Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementationmechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics convergeand are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium.In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of ``complexity'' commonlyused against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more refined equilibrium concepts,the dynamics converge but are not stable. Some papers in the literatureon implementation with refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that themechanisms they propose are ``simple'' and implement ``everything'' (incontrast with the canonical mechanism). The fact that some of these ``simple''mechanisms have unstable equilibria suggests that these statements shouldbe interpreted with some caution.

One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands

We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and viceversa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The structural approach of a natrex model on equilibrium exchange rates

Following a general macroeconomic approach, this paper sets a closed micro-founded structural model to determine the long run real exchange rate of a developed economy. In particular, the analysis follows the structure of a Natrex model. The main contribution of this research paper is the development of a solid theoretical framework that analyse in depth the basis of the real exchange rate and the details of the equilibrium dynamics after any shock influencing the steady state. In our case, the intertemporal factors derived from the stock-flow relationship will be particularly determinant. The main results of the paper can be summarised as follows. In first place, a complete well-integrated structural model for long-run real exchange rate determination is developed from first principles. Moreover, within the concrete dynamics of the model, it is found that some convergence restrictions will be necessary. On one hand, for the medium run convergence the sensitivity of the trade balance to changes in real exchange rate should be higher that the correspondent one to the investment decisions. On the other hand, and regarding long-run convergence, it is also necessary both that there exists a negative relationship between investment and capital stock accumulation and that the global saving of the economy depends positively on net foreign debt accumulation. In addition, there are also interesting conclusions about the effects that certain shocks over the exogenous variables of the model have on real exchange rates.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds..

Real equilibrium exchange rates. A panel data approach for advanced and emerging economies.

Based on an behavioral equilibrium exchange rate model, this paper examines the determinants of the real effective exchange rate and evaluates the degree of misalignment of a group of currencies since 1980. Within a panel cointegration setting, we estimate the relationship between exchange rate and a set of economic fundamentals, such as traded-nontraded productivity differentials and the stock of foreign assets. Having ascertained the variables are integrated and cointegrated, the long-run equilibrium value of the fundamentals are estimated and used to derive equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments. Although there is statistical homogeneity, some structural differences were found to exist between advanced and emerging economies.

A Computable general equilibrium approach to hypothetical extractions and missing links

Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.

Non-hyperbolic boundary equilibrium bifurcations in planar Filippov systems: a case study approach

Boundary equilibrium bifurcations in piecewise smooth discontinuous systems are characterized by the collision of an equilibrium point with the discontinuity surface. Generically, these bifurcations are of codimension one, but there are scenarios where the phenomenon can be of higher codimension. Here, the possible collision of a non-hyperbolic equilibrium with the boundary in a two-parameter framework and the nonlinear phenomena associated with such collision are considered. By dealing with planar discontinuous (Filippov) systems, some of such phenomena are pointed out through specific representative cases. A methodology for obtaining the corresponding bi-parametric bifurcation sets is developed.

Explaining High Economic Growth in Small Tourism Countries with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper shows that tourism specialisation can help to explain the observed high growth rates of small countries. For this purpose, two models of growth and trade are constructed to represent the trade relations between two countries. One of the countries is large, rich, has an own source of sustained growth and produces a tradable capital good. The other is a small poor economy, which does not have an own engine of growth and produces tradable tourism services. The poor country exports tourism services to and imports capital goods from the rich economy. In one model tourism is a luxury good, while in the other the expenditure elasticity of tourism imports is unitary. Two main results are obtained. In the long run, the tourism country overcomes decreasing returns and permanently grows because its terms of trade continuously improve. Since the tourism sector is relatively less productive than the capital good sector, tourism services become relatively scarcer and hence more expensive than the capital good. Moreover, along the transition the growth rate of the tourism economy holds well above the one of the rich country for a long time. The growth rate differential between countries is particularly high when tourism is a luxury good. In this case, there is a faster increase in the tourism demand. As a result, investment of the small economy is boosted and its terms of trade highly improve.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).