Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

On the stability of cooperation structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

Law and the practise of principle in diverse societies

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’objecte principal del projecte ha estat analitzar les implicacions jurídico-polítiques i institucionals d’una teoria de la justícia i la igualtat liberals aplicada a societats multiculturals amb un marcat predomini de la diversitat cultural. L’anàlisi desenvolupa una línia d'investigació interdisciplinar - entre el dret i la teoria política - iniciada en una tesis doctoral sobre multiculturalisme i drets de les minories culturals (UPF, 2000) que va culminar en la publicació de Group Rights as Human Rights (Springer, 2006). La recerca adopta com a punt de partida les conclusions de l'esmentada obra, en especial, la rellevància del reconeixement de drets col•lectius; tanmateix, el tipus de qüestions plantejades, l’enfoc i la metodologia emprades són substancialment diferents. En concret, s'adrecen preguntes específiques sobre el model i aspiracions del constitucionalisme democràtic i el paper del dret en contextos multiculturals. També s’atorga un pes central a la dimensió institucional dels models de gestió de la diversitat que s’analitzen, prioritzant un enfocament comparatiu a partir de l’estudi de controvèrsies concretes. L’objectiu és superar algunes limitacions importants de la literatura actual, com ara la tendència a examinar en abstracte la compatibilitat de determinades demandes amb el constitucionalisme democràtic, sense abordar el funcionament d'estratègies de gestió de la diversitat cultural emprades en contextos concrets. Els treballs producte d'aquest projecte articulen les línies bàsiques d’un model pluralista, basat en principis més que en regles, que desafia els plantejaments dominants actualment. Aquest model es caracteritza pel compromís amb la legitimitat i igualtat comparatives, rebutjant el paternalisme i les visions liberals típiques sobre el paper de la regulació. La presumpció de l’“standing” moral dels grups identitaris és fonamental per tal de considerar-los interlocutors vàlids amb interessos genuïns. També s’argumenta que la integració social en contextos multiculturals no depèn tant de l’eliminació del conflicte sinó, sobre tot, d’una gestió eficient que eviti abusos de poder sistemàtics. El model defensa el rol del dret en la institucionalització del diàleg intercultural, però admet que el diàleg no necessàriament condueix a l’acord o a una estructura reguladora coherent i uniforme. Les aspiracions del ordre jurídic pluralista són més modestes: afavorir la negociació i resolució en cada conflicte, malgrat la persistència de la fragmentació i la provisionalitat dels acords. La manca d'un marc regulador comú esdevé una virtut en la mesura que permet la interacció de diferents subordres; una interacció governada per una multiplicitat de regles no necessàriament harmòniques. Els avantatges i problemes d’aquest model s'analitzen a partir de l'anàlisi de l’estructura fragmentària de l'ordre jurídic internacional i del règim Europeu de drets humans.

Study and implementation of some quantitative trading models

Quantitative or algorithmic trading is the automatization of investments decisions obeying a fixed or dynamic sets of rules to determine trading orders. It has increasingly made its way up to 70% of the trading volume of one of the biggest financial markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). However, there is not a signi cant amount of academic literature devoted to it due to the private nature of investment banks and hedge funds. This projects aims to review the literature and discuss the models available in a subject that publications are scarce and infrequently. We review the basic and fundamental mathematical concepts needed for modeling financial markets such as: stochastic processes, stochastic integration and basic models for prices and spreads dynamics necessary for building quantitative strategies. We also contrast these models with real market data with minutely sampling frequency from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Quantitative strategies try to exploit two types of behavior: trend following or mean reversion. The former is grouped in the so-called technical models and the later in the so-called pairs trading. Technical models have been discarded by financial theoreticians but we show that they can be properly cast into a well defined scientific predictor if the signal generated by them pass the test of being a Markov time. That is, we can tell if the signal has occurred or not by examining the information up to the current time; or more technically, if the event is F_t-measurable. On the other hand the concept of pairs trading or market neutral strategy is fairly simple. However it can be cast in a variety of mathematical models ranging from a method based on a simple euclidean distance, in a co-integration framework or involving stochastic differential equations such as the well-known Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean reversal ODE and its variations. A model for forecasting any economic or financial magnitude could be properly defined with scientific rigor but it could also lack of any economical value and be considered useless from a practical point of view. This is why this project could not be complete without a backtesting of the mentioned strategies. Conducting a useful and realistic backtesting is by no means a trivial exercise since the \laws" that govern financial markets are constantly evolving in time. This is the reason because we make emphasis in the calibration process of the strategies' parameters to adapt the given market conditions. We find out that the parameters from technical models are more volatile than their counterpart form market neutral strategies and calibration must be done in a high-frequency sampling manner to constantly track the currently market situation. As a whole, the goal of this project is to provide an overview of a quantitative approach to investment reviewing basic strategies and illustrating them by means of a back-testing with real financial market data. The sources of the data used in this project are Bloomberg for intraday time series and Yahoo! for daily prices. All numeric computations and graphics used and shown in this project were implemented in MATLAB^R scratch from scratch as a part of this thesis. No other mathematical or statistical software was used.

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.

Management of Exceptions on Access Control Policies

Peer-reviewed

Accuracy vs. simplicity: a complex trade-off

Inductive learning aims at finding general rules that hold true in a database. Targeted learning seeks rules for the predictions of the value of a variable based on the values of others, as in the case of linear or non-parametric regression analysis. Non-targeted learning finds regularities without a specific prediction goal. We model the product of non-targeted learning as rules that state that a certain phenomenon never happens, or that certain conditions necessitate another. For all types of rules, there is a trade-off between the rule's accuracy and its simplicity. Thus rule selection can be viewed as a choice problem, among pairs of degree of accuracy and degree of complexity. However, one cannot in general tell what is the feasible set in the accuracy-complexity space. Formally, we show that finding out whether a point belongs to this set is computationally hard. In particular, in the context of linear regression, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard. Computational complexity may explain why a person is not always aware of rules that, if asked, she would find valid. This, in turn, may explain why one can change other people's minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing new information.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

A Retail benchmarking approach to eficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network covera.

Aplicaciones Single Program Multiple Data (SPMD) en ambientes distribuidos

Un reto al ejecutar las aplicaciones en un cluster es lograr mejorar las prestaciones utilizando los recursos de manera eficiente, y este reto es mayor al utilizar un ambiente distribuido. Teniendo en cuenta este reto, se proponen un conjunto de reglas para realizar el cómputo en cada uno de los nodos, basado en el análisis de cómputo y comunicaciones de las aplicaciones, se analiza un esquema de mapping de celdas y un método para planificar el orden de ejecución, tomando en consideración la ejecución por prioridad, donde las celdas de fronteras tienen una mayor prioridad con respecto a las celdas internas. En la experimentación se muestra el solapamiento del computo interno con las comunicaciones de las celdas fronteras, obteniendo resultados donde el Speedup aumenta y los niveles de eficiencia se mantienen por encima de un 85%, finalmente se obtiene ganancias de los tiempos de ejecución, concluyendo que si se puede diseñar un esquemas de solapamiento que permita que la ejecución de las aplicaciones SPMD en un cluster se hagan de forma eficiente.

A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum

In a distribution problem, and specfii cally in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that no agent receives more than her claim, a problem that can arise when using the egalitarian division. We propose an alternative modi cation, by using a convex combination of P and EA. The recursive application of this new rule finishes at the CEA rule. Our solution concept ensures a minimum amount to each agent, and distributes the remaining estate in a proportional way. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Proportional rule, Equal Awards, Convex combination of rules, Lorenz dominance. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Bingo Segur

L'aplicació 'Bingo Segur' ha estat una implementació pel cas del joc del bingo, del recurs de les cadenes hash esteses amb compromís de bit, que ens garanteix confidencialitat i autenticació de les dades.

Bingo segur

En aquest TFC es proposa un protocol de CMS aplicat a un Joc de Bingo, en que les entrades són nombres generats pels jugadors i el resultat cercat és un nombre aleatori per al joc.

Analitzador gràfic de xarxa en entorn GNU

Treball de fi de carrera d'enginyeria tècnica en informàtica de sistemes. El treball s'estructura en introducció, anàlisi, implementació, manual d'instal·lació, joc de proves... del treball. Aquest Treball Final de Carrera s'inclou dins de l'àrea de Xarxes deComputadors. Consisteix en la realització d'una aplicació gràfica en entornGNU que faci un anàlisi del tràfic d'una xarxa informàtica; això es coneix ambel nom de Sniffer.