Learning from errors

We present a model of learning in which agents learn from errors. If an action turns out to be an error, the agent rejects not only that action but also neighboring actions. We find that, keepng memory of his errors, under mild assumptions an acceptable solution is asymptotically reached. Moreover, one can take advantage of big errors for a faster learning.

Anàlisi de la controvèrsia L'Hôpital - Bernoulli

El 1696 el Marquès de L'Hôpital publicà el primer tractat sistemàtic sobre càlcul diferencial, l'"Analyse des infiniments petits", que es basava en les "Lectiones de calculo differentialium" de Johann Bernoulli. Però podem parlar d'aportacions originals per part de L'Hôpital? L'objectiu d'aquest treball de recerca és comparar el contingut i la forma de l'Analyse i de les Lectiones i detectar possibles influències d'altres autors per intentar, finalment, donar una resposta a aquesta qüestió.

Recovering the Elliott invariant from the Cuntz semigroup

Let A be a simple, separable C*-algebra of stable rank one. We prove that the Cuntz semigroup of C (T, A) is determined by its Murray-von Neumann semigroup of projections and a certain semigroup of lower semicontinuous functions (with values in the Cuntz semigroup of A). This result has two consequences. First, specializing to the case that A is simple, finite, separable and Z-stable, this yields a description of the Cuntz semigroup of C (T, A) in terms of the Elliott invariant of A. Second, suitably interpreted, it shows that the Elliott functor and the functor defined by the Cuntz semigroup of the tensor product with the algebra of continuous functions on the circle are naturally equivalent.

Bayesian nash equilibrium in ''linear'' cournot models with private information about costs

Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices (and quantities) has been ignored or not properly dealt with and the correct calculation of all Bayesian Nash equilibria is more complicated than expected. Moreover, multiple symmetric and interior Bayesianf equilibria may exist for an open set of parameters. The reason for this is that linear demand is not really linear, since there is a kink at zero price: the general ''linear'' inverse demand function is P (Q) = max{a - bQ, 0} rather than P (Q) = a - bQ.

Overcoming the ethical dilemmas of skilled migration? An analysis of international narratives on the “brain drain”

Migration-related issues have, since approximately 2000, been the object of increased attention at the international level. This has led, among other things, to the production of international narratives, which aim both at understanding migration and at proposing policy recommendations on how to address it, with the objective of improving the governance of migration at the global level. But this implies overcoming dilemmas stemming from the diverging interests of states and other actors (like NGOs and the private sector). This article examines the way in which international migration narratives address skilled migration, which is characterised by some of the clearest political trade-offs between stakeholders. It argues that these narratives attempt to speak to all parties and conciliate contradictory arguments about what should be done, in order to discursively overcome policy dilemmas and create a consensus. While this is line with the mandate of international organizations, it depoliticises migration issues.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.