Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Aplicaciones Single Program Multiple Data (SPMD) en ambientes distribuidos

Un reto al ejecutar las aplicaciones en un cluster es lograr mejorar las prestaciones utilizando los recursos de manera eficiente, y este reto es mayor al utilizar un ambiente distribuido. Teniendo en cuenta este reto, se proponen un conjunto de reglas para realizar el cómputo en cada uno de los nodos, basado en el análisis de cómputo y comunicaciones de las aplicaciones, se analiza un esquema de mapping de celdas y un método para planificar el orden de ejecución, tomando en consideración la ejecución por prioridad, donde las celdas de fronteras tienen una mayor prioridad con respecto a las celdas internas. En la experimentación se muestra el solapamiento del computo interno con las comunicaciones de las celdas fronteras, obteniendo resultados donde el Speedup aumenta y los niveles de eficiencia se mantienen por encima de un 85%, finalmente se obtiene ganancias de los tiempos de ejecución, concluyendo que si se puede diseñar un esquemas de solapamiento que permita que la ejecución de las aplicaciones SPMD en un cluster se hagan de forma eficiente.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

Including the workload effect in the parallel program signature

Performance prediction and application behavior modeling have been the subject of exten- sive research that aim to estimate applications performance with an acceptable precision. A novel approach to predict the performance of parallel applications is based in the con- cept of Parallel Application Signatures that consists in extract an application most relevant parts (phases) and the number of times they repeat (weights). Executing these phases in a target machine and multiplying its exeuction time by its weight an estimation of the application total execution time can be made. One of the problems is that the performance of an application depends on the program workload. Every type of workload affects differently how an application performs in a given system and so affects the signature execution time. Since the workloads used in most scientific parallel applications have dimensions and data ranges well known and the behavior of these applications are mostly deterministic, a model of how the programs workload affect its performance can be obtained. We create a new methodology to model how a program’s workload affect the parallel application signature. Using regression analysis we are able to generalize each phase time execution and weight function to predict an application performance in a target system for any type of workload within predefined range. We validate our methodology using a synthetic program, benchmarks applications and well known real scientific applications.

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

The impact of interest-rate subsidies on long-term household debt: Evidence from a large program

The responsiveness of long-term household debt to the interest rate is acrucial parameter for assessing the effectiveness of public policies aimedat promoting specific types of saving. This paper estimates the effect ofa reform of Credito Bonificado, a large program in Portugal that subsidizedmortgage interest rates, on long-term household debt. The reform establisheda ceiling in the price of the house that could be financed through theprogram, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in incentives. Usinga unique dataset of matched household survey data and administrative recordsof debt, we document a large decrease in the probability of signing a newloan after the removal of the subsidy.

Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability

We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output. More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility. A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.

An enhanced concave program relaxation for choice network revenue management

The network choice revenue management problem models customers as choosing from an offer-set, andthe firm decides the best subset to offer at any given moment to maximize expected revenue. The resultingdynamic program for the firm is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear programcalled the CDLP which has an exponential number of columns. However, under the choice-set paradigmwhen the segment consideration sets overlap, the CDLP is difficult to solve. Column generation has beenproposed but finding an entering column has been shown to be NP-hard. In this paper, starting with aconcave program formulation based on segment-level consideration sets called SDCP, we add a class ofconstraints called product constraints, that project onto subsets of intersections. In addition we proposea natural direct tightening of the SDCP called ?SDCP, and compare the performance of both methodson the benchmark data sets in the literature. Both the product constraints and the ?SDCP method arevery simple and easy to implement and are applicable to the case of overlapping segment considerationsets. In our computational testing on the benchmark data sets in the literature, SDCP with productconstraints achieves the CDLP value at a fraction of the CPU time taken by column generation and webelieve is a very promising approach for quickly approximating CDLP when segment consideration setsoverlap and the consideration sets themselves are relatively small.

Improving college access and success for low-income students: Evidence from a large need-based grant program

Using comprehensive administrative data on France's single largest financialaid program, this paper provides new evidence on the impact of large-scaleneed-based grant programs on the college enrollment decisions, persistenceand graduation rates of low-income students. We exploit sharp discontinuitiesin the grant eligibility formula to identify the impact of aid on student outcomesat different levels of study. We find that eligibility for an annual cashallowance of 1,500 euros increases college enrollment rates by up to 5 percentagepoints. Moreover, we show that need-based grants have positive effectson student persistence and degree completion.