Sales restriction, quality selection and the mode of competition
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
01/04/2009
|
| Resumo |
A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia |
| Direitos |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència Creative Commons: Reconeixement – No comercial – Sense obra derivada (by-nc-nd) <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ca">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ca</a> |
| Palavras-Chave | #Oligopolis -- Models economètrics |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
