The economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An analysis of first impacts and prospects

This paper was presented at the International Sport Business Symposium, held by the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, in 2008. The speakers, Ferran Brunet, as a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Zuo Xinwen, as a member of Beijing Development and Reform Commission, both set out to analyze changes in the economic and social development of the city which were undertaken with the aim to celebrate the 2008 Olympic Games. They discuss aspects as a transformation in the mode of economic growth, resources of the Organizing Committee, investments related to the Games, transport and communications, industries, the balance of urban and rural development, urban construction and management service and operations into a well-off society.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.