Crecimiento, instituciones e hidrocarburos : el proyecto petrolero mexicano en perspectiva histórica comparada (1938-2000)

En este trabajo se analiza la política petrolera mexicana durante el período 1938-2000 y su aportación al crecimiento económico mexicano. La orientación de la producción petrolera permite distinguir dos modelos de gestión de la industria petrolera. El primero de ellos; entre 1938-1976 tuvo por finalidad el aprovisionamiento energético del mercado interior a bajos precios. El segundo a partir de 1976 orientado hacia la exportación y la captura de la renta petrolera internacional. Esta ruptura en la política petrolera asociada constituye un caso interesante en sí mismo porque permite comparar los efectos de dos políticas totalmente opuestas sobre el crecimiento económico y sobre el desempeño de la propia industria petrolera en un país donde el Estado tiene derechos de propiedad exclusivos sobre el sector petrolero. Por ello, se aborda el tema como una problemática institucional que toma en cuenta tanto las características internas de México como la dinámica del mercado petrolero internacional. Se incide en el hecho de que el Estado mexicano ha utilizado a la industria petrolera y; concretamente los recursos que ésta genera no sólo como un instrumento para favorecer el crecimiento económico del país sino también para mantener el control del poder político frente a la élite económica. Así el inmovilismo institucional; la falta de ingresos e inversiones propias y el comportamiento rentista del Estado parecen haber condenado al sector petrolero mexicano al atraso y la ineficiencia. De este modo; se focaliza en las interrelaciones entre las instituciones económicas y políticas como elemento explicativo del por qué la industria petrolera no ha logrado convertirse en un elemento dinamizador del crecimiento económico mexicano en el largo plazo.

The Role of Railways in Export-Led Growth: The Case of Uruguay, 1870-1913

The social saving literature has highlighted the indispensable role that railways played before 1914 in several Latin American export-oriented economies, such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The article analyses the case of Uruguay, a country that, by 1914, had built one of the densest railway networks in Latin America. The article shows that, in contrast to what happened in other economies of the region, the resource saving effects of the Uruguayan railways during the first globalisation were tiny due to the small share that railway output accounted for within the country's gross domestic product (GDP). Three complementary reasons are suggested to explain that result, namely: the geographical structure of the country; its sectoral specialisation; and the small scale of the Uruguayan economy. Due to these three characteristics, Uruguay was unable to benefit from railways in the way that other export-oriented Latin American economies did during the first period of globalisation. This conclusion draws attention to the geographic-specific character of railway technology.

An agency-oriented model to explain vine-growing specialization in the province of Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) in the mid-nineteenth century

[cat] En aquest treball presentem un model per explicar el procés d’especialització vitícola assolit als municipis de la província de Barcelona, a mitjans del s. XIX,que cerca entendre com va sorgir històricament un avantatge comparatiu fruit d’un procés que esdevindria un dels punts de partida del procés d’industrialització a Catalunya. Els resultats confirmen els papers jugats pel impuls “Boserupià” de la població en un context d’intensificació de l’ús de la terra, i d’un impuls del mercat “Smithià” en un context d’expansió de la demanda per part de les economies atlàntiques. També es posa de manifest la importància de les dotacions agro-ecològiques i les condicions socioinstitucionals relacionades amb la desigualtat d’ingrés. La difusió de la vinya donà com a resultat unes comunitats rurals menys desiguals fins al 1820, tot i que aquesta desigualtat augmentà de nou a partir d'aleshores.

An agency-oriented model to explain vine-growing specialization in the province of Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) in the mid-nineteenth century

[cat] En aquest treball presentem un model per explicar el procés d’especialització vitícola assolit als municipis de la província de Barcelona, a mitjans del s. XIX,que cerca entendre com va sorgir històricament un avantatge comparatiu fruit d’un procés que esdevindria un dels punts de partida del procés d’industrialització a Catalunya. Els resultats confirmen els papers jugats pel impuls “Boserupià” de la població en un context d’intensificació de l’ús de la terra, i d’un impuls del mercat “Smithià” en un context d’expansió de la demanda per part de les economies atlàntiques. També es posa de manifest la importància de les dotacions agro-ecològiques i les condicions socioinstitucionals relacionades amb la desigualtat d’ingrés. La difusió de la vinya donà com a resultat unes comunitats rurals menys desiguals fins al 1820, tot i que aquesta desigualtat augmentà de nou a partir d'aleshores.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Research policy and endogenous growth

This paper studies the effects of different types of research policy on economic growth. We find that while tax incentives to private research, public funding of private projects, and basic research performed at public institutions have unambiguously positive effects on economic growth, performing applied research at public institutions could have negative growth effects. This is due to the large crowding out of private research caused by public R\&D when it competes with private firms in the "patent race". Concerning the effects of these policies on welfare, it is found that research policy can either improve or reduce consumer welfare depending on the characteristics of the policy and that an excessively high research subsidy will reduce it.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Long-run Inflation-Unemployment Dynamics: The Spanish Phillips Curve and Economic Policy

This paper takes a new look at the long-run dynamics of inflation and unemployment in response to permanent changes in the growth rate of the money supply. We examine the Phillips curve from the perspective of what we call "frictional growth", i.e. the interaction between money growth and nominal frictions. After presenting theoretical models of this phenomenon, we construct an empirical model of the Spanish economy and, in this context, we evaluate the long-run inflation-unemployment trade for Spain and examine how recent policy changes have afected it.