Abstract splines in Krein spaces

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Implementación de movimientos suaves en robots industriales mediante splines cúbicos: aplicación a un laboratorio remoto de robótica

La solución a los problemas de disponibilidad horaria para la realización de sesiones prácticas por parte de los estudiantes se encuentra en los laboratorios remotos, que permiten a estos interactuar con los elementos instalados en los laboratorios sin necesidad de estar presentes físicamente. Este proyecto pretende crear un laboratorio remoto para la asignatura “Robótica y Automatización Industrial” impartida en la ETSE, UAB, en el cual los estudiantes puedan ejecutar trayectorias de tipo spline cúbico en un brazo robot y observar a través de vídeo en tiempo real los movimientos del robot desde cualquier lugar con conexión a Internet.

On slicewise monotone parameterized problems and optimal proof systems for TAUT

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"

Reduction theorems for operators on the cones of monotone functions

For a quasilinear operator on the semiaxis a reduction theorem is proved on the cones of monotone functions in Lp - Lq setting for 0 < q < ∞, 1<= p < ∞. The case 0 < p < 1 is also studied for operators with additional properties. In particular, we obtain critera for three-weight inequalities for the Hardy-type operators with Oinarov' kernel on monotone functions in the case 0 < q < p <= 1.

Hardy’s inequalities for monotone functions on partly ordered measure spaces

We characterize the weighted Hardy inequalities for monotone functions in Rn +. In dimension n = 1, this recovers the standard theory of Bp weights. For n > 1, the result was previously only known for the case p = 1. In fact, our main theorem is proved in the more general setting of partly ordered measure spaces.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

A generalization of histogram type estimators

We introduce simple nonparametric density estimators that generalize theclassical histogram and frequency polygon. The new estimators are expressed as linear combination of density functions that are piecewisepolynomials, where the coefficients are optimally chosen in order to minimize the integrated square error of the estimator. We establish the asymptotic behaviour of the proposed estimators, and study theirperformance in a simulation study.

A sharp concentration inequality with applications

We present a new general concentration-of-measure inequality and illustrate its power by applications in random combinatorics. The results find direct applications in some problems of learning theory.

Nonparametric bounds on the returns to language skills

This paper applies the theoretical literature on nonparametric bounds ontreatment effects to the estimation of how limited English proficiency (LEP)affects wages and employment opportunities for Hispanic workers in theUnited States. I analyze the identifying power of several weak assumptionson treatment response and selection, and stress the interactions between LEPand education, occupation and immigration status. I show that thecombination of two weak but credible assumptions provides informative upperbounds on the returns to language skills for certain subgroups of thepopulation. Adding age at arrival as a monotone instrumental variable alsoprovides informative lower bounds.

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. I show thatwhen the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium thatsatisfies a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies be{\sl piecewise monotone}. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.