Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Behavioral aspects of investment fund's markets: are good managers lucky or skilled?

It is generally accepted that financial markets are efficient in the long run a lthough there may be some deviations in the short run. It is also accepted that a good portfolio manager is the one who beats the market persistently along time, this type of manager could not exist if markets were perfectly efficient According to this in a pure efficient market we should find that managers know that they can not beat the market so they would undertake only pure passive management strategies. Assuming a certain degree of inefficiency in the short run, a market may show some managers who tr y to beat the market by undertaking active strategies. From Fama’s efficient markets theory we can state that these active managers may beat the market occasionally although they will not be able to enhance significantly their performance in the long run. On the other hand, in an inefficient market it would be expected to find a higher level of activity related with the higher probability of beating the market. In this paper we follow two objectives: first, we set a basis to analyse the level of efficiency in an asset invest- ment funds market by measuring performance, strategies activity and it’s persistence for a certain group of funds during the period of study. Second, we analyse individual performance persistence in order to determine the existence of skilled managers. The CAPM model is taken as theoretical background and the use of the Sharpe’s ratio as a suitable performance measure in a limited information environment leads to a group performance measurement proposal. The empiri- cal study takes quarterly data from 1999-2007 period, for the whole population of the Spanish asset investment funds market, provided by the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This period of study has been chosen to ensure a wide enough range of efficient market observation so it would allow us to set a proper basis to compare with the following period. As a result we develop a model that allows us to measure efficiency in a given asset mutual funds market, based on the level of strategy’s activity undertaken by managers. We also observe persistence in individual performance for a certain group of funds

Online Volunteers : Knowledge Managers in Nonprofits

Peer-reviewed

Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants

An analysis is carried out in a sample of 738 industrial plants of the determining factors in the use of internal promotion of blue-collar workers to middle managers and skilled technicians as against their external recruitment. The use of internal promotion is positively correlated with variables indicative of the efforts made by plants to measure employees' skills, and to a lesser extent, with the level of specificity of investments in human capital made by blue-collar workers. Contrary to what was expected, variables related with the use and efficiency of other incentive systems have no significant influence on the increased or decreased use of internal promotion. These results are initial evidence that internal promotions are used to protect and favour specific investments, especially those made by firms in order to discover their workers' skills.

A Methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both magnitudes

Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.

Efficiency and quality in local government management: the case of Spanish local authorities

This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment, and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Ràdio participativa amb difusió per Internet

Aquesta memòria reuneix una explicació del treball que s'ha dut a terme per a desenvolupar el projecte final de carrera. Aquest tracta d'implementar una ràdio musical que s'emet per Internet però amb la característica d'ésser una ràdio que decideixi la programació musical en funció de la seva audiència. Per a realitzar això es distingiran dos tipus d'usuaris: els oients i els gestors de la ràdio musical. El gestors de la ràdio tindran la responsabilitat d'alimentar de música la ràdio, etiquetar i classificar aquesta música perquè la ràdio estableixi criteris de similitud entre cançons. Els oients seran responsables d'opinar sobre les cançons que emet la ràdio, si els agrada o desagrada, per guiar la ràdio cap al gust musical del propi oient. La complexitat està en què no es tracta d'una ràdio musical amb un sol oient sinó que hi ha diferents oients i s'haurà de saber gestionar correctament els gustos dispersos dels oients. En el present document recullim tots els treballs realitzats, l'anàlisis formal del problema, l'explicació de la solució proposada i com hem realitzat aquesta solució.

Adaptación de un gestor de contenidos para agendas de aprendizaje

Una agenda d'aprenentatge és la disposició temporal de les activitats a realitzar per part d'un alumne per tal d'assolir els objectius docents d'una assignatura. Aquest projecte, una vegada analitzats diferents gestors de continguts, n'adapta un, Moodle, per mostrar les citades agendes. Aquesta implementació neix de la necessitat que els estudiants de primers cursos tinguin pautades les activitats a realitzar tenint en compte el nou escenari europeu d'educació superior i la posada en marxa dels crèdits ECTS, que inclouen les hores de dedicació fora de l'aula.

Política de la competència de la Unió Europea en el sector audiovisual. El cas dels operadors públics estatals de televisió a Espanya i el Regne Unit: RTVE i BBC

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Center for Socio-Legal Studies de la Universitat d’Oxford, Gran Bretanya, entre setembre del 2006 i gener del 2007. L'objectiu d'aquesta recerca ha estat determinar i avaluar com la política de la competència de la Unió Europea ha contribuït a la configuració del sector públic televisiu espanyol i britànic. El marc teòric està basat en el concepte d’ “europeització”, desenvolupat per Harcourt (2002) en el sector de mitjans, i que implica una progressiva referencialitat de les polítiques estatals amb les europees mitjançant dos mecanismes: la redistribució de recursos i els efectes en la socialització de la política europea. Per tal de verificar aquest impacte en el sector televisiu, la recerca ha desenvolupat una aproximació en dues etapes. En primer lloc, a banda de fer un inicial repàs bibliogràfic s'han estudiat les accions de la Comissió Europea en aquest terreny, sobre tot la Comunicació sobre aplicació de la reglamentació d'ajudes públiques al sector de la radiodifusió de 2001. En una segona etapa, s'han desenvolupat un seguit d'entrevistes personals a directius i polítics del sector a Brussel•les, Londres i Madrid. Els resultats de la recerca mostren que el procés d’Europeïtzació es un fenomen creixent en el sector audiovisual públic a Espanya i el Regne Unit, però que encara les peculiaritats estatals juguen un factor preponderant en regular aquesta influència de la UE. L'anàlisi de les entrevistes qualitatives mostren també que hi ha una relació inversament proporcional entre la tradició democràtica i el grau d’influència i de referència que suposa la UE en el sector audiovisual. Mentre que el Regne Unit, l'acció de la política de la competència de la UE es percep com a element suplementari, a Espanya la seva referencialitat ha estat clau, tot i que no decisiva, per la reforma dels mitjans públics estatals.  

Combining classification techniques to define topo-climatic landscapes

Landscape classification tackles issues related to the representation and analysis of continuous and variable ecological data. In this study, a methodology is created in order to define topo-climatic landscapes (TCL) in the north-west of Catalonia (north-east of the Iberian Peninsula). TCLs relate the ecological behaviour of a landscape in terms of topography, physiognomy and climate, which compound the main drivers of an ecosystem. Selected variables are derived from different sources such as remote sensing and climatic atlas. The proposed methodology combines unsupervised interative cluster classification with a supervised fuzzy classification. As a result, 28 TCLs have been found for the study area which may be differentiated in terms of vegetation physiognomy and vegetation altitudinal range type. Furthermore a hierarchy among TCLs is set, enabling the merging of clusters and allowing for changes of scale. Through the topo-climatic landscape map, managers may identify patches with similar environmental conditions and asses at the same time the uncertainty involved.