Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Periodic Solutions in Low-Dimensional Climatic Models

Classic climatic models use constitutive laws without any response time. A more realistic approach to the natural processes governing climate dynamics must introduce response time for heat and radiation fluxes. Extended irreversible thermodynamics (EIT) is a good thermodynamical framework for introducing nonclassical constitutive laws. In the present study EIT has been used to analyze a Budyko–Sellers one-dimensional energybalance model developed by G. R. North. The results present self-sustained periodic oscillations when the response time is greater than a critical value. The high-frequency (few kiloyears) damped and nondamped oscillations obtained can be related to abrupt climatic changes without any variation in the external forcing of the system

Optimal management of microgrids

Desenvolupament dels models matemàtics necessaris per a controlar de forma òptima la microxarxa existent als laboratoris del Institut de Recerca en Energia de Catalunya. Els algoritmes s'implementaran per tal de simular el comportament i posteriorment es programaran directament sobre els elements de la microxarxa per verificar el seu correcte funcionament.. Desenvolupament dels models matemàtics necessaris per a controlar de forma òptima la microxarxa existent als laboratoris del Institut de Recerca en Energia de Catalunya. Els algoritmes s'implementaran per tal de simular el comportament i posteriorment es programaran directament sobre els elements de la microxarxa per verificar el seu correcte funcionament.

Evaluating solutions to process, view and listen mathematical formula within an accessible context

Proves de conversió de fòrmules matemàtiques des d'editors de text ofimàtics i des de Làtex. Visionat en HTML i MathML. El millor resultat s'aconsegueix amb MSWord+MathType i IE+MathPlayer.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Interiority of the optimal population growth rate with endogenous fertility

This paper analyzes the issue of the interiority of the optimal population growth rate in a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, we show that the introduction of a cost of raising children allows for the possibility of the existence of an interior global maximum in the planner¿s problem, contrary to the exogenous fertility case

Optimal generalized quantum measurements for arbitrary spin systems

Positive-operator-valued measurements on a finite number of N identically prepared systems of arbitrary spin J are discussed. Pure states are characterized in terms of Bloch-like vectors restricted by a SU(2J+1) covariant constraint. This representation allows for a simple description of the equations to be fulfilled by optimal measurements. We explicitly find the minimal positive-operator-valued measurement for the N=2 case, a rigorous bound for N=3, and set up the analysis for arbitrary N.