Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

Analog Modelling of N-S anticlines of the External Sierras (Jaca basin, Southern Pyrenees)

Report for the scientific sojourn carried out at the Uppsala Universitet, Sweden, from April to July the 2007. Two series of analogue models are used to explore ductile-frictional contrasts of the basal décollement in the development of oblique and transverse structures simultaneously to thin-skinned shortening. These models simulate the evolution of the Central External Sierras (Southern Pyrenees, Spain), which constitute the frontal emerging part of the southernmost Pyrenean thrust sheet. They are characterized by the presence of transverse N-S to NW-SE anticlines, which are perpendicular to the Pyrenean structural trend and developed in the hangingwall of the Santo Domingo thrust system, detaching on an unevenly distributed Triassic materials (evaporitic-dolomitic interfingerings). Model setup performs a décollement made by three patches of silicone neighbouring pure brittle sand. Model series A test the thickness ratio between overburden and décollement. Model series B test the width of frictional detachment areas. Model results show how deformation reaches further in areas detached on ductile layer whereas frictional décollement areas assimilate the strain by means of an additional uplift. This replicates the structural style of Central External Sierras: higher structural relief of N-S anticlines with regard to orogen-parallel structures, absence of a representative ductile décollement in the core, tilting towards the orogen and foreland-side closure not thrusted by the frontal emerging South-Pyrenean thrust.

The value of useless information

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or notto observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remainignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model, which does not distinguishbetween lotteries for which the agent sees the final outcome and those for which hedoes not. I develop a simple model that admits preferences for making an observationor for remaining in doubt. I then use this model to analyze the connectionbetween preferences of this nature and risk-attitude. This framework accommodatesa wide array of behavioral patterns that violate the vNM model, and thatmay not seem related, prima facie. For instance, it admits self-handicapping, inwhich an agent chooses to impair his own performance. It also accommodatesa status quo bias without having recourse to framing effects, or to an explicitdefinition of reference points. In a political economy context, voters have strictincentives to shield themselves from information. In settings with other-regardingpreferences, this model predicts observed behavior that seems inconsistent witheither altruism or self-interested behavior.

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear.We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under thisuncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternativevon Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extensionof the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy(without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation.Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendationsof the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, thenwe prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possibledisappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implicationsfor intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.

Una modelización de los años de vida ajustados por la calidad como utilidades esperadas

En el presente trabajo, los a\~nos de vida ajustados por la calidad(AVAC), son caracterizados como funciones de utilidad von Newman--Morgenstern.Esta caracterizaci\'on se efect\'ua para dos problemas de elecci\'on: laelecci\'on entre loter{\'\i}as definidas sobre estados de salud cr\'onicosy la elecci\'on entre loter{\'\i}as definidas sobre estados de saludtemporales. En el primer caso, deducimos las mismas condiciones que Pliskinet al. (1980), s\'olo que siguiendo un camino m\'as directo. En el segundocaso, una vez establecida una condici\'on de independencia aditiva basadaen Fishburn (1970), inferimos una nueva condici\'on en la literatura sobreAVAC que denominamos \underline{condici\'on de simetr{\'\i}a}.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.