The Impact of advice on women's and men's selection into competition

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice affects the gender gap in the entry into a real-effort tournament. Our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action. Advice is given by subjects who have already had some experience with the participation decision. We show that advice improves the entry decision of subjects, in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down. This is mainly driven by significantly increased entry of strong performing women, who also become significantly more confident, and reduced entry of weak performing men.

Sales restriction, quality selection and the mode of competition

A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition

L' atur de llarga durada de les dones majors de 45 anys a Catalunya: una anàlisi exploratòria tenint en compte la classe social i la divisió sexual del treball

This article provides an in-depth study of long-term female unemployment in Catalonia.Long-term unemployment statistics reveal which social groups are most likely to experience difficulty re-entering the labour market. In this case, we found that women are mainly affected by this type of labour exclusion, in particular poorly qualified, working-class women who are aged over 45 and with family responsibilities.The article aims to explore how the overlapping of factors such as gender, age, social class, origin and the division of work based on gender are related to long-term female unemployment. Moreover, we were able to detect which conceptual tools provide us with the production/reproduction paradigm so as to be able to analyse the future of female unemployment. The methodology we used combines quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the one hand, the analysis of secondary statistical data focusing on Catalonia is useful in understanding the situation from a macro-social perspective. On the other hand, an exploratory discussion group enables us to investigate social imaginary practises among unemployed working class women aged over 45. This discussion group was held in Igualada -capital of the Anoia region - an area of Catalonia deeply affected by unemployment in the current economic crisis.

Toronto Waterfront Internacional Competition

Concurs internacional restringit per invitació per a la Toronto Waterfront international competition

Anisotropic dispersion, space competition, and the slowdown of the Neolithic transition

The front speed of the Neolithic (farmer) spread in Europe decreased as it reached Northern latitudes, where the Mesolithic (huntergatherer) population density was higher. Here, we describe a reaction diffusion model with (i) an anisotropic dispersion kernel depending on the Mesolithicpopulation density gradient and (ii) a modified population growth equation. Both effects are related to the space available for the Neolithic population. The model is able to explain the slowdown of the Neolithic front as observed from archaeological data

Prevención de la transmisión sexual del VIH en adolescentes

En una muestra de 119 estudiantes de cuarto de Educación Secundaria Obligatoria (ESO) y primerode Bachillerato (52,6% mujeres) se analizan los conocimientos sobre la prevención de latransmisión sexual del virus del sida, las expectativas de resultados y de autoeficacia respecto a losmétodos preventivos y el tipo de prevención utilizada durante la última relación sexual. Para evitarlas respuestas inducidas respecto a los comportamientos preventivos se emplea un formato de preguntaabierta. Los resultados muestran que sólo el 23,5% de los estudiantes han dado dos respuestastotalmente correctas sobre estrategias consideradas eficaces en la prevención sexual del VIH:uso del preservativo y abstinencia (por este orden). El 70,5% valoran totalmente o muy eficaz elpreservativo para evitar la transmisión sexual del VIH y el 95% de los que dan la segunda respuestajuzgan totalmente eficaz la práctica de la abstinencia con la misma finalidad. En el caso del preservativose sienten totalmente o muy capaces de usarlo el 64,3%, mientras que cuando se trata de laabstinencia sólo se perciben con esa competencia el 20%. Por lo que se refiere al uso autoinformadode métodos preventivos en la última relación, por parte de los 29 estudiantes que tuvieronactividad sexual durante el mes anterior, se observa que 21 de ellos emplearon el preservativo, dosla píldora anticonceptiva, otros dos no precisan el tipo de precaución y el resto no tomó ninguna.Tanto el reducido nivel de conocimientos sobre prevención, como la baja percepción de autoeficaciapara mantenerse abstinentes, nos alertan sobre la necesidad de hacer un mayor esfuerzo de informaciónpara eliminar creencias equivocadas, como por ejemplo: sobre la pretendida eficacia protectorade tener relaciones sexuales con una pareja estable o conocida. Así mismo, conviene insistiren el uso del preservativo como anticonceptivo de elección entre los adolescentes

Avoiding transcription factor competition at promoter level increases the chances of obtaining oscillations

Background: The ultimate goal of synthetic biology is the conception and construction of genetic circuits that are reliable with respect to their designed function (e.g. oscillators, switches). This task remains still to be attained due to the inherent synergy of the biological building blocks and to an insufficient feedback between experiments and mathematical models. Nevertheless, the progress in these directions has been substantial. Results: It has been emphasized in the literature that the architecture of a genetic oscillator must include positive (activating) and negative (inhibiting) genetic interactions in order to yield robust oscillations. Our results point out that the oscillatory capacity is not only affected by the interaction polarity but by how it is implemented at promoter level. For a chosen oscillator architecture, we show by means of numerical simulations that the existence or lack of competition between activator and inhibitor at promoter level affects the probability of producing oscillations and also leaves characteristic fingerprints on the associated period/amplitude features. Conclusions: In comparison with non-competitive binding at promoters, competition drastically reduces the region of the parameters space characterized by oscillatory solutions. Moreover, while competition leads to pulse-like oscillations with long-tail distribution in period and amplitude for various parameters or noisy conditions, the non-competitive scenario shows a characteristic frequency and confined amplitude values. Our study also situates the competition mechanism in the context of existing genetic oscillators, with emphasis on the Atkinson oscillator.

A qui li dic? : la detecció de l’abús sexual infantil i el traspàs d’informació entre professionals

Aquest treball s'estructura en una primera part de fonamentació teòrica. El procediment que s'ha seguit ha estat la recerca bibliogràfica. Es basa en els aspectes tècnics a tenir en compte per la detecció de l' Abusos Sexuals Infantils (ASI), la ubicació dels Serveis Bàsics d'Atenció Social (SBAS) dins el sistema català de serveis socials, el marc jurídic dels drets i de la protecció a la infància i l'adolescència així com de qüestions relatives al tractament de dades, de la confidencialitat de les informacions de què disposem els/les professionals, l'obligació de secret, complementat amb la deontologia professional, que ens pot orientar a l'hora de prendre les decisions més adequades a la nostra praxi. La segona part del treball és empírica. El procediment ha estat portar a terme un grup de reflexió ètica amb professionals del Consorci de Benestar Social del Pla de l'Estany-Banyoles. Partint de casos pràctics de sospita d'ASI, les persones participants han concretat els principals problemes (alguns dels quals relacionats amb l'ètica aplicada) davant els quals s'han trobat a la fase de detecció/intervenció. Les aportacions extretes de les diferents sessions en les quals es van treballar part dels objectius d'aquesta recerca ens permeten concretar la realitat i una primera deliberació sobre quina podria ser la bona pràctica general. La tercera part utilitza la fonamentació teòrica i els material del treball de camp per presentar la reflexió final que pretén donar resposta als objectius plantejats en aquesta recerca

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

Recontracting and competition

We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as theset of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizesthe core. The results are extended to production economies by extending thedefinition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agentsto recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed onfirms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy thefollowing conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle isa maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. Therecontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers tohis equilibrium bundle.