On money as a medium of exchange when goods vary by supply and demand

Models of the exchange process based on search theory can be usedto analyze the features of objects that make them more or less likely toemerge as ``money'' in equilibrium. These models illustrate the trade--offbetween endogenous acceptability (an equilibrium property) and intrinsiccharacteristics of goods, such as storability, recognizability, etc. Inthis paper, we look at how the relative supply and demand for various goodsaffect their likelihood of becoming money. Intuitively, goods in highdemand and/or low supply are more likely to appear as commodity money,subject to the qualification that which object ends up circulating as amedium of exchange depends at least partly on convention. Welfare propertiesare discussed.

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.

Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' motivation, as second movers, workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition has only minor psychological effects in our data.

A never-ending debate: Demand versus supply water policies. A CGE analysis for Catalonia

Water scarcity is a long-standing problem in Catalonia, as there are significant differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of water through the territory. There has consequently been a debate for many years about whether the solution to water scarcity must be considered in terms of efficiency or equity, the role that the public sector must play and the role that market-based instruments should play in water management. The aim of this paper is to use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the advantages and disadvantages associated with different policy instruments, from both a supply and a demand viewpoint, which can be applied to water management in Catalonia. We also introduce an ecological sector in our CGE model, allowing us to analyze the environmental impact of the alternative policies simulated. The calibration of the exogenous variables of the CGE model is performed by using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Catalan economy with 2001 data. The results suggest that taking into account the principle of sustainability of the resource, the policy debate between supply and demand in water policies is obsolete, and a new combination of policies is required to respect the different values associated with water. Keywords: Water Policies; Computable General Equilibrium Model; Economic Effects; Environmental Effects.

Labour Market Formation Patterns in Nineteenth Century Catalonia

In this paper we portray the features of the Catalan textiles labour market in a period of technological change. Supply and demand for labour as well as a gendered view of living standards are presented. A first set of results is that labour supply adjusts to changes in labour demand trough the spread of new demographic attitudes. In this respect we imply that labour economic agents (or labour population) were able to modify the economic condition of their children. A second set of results refers to living standards and income distribution inequality. In this respect we see that unemployment and protectionism were the main sources breeding income inequality. A third set of results deals with the extreme labour market segmentation according to gender. Since women s real wages did not obey to an economic rationale we conclude that women were outside the labour market.

Endogenous labor market participation and the business cycle

Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

On the identification of monetary (and other) shocks

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we construct a DSGE model which spells out explicitly the instrumentation of monetary policy. The interest rate is determined every period depending on the supply and demand for reserves which in turn are affected by fundamental shocks: unforeseeable changes in cash withdrawal, autonomous factors, technology and government spending. Unexpected changes in the monetary conditions of the economy are interpreted as monetary shocks. We show that these monetary shocks have the usual effects on economic activity without the need of imposing additional frictions as limited participation in asset markets or sticky prices. Second, we show that this view of monetary policy may have important consequences for empirical research. In the model, the contemporaneous correlations between interest rates, prices and output are due to the simultaneous effect of all fundamental shocks. We provide an example where these contemporaneous correlations may be misinterpreted as a Taylor rule. In addition, we use the sign of the impact responses of all shocks on output, prices and interest rates derived from the model to identify the sources of shocks in the data.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Calling vs receiving party pays: market penetration and the importance of the call externality

In this paper we study how the access price affects the choice of the tariff regime taken by the network operators. We show that for high values of the access price, that is taken as a parameter by the firms, networks decide to charge only the callers. Otherwise, for low values of the access charge, networks charge also the receivers. Moreover, we compare market penetration and total welfare between the two price regimes. Our model suggests that, for high values of call externality, market penetration and total welfare are larger in Receiving Party Pays regime when the access charge is close to zero.

Macroeconomic shocks and the business cycle: evidence from a structural factor model

We use a dynamic factor model to provide a semi-structural representation for 101 quarterly US macroeconomic series. We find that (i) the US economy is well described by a number of structural shocks between two and six. Focusing on the four-shock specification, we identify, using sign restrictions, two non-policy shocks, demand and supply, and two policy shocks, monetary and fiscal. We obtain the following results. (ii) Both supply and demand shocks are important sources of fluctuations; supply prevails for GDP, while demand prevails for employment and inflation. (ii) Policy matters, Both monetary and fiscal policy shocks have sizeable effects on output and prices, with little evidence of crowding out; both monetary and fiscal authorities implement important systematic countercyclical policies reacting to demand shocks. (iii) Negative demand shocks have a large long-run positive effect on productivity, consistently with the Schumpeterian "cleansing" view of recessions.

Market Transparency, Market Quality and Sunshine Trading

This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We find that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Key words: Market Microstructure, Transparency, Prior Information, Market Quality, Sunshine Trading

Financial Repression in a Natural Experiment: Loan Allocation and the Change in the Usury Laws in 1714

If financial deepening aids economic growth, then financial repression should be harmful. We use a natural experiment – the change in the English usury laws in 1714 – to analyze the effects of interest rate restrictions. We use a sample of individual loan transactions to demonstrate how the reduction of the legal maximum rate of interest affected the supply and demand for credit. Average loan size and minimum loan size increased strongly, and access to credit worsened for those with little ‘social capital.’ While we have no direct evidence that loans were misallocated, the discontinuity in loan receipts makes this highly likely. We conclude that financial repression can undermine the positive effects of financial deepening.