de regresión para determinar la asociación estadística de los diferentes estados de ánimo (tristeza, nerviosismo y soledad), características del grupo de iguales y estilos parentales, con el consumo de tabaco. Los resultados indican que el comportamiento adictivo es más probable cuando los adolescentes muestran estados de ánimo negativos, controlando por variables socio-demográficas y otros factores de riesgo. Entre estos factores adicionales, los estilos parentales autoritativos reducen el riesgo del consumo de tabaco en comparación con la parentalidad autoritaria, permisiva y negligente. El consumo generalizado de tabaco en el grupo de iguales es el factor de riesgo que tiene una asociación más alta con el comportamiento individual del adolescente.

Liderazgo y dirección de empresas en el s. XXI

Peer-reviewed