The making of international environmental agreements

We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries at least equal to some ratification threshold. We analyze the role played by ratification threshold rules and provide conditions for international environmental agreements to enter into force. We show that a large typology of agreements can enter into force among the one constituted by the grand coalition.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

A General model of bilateral migration agreements

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.

Mathematical description of bacterial traveling pulses

The Keller-Segel system has been widely proposed as a model for bacterial waves driven by chemotactic processes. Current experiments on E. coli have shown precise structure of traveling pulses. We present here an alternative mathematical description of traveling pulses at a macroscopic scale. This modeling task is complemented with numerical simulations in accordance with the experimental observations. Our model is derived from an accurate kinetic description of the mesoscopic run-and-tumble process performed by bacteria. This model can account for recent experimental observations with E. coli. Qualitative agreements include the asymmetry of the pulse and transition in the collective behaviour (clustered motion versus dispersion). In addition we can capture quantitatively the main characteristics of the pulse such as the speed and the relative size of tails. This work opens several experimental and theoretical perspectives. Coefficients at the macroscopic level are derived from considerations at the cellular scale. For instance the stiffness of the signal integration process turns out to have a strong effect on collective motion. Furthermore the bottom-up scaling allows to perform preliminary mathematical analysis and write efficient numerical schemes. This model is intended as a predictive tool for the investigation of bacterial collective motion.

Law and the practise of principle in diverse societies

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, entre 2007 i 2009. L’objecte principal del projecte ha estat analitzar les implicacions jurídico-polítiques i institucionals d’una teoria de la justícia i la igualtat liberals aplicada a societats multiculturals amb un marcat predomini de la diversitat cultural. L’anàlisi desenvolupa una línia d'investigació interdisciplinar - entre el dret i la teoria política - iniciada en una tesis doctoral sobre multiculturalisme i drets de les minories culturals (UPF, 2000) que va culminar en la publicació de Group Rights as Human Rights (Springer, 2006). La recerca adopta com a punt de partida les conclusions de l'esmentada obra, en especial, la rellevància del reconeixement de drets col•lectius; tanmateix, el tipus de qüestions plantejades, l’enfoc i la metodologia emprades són substancialment diferents. En concret, s'adrecen preguntes específiques sobre el model i aspiracions del constitucionalisme democràtic i el paper del dret en contextos multiculturals. També s’atorga un pes central a la dimensió institucional dels models de gestió de la diversitat que s’analitzen, prioritzant un enfocament comparatiu a partir de l’estudi de controvèrsies concretes. L’objectiu és superar algunes limitacions importants de la literatura actual, com ara la tendència a examinar en abstracte la compatibilitat de determinades demandes amb el constitucionalisme democràtic, sense abordar el funcionament d'estratègies de gestió de la diversitat cultural emprades en contextos concrets. Els treballs producte d'aquest projecte articulen les línies bàsiques d’un model pluralista, basat en principis més que en regles, que desafia els plantejaments dominants actualment. Aquest model es caracteritza pel compromís amb la legitimitat i igualtat comparatives, rebutjant el paternalisme i les visions liberals típiques sobre el paper de la regulació. La presumpció de l’“standing” moral dels grups identitaris és fonamental per tal de considerar-los interlocutors vàlids amb interessos genuïns. També s’argumenta que la integració social en contextos multiculturals no depèn tant de l’eliminació del conflicte sinó, sobre tot, d’una gestió eficient que eviti abusos de poder sistemàtics. El model defensa el rol del dret en la institucionalització del diàleg intercultural, però admet que el diàleg no necessàriament condueix a l’acord o a una estructura reguladora coherent i uniforme. Les aspiracions del ordre jurídic pluralista són més modestes: afavorir la negociació i resolució en cada conflicte, malgrat la persistència de la fragmentació i la provisionalitat dels acords. La manca d'un marc regulador comú esdevé una virtut en la mesura que permet la interacció de diferents subordres; una interacció governada per una multiplicitat de regles no necessàriament harmòniques. Els avantatges i problemes d’aquest model s'analitzen a partir de l'anàlisi de l’estructura fragmentària de l'ordre jurídic internacional i del règim Europeu de drets humans.

Collective intelligence

Estudio e implantación de algoritmos de recomendación, búsqueda, ranking y aprendizaje.

Open video tools to support the production of online collaborative audiovisual projects : how to promote collective creation in e-learning

This paper analyses the use of open video editing tools to support the creation and production of online collaborative audiovisual projects for higher education. It focuses on the possibilities offered by these tools to promote collective creation in virtual environments.

Collective Intelligence for OER Sustainability

To thrive, the Open Educational Resource (OER) movement, or a given initiative, must make sense of a complex, changing environment. Since "sustainability" is a desirable systemic capacity that our community should display, we consider a number of principles that sharpen the concept: resilience, sensemaking and complexity. We outline how these motivate the concept of collective intelligence (CI), we give examples of what OER-CI might look like, and we describe the emerging Cohere CI platform we are developing in response to these requirements.

The Decision on Turkish EU accession in December 2002: The logic of anarchy, collective action problems and rhetorical action

Studies of the EU accession of the East and Central European Countries have stressed the importance of neo-liberal institutionalism as an explanation for Member State preferences. In this paper it is argued that Member States’ preferences over Turkish EU accession are better explained by power politics and neo-realism. It seems therefore that Turkey’s way to the EU follows another path than the East and Central Countries. Turkish accession raises the question of the EU’s role in a uni-polar world order – whether the EU should develop into an independent actor on the world stage or not. However, when it comes to the interaction among the Member States in order to decide on when to open accession negotiations with Turkey the constitutive values of the EU seriously modify the outcome that pure power politics would have let to.