A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Optimal taxation without state-contingent debt

To recover a version of Barro's (1979) `random walk'tax smoothing outcome, we modify Lucas and Stokey's (1983) economyto permit only risk--free debt. This imparts near unit root like behaviorto government debt, independently of the government expenditureprocess, a realistic outcome in the spirit of Barro's. We showhow the risk--free--debt--only economy confronts the Ramsey plannerwith additional constraints on equilibrium allocations thattake the form of a sequence of measurability conditions.We solve the Ramsey problem by formulating it in terms of a Lagrangian,and applying a Parameterized Expectations Algorithm tothe associated first--order conditions. The first--order conditions andnumerical impulse response functions partially affirmBarro's random walk outcome. Though the behaviors oftax rates, government surpluses, and government debts differ, allocationsare very close for computed Ramsey policies across incomplete and completemarkets economies.

Small-area estimation with spatial similarity

A class of composite estimators of small area quantities that exploit spatial (distancerelated)similarity is derived. It is based on a distribution-free model for the areas, but theestimators are aimed to have optimal design-based properties. Composition is applied alsoto estimate some of the global parameters on which the small area estimators depend.It is shown that the commonly adopted assumption of random effects is not necessaryfor exploiting the similarity of the districts (borrowing strength across the districts). Themethods are applied in the estimation of the mean household sizes and the proportions ofsingle-member households in the counties (comarcas) of Catalonia. The simplest version ofthe estimators is more efficient than the established alternatives, even though the extentof spatial similarity is quite modest.

Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whoseinternal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problemsarrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to theirrespective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone.The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason,the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization ofthe threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of foatingproblems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We buildupon this characterization to address a design problem: the determinationof what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any givenproblem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimalnetwork is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized ), whereas it islargely homogenous (or decentralized ) for high arrival rates. We also showthat, if an auxiliary assumption holds, the transition between these twoopposite structures is sharp and they are the only ones to ever qualify asoptimal.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Optimal management of microgrids

Desenvolupament dels models matemàtics necessaris per a controlar de forma òptima la microxarxa existent als laboratoris del Institut de Recerca en Energia de Catalunya. Els algoritmes s'implementaran per tal de simular el comportament i posteriorment es programaran directament sobre els elements de la microxarxa per verificar el seu correcte funcionament.. Desenvolupament dels models matemàtics necessaris per a controlar de forma òptima la microxarxa existent als laboratoris del Institut de Recerca en Energia de Catalunya. Els algoritmes s'implementaran per tal de simular el comportament i posteriorment es programaran directament sobre els elements de la microxarxa per verificar el seu correcte funcionament.

Two component Emden sphere

The theory of a self-gravitating gas sphere is given. The gravitational field is generated by two components, each of which is an independent isothermal gas. Various quantities of interest, such as density profiles, core radii of both components, masses, free-free luminosity, surface brightness, central surface density, and overestimate of central mass density, are given for different values of both parameters which arise naturally (ratio of central densities, ratio of rms velocities). Fundamental changes appear when comparison is made with a theory in which the second component is a 'test component'. Procedures are given for the complete analysis of real astrophysical configurations such as clusters of galaxies or globular clusters.

On-line event detection by recursive dynamic principal component analysis and gas sensor arrays under drift conditions

Leakage detection is an important issue in many chemical sensing applications. Leakage detection hy thresholds suffers from important drawbacks when sensors have serious drifts or they are affected by cross-sensitivities. Here we present an adaptive method based in a Dynamic Principal Component Analysis that models the relationships between the sensors in the may. In normal conditions a certain variance distribution characterizes sensor signals. However, in the presence of a new source of variance the PCA decomposition changes drastically. In order to prevent the influence of sensor drifts the model is adaptive and it is calculated in a recursive manner with minimum computational effort. The behavior of this technique is studied with synthetic signals and with real signals arising by oil vapor leakages in an air compressor. Results clearly demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method.

Drift compensation of gas sensor array data by common principal component analysis

A new drift compensation method based on Common Principal Component Analysis (CPCA) is proposed. The drift variance in data is found as the principal components computed by CPCA. This method finds components that are common for all gasses in feature space. The method is compared in classification task with respect to the other approaches published where the drift direction is estimated through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of a reference gas. The proposed new method ¿ employing no specific reference gas, but information from all gases ¿has shown the same performance as the traditional approach with the best-fitted reference gas. Results are shown with data lasting 7-months including three gases at different concentrations for an array of 17 polymeric sensors.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.