Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Complementarity between technology make and buy in innovation strategies: Evidence from Belgiam manufacturing firms

This paper characterizes the innovation strategy of manufacturing firms andexamines the relation between the innovation strategy and importantindustry-, firm- and innovation-specific characteristics using Belgiandata from the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey. In addition to importantsize effects explaining innovation, we find that high perceived risks andcosts and low appropriability of innovations do not discourage innovation,but rather determine how the innovation sourcing strategy is chosen. Withrespect to the determinants of the decision of the innovative firm toproduce technology itself (Make) or to source technology externally (Buy),we find that small firms are more likely restrict their innovation strategyto an exclusive make or buy strategy, while large firms are more likely tocombine both internal and external knowledge acquisition in their innovationstrategy. An interesting result that highlights the complementary nature ofthe Make and Buy decisions, is that, controlled for firm size, companies forwhich internal information is an important source for innovation are morelikely to combine internal and external sources of technology. We find thisto be evidence of the fact that in-house R&D generates the necessaryabsorptive capacity to profit from external knowledge acquisition. Also theeffectiveness of different mechanisms to appropriate the benefits ofinnovations and the internal organizational resistance against change areimportant determinants of the firm's technology sourcing strategy.

Trends in hours, balanced growth and the role of technology in the business cycle

The present paper revisits a property embedded in most dynamic macroeconomic models: the stationarity of hours worked. First, I argue that, contrary to what is often believed, there are many reasons why hours could be nonstationary in those models, while preserving the property of balanced growth. Second, I show that the postwar evidence for most industrialized economies is clearly at odds with the assumption of stationary hours per capita. Third, I examine the implications of that evidence for the role of technology as a source of economic fluctuations in the G7 countries.

External technology sources: Embodied or disembodied technology acquisition

This paper analyzes the choice between different innovationactivities of a firm. In particular, we study the technologyacquisition decision of the firm, i.e. its technology BUYdecision as part of the firm's innovation strategy. We take a closer look at the different types of external technologyacquisition where we distinguish two broad types of technologybuy decisions. On the one hand, the firm can acquire new technology which is embodied in an asset that is acquired suchas new personnel or (parts of) other firms or equipment. On the other hand, the firm can obtain new technology disembodiedthrough a licensing agreement or by outsourcing the technologydevelopment from an R&D contractor or consulting agency. Through a series of Probit regressions, we discuss variables that might affect external technology acquisition choices of the firm andpay special attention to the firm's abilities to scan the market for technology and to absorb the technology acquired. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of different appropriationregimes on the decision of the firm to source technology.

Thermal modeling and management in ultrathin chip stack technology

This paper presents a thermal modeling for power management of a new three-dimensional (3-D) thinned dies stacking process. Besides the high concentration of power dissipating sources, which is the direct consequence of the very interesting integration efficiency increase, this new ultra-compact packaging technology can suffer of the poor thermal conductivity (about 700 times smaller than silicon one) of the benzocyclobutene (BCB) used as both adhesive and planarization layers in each level of the stack. Thermal simulation was conducted using three-dimensional (3-D) FEM tool to analyze the specific behaviors in such stacked structure and to optimize the design rules. This study first describes the heat transfer limitation through the vertical path by examining particularly the case of the high dissipating sources under small area. First results of characterization in transient regime by means of dedicated test device mounted in single level structure are presented. For the design optimization, the thermal draining capabilities of a copper grid or full copper plate embedded in the intermediate layer of stacked structure are evaluated as a function of the technological parameters and the physical properties. It is shown an interest for the transverse heat extraction under the buffer devices dissipating most the power and generally localized in the peripheral zone, and for the temperature uniformization, by heat spreading mechanism, in the localized regions where the attachment of the thin die is altered. Finally, all conclusions of this analysis are used for the quantitative projections of the thermal performance of a first demonstrator based on a three-levels stacking structure for space application.

Dynamic compact thermal models with multiple power sources: application to an ultrathin chip stacking technology

Whereas numerical modeling using finite-element methods (FEM) can provide transient temperature distribution in the component with enough accuracy, it is of the most importance the development of compact dynamic thermal models that can be used for electrothermal simulation. While in most cases single power sources are considered, here we focus on the simultaneous presence of multiple sources. The thermal model will be in the form of a thermal impedance matrix containing the thermal impedance transfer functions between two arbitrary ports. Eachindividual transfer function element ( ) is obtained from the analysis of the thermal temperature transient at node ¿ ¿ after a power step at node ¿ .¿ Different options for multiexponential transient analysis are detailed and compared. Among the options explored, small thermal models can be obtained by constrained nonlinear least squares (NLSQ) methods if the order is selected properly using validation signals. The methods are applied to the extraction of dynamic compact thermal models for a new ultrathin chip stack technology (UTCS).

Application of a floating well concept to a latch-up-free, low-cost, smart power high-side switch technology

The aim of this brief is to present an original design methodology that permits implementing latch-up-free smart power circuits on a very simple, cost-effective technology. The basic concept used for this purpose is letting float the wells of the MOS transistors most susceptible to initiate latch-up.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.