Semantics-supported cooperative learning for enhanced awareness

Awareness is required for supporting all forms of cooperation. In Computer Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL), awareness can be used for enhancing collaborative opportunities across physical distances and in computer-mediated environments. Shared Knowledge Awareness (SKA) intends to increase the perception about the shared knowledge, students have in a collaborative learning scenario and also concerns the understanding that this group has about it. However, it is very difficult to produce accurate awareness indicators based on informal message exchange among the participants. Therefore, we propose a semantic system for cooperation that makes use of formal methods for knowledge representation based on semantic web technologies. From these semantics-enhanced repository and messages, it could be easier to compute more accurate awareness.

From room for books to room for users: an old infantry barrack as an answer to the lack of space

At the beginning of the 21st century, some Catalan university libraries detected a need stemming from the lack of space and the reconversion of physical libraries within the new European educational panorama. With the same cooperative spirit that characterized previous CBUC (Consortium of Academic Libraries of Catalonia) programs and services, the Consortium set in motion a project to address this need. An initial study was commissioned in 2002, and in 2003 a suitable building (old infantry barracks) was found in Lleida. The official opening took place in 2008. GEPA (Guaranteed Space for the Preservation of Access) facility is a cooperative repository, whose objectives are to store and preserve low use documents, ensuring their future access when needed, to convert room for books into room for library users, and doing it saving both space and money. The paper presents a brief historical introduction about the physical management of collections in libraries, and a short overview about high density library repositories all over the world, as an answer to the pressing problem of lack of spaces. The main goals of the communication are to comment the architectural project and its librarian issues, and to show how the GEPA facility allowed to change the spaces in university libraries in Catalonia. On the one hand, the paper deals with the selection of an old building to be renovated, the determination of the librarian needs, the compact shelving system chosen to store the documents in the building, the relation between physical space and information management, and the logistics involved in the load of low use documents from the libraries into the facility. On the other hand, we will show some examples of physical changes in Catalan libraries after large loads of documents to GEPA.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

On the origin of the selectivity of plasmidic H-NS towards horizontally acquired DNA: Linking H-NS oligomerization and cooperative DNA binding

The nucleoid-associated protein H-NS is a global modulator of the expression of genes associated with adaptation to environmental changes. A variant of H-NS expressed in the R27 plasmid was previously shown to selectively modulate the expression of horizontally acquired genes, with minimal effects on core genes that are repressed by the chromosomal form of H-NS. Both H-NS proteins are formed by an oligomerization domain and a DNA-binding domain, which are connected by a linker that is highly flexible in the absence of DNA. We studied DNA binding by means of oligomer-forming chimeric proteins in which domains of the chromosomal and plasmidic variants are exchanged, as well as in monomeric truncated forms containing the DNA-binding domain and variable portions of the linker. Point mutations in the linker were also examined in full-length and truncated H-NS constructs. These experiments show that the linker region contributes to DNA binding affinity and that it is a main component of the distinct DNA binding properties of chromosomal and plasmidic H-NS. We propose that interactions between the linker and DNA limit the flexibility of the connection between H- NS oligomerization and DNA binding and provide an allosteric indirect readout mechanism to detect long- range distortions of DNA, thus enabling discrimination between core and horizontally acquired DNA.

Cooperative motion of intrinsic and actuated semiflexible swimmers

We examine the phenomenon of hydrodynamic-induced cooperativity for pairs of flagellated micro-organism swimmers, of which spermatozoa cells are an example. We consider semiflexible swimmers, where inextensible filaments are driven by an internal intrinsic force and torque-free mechanism (intrinsic swimmers). The velocity gain for swimming cooperatively, which depends on both the geometry and the driving, develops as a result of the near-field coupling of bending and hydrodynamic stresses. We identify the regimes where hydrodynamic cooperativity is advantageous and quantify the change in efficiency. When the filaments' axes are parallel, hydrodynamic interaction induces a directional instability that causes semiflexible swimmers that profit from swimming together to move apart from each other. Biologically, this implies that flagella need to select different synchronized collective states and to compensate for directional instabilities (e.g., by binding) in order to profit from swimming together. By analyzing the cooperative motion of pairs of externally actuated filaments, we assess the impact that stress distribution along the filaments has on their collective displacements.

Workshop on repositories and journals

Third LERU Doctoral Summer School Beyond Open Access: Open Education, Open Data and Open Knowledge Barcelona, 9th July, 2012

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

Los efectos de la sociedad en los museos: del boom a la crisis de ideas = The effects of the society in museums: from boom to the ideas crisis

This paper compares different times of museums considering the situation of the past two decades. It reflects on the upswing and down, knowing that partake of the latter and we are in a deep crisis and unsustainable policies dictating contradictory. This situation raises the museums with their own project and creative professionals can better overcome difficulties because they do not suffer crisis of ideas. Some paradoxes are evident as the case of Greece, the place where the museums are repositories of highly relevant cultural values and the same institutions that have enhanced their improvement in the years of the upswing, they currently require, cuts that put them in a position risk. Similarly we can see that policies are applied to thin the identity of museums since they rely on adjustments that do not study each particular case. Alternatively there is the creativity and efforts of managers and professionals in general and cooperative work. It gives details of some of our participatory projects that go in this direction and to be successfully applied