Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

The strategic behavior of rational novices

There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often deviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the observations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these modifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the rational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes account of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central principals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are evaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their decisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game theoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive weights.

The rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model and the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established. In addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice equilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary contribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is estimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the voluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data better than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2 analysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the one used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.

The rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again, computing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from the Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model outperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study. However, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated rule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Equilibrium in dynamic economic models

The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents are often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their actions or other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will necessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The economic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the classic chain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles by the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building. The third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in an overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand shocks.

The first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building game. A sequential equilibrium model, called the "error prone agents" model, is developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially subjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium calculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than when perfect implementation is assumed.

In the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experiments run by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers in this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications to the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite well in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from the sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications must be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs.

The third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping generations model. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time horizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One main reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping generations environments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially in experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important place to start when examining these environments because it will produce the ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes this a natural baseline to which other models of price dynamics could be compared.

Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

I. The effect of N,N,N',N' -tetramethylethylenediamine on the Schlenk Equilibrium. II. The nature of the Di-Grignard reagent

I. The influence of N,N,N’,N’-tetramethylethylenediamine on the Schlenk equilibrium

The equilibrium between ethylmagnesium bromide, diethylmagnesium, and magnesium bromide has been studied by nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. The interconversion of the species is very fast on the nmr time scale, and only an averaged spectrum is observed for the ethyl species. When N,N,N’,N’-tetramethylethylenediamine is added to solutions of these reagents in tetrahydrofuran, the rate of interconversion is reduced. At temperatures near -50°, two ethylmagnesium species have been observed. These are attributed to the different ethyl groups in ethylmagnesium bromide and diethylmagnesium, two of the species involved in the Schlenk equilibrium of Grignard reagents.

II. The nature of di-Grignard reagents

Di-Grignard reagents have been examined by nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy in an attempt to prove that dialkylmagnesium reagents are in equilibrium with alkylmagnesium halides. The di-Grignard reagents of compounds such as 1,4-dibromobutane have been investigated. The dialkylmagnesium form of this di-Grignard reagent can exist as an intramolecular cyclic species, tetramethylene-magnesium. This cyclic form would give an nmr spectrum different from that of the classical alkylmagnesium halide di-Grignard reagent. In dimethyl ether-tetrahydrofuran solutions of di-Grignard reagents containing N N,N,N’,N’-Tetramethylethylenediamine, evidence has been found for the existence of an intramolecular dialkylmagnesium species. This species is rapidly equilibrating with other forms, but at low temperatures, the rates of interconversion are reduced. Two species can be seen in the nmr spectrum at -50°. One is the cyclic species; the other is an open form.

Inversion of the carbon at the carbon-magnesium bond in di-Grignard reagents has also been studied. This process is much faster than in corresponding monofunctional Grignard reagents.

I. The structure and properties of closed circular duplex DNA. II. Chemically interacting systems at equilibrium in a buoyant density gradient

I. The binding of the intercalating dye ethidium bromide to closed circular SV 40 DNA causes an unwinding of the duplex structure and a simultaneous and quantitatively equivalent unwinding of the superhelices. The buoyant densities and sedimentation velocities of both intact (I) and singly nicked (II) SV 40 DNAs were measured as a function of free dye concentration. The buoyant density data were used to determine the binding isotherms over a dye concentration range extending from 0 to 600 µg/m1 in 5.8 M CsCl. At high dye concentrations all of the binding sites in II, but not in I, are saturated. At free dye concentrations less than 5.4 µg/ml, I has a greater affinity for dye than II. At a critical amount of dye bound I and II have equal affinities, and at higher dye concentration I has a lower affinity than II. The number of superhelical turns, τ, present in I is calculated at each dye concentration using Fuller and Waring's (1964) estimate of the angle of duplex unwinding per intercalation. The results reveal that SV 40 DNA I contains about -13 superhelical turns in concentrated salt solutions.

The free energy of superhelix formation is calculated as a function of τ from a consideration of the effect of the superhelical turns upon the binding isotherm of ethidium bromide to SV 40 DNA I. The value of the free energy is about 100 kcal/mole DNA in the native molecule. The free energy estimates are used to calculate the pitch and radius of the superhelix as a function of the number of superhelical turns. The pitch and radius of the native I superhelix are 430 Å and 135 Å, respectively.

A buoyant density method for the isolation and detection of closed circular DNA is described. The method is based upon the reduced binding of the intercalating dye, ethidium bromide, by closed circular DNA. In an application of this method it is found that HeLa cells contain in addition to closed circular mitochondrial DNA of mean length 4.81 microns, a heterogeneous group of smaller DNA molecules which vary in size from 0.2 to 3.5 microns and a paucidisperse group of multiples of the mitochondrial length.

II. The general theory is presented for the sedimentation equilibrium of a macromolecule in a concentrated binary solvent in the presence of an additional reacting small molecule. Equations are derived for the calculation of the buoyant density of the complex and for the determination of the binding isotherm of the reagent to the macrospecies. The standard buoyant density, a thermodynamic function, is defined and the density gradients which characterize the four component system are derived. The theory is applied to the specific cases of the binding of ethidium bromide to SV 40 DNA and of the binding of mercury and silver to DNA.

Disorder driven transitions in non-equilibrium quantum systems

This thesis presents studies of the role of disorder in non-equilibrium quantum systems. The quantum states relevant to dynamics in these systems are very different from the ground state of the Hamiltonian. Two distinct systems are studied, (i) periodically driven Hamiltonians in two dimensions, and (ii) electrons in a one-dimensional lattice with power-law decaying hopping amplitudes. In the first system, the novel phases that are induced from the interplay of periodic driving, topology and disorder are studied. In the second system, the Anderson transition in all the eigenstates of the Hamiltonian are studied, as a function of the power-law exponent of the hopping amplitude.

In periodically driven systems the study focuses on the effect of disorder in the nature of the topology of the steady states. First, we investigate the robustness to disorder of Floquet topological insulators (FTIs) occurring in semiconductor quantum wells. Such FTIs are generated by resonantly driving a transition between the valence and conduction band. We show that when disorder is added, the topological nature of such FTIs persists as long as there is a gap at the resonant quasienergy. For strong enough disorder, this gap closes and all the states become localized as the system undergoes a transition to a trivial insulator.

Interestingly, the effects of disorder are not necessarily adverse, disorder can also induce a transition from a trivial to a topological system, thereby establishing a Floquet Topological Anderson Insulator (FTAI). Such a state would be a dynamical realization of the topological Anderson insulator. We identify the conditions on the driving field necessary for observing such a transition. We realize such a disorder induced topological Floquet spectrum in the driven honeycomb lattice and quantum well models.

Finally, we show that two-dimensional periodically driven quantum systems with spatial disorder admit a unique topological phase, which we call the anomalous Floquet-Anderson insulator (AFAI). The AFAI is characterized by a quasienergy spectrum featuring chiral edge modes coexisting with a fully localized bulk. Such a spectrum is impossible for a time-independent, local Hamiltonian. These unique characteristics of the AFAI give rise to a new topologically protected nonequilibrium transport phenomenon: quantized, yet nonadiabatic, charge pumping. We identify the topological invariants that distinguish the AFAI from a trivial, fully localized phase, and show that the two phases are separated by a phase transition.

The thesis also present the study of disordered systems using Wegner's Flow equations. The Flow Equation Method was proposed as a technique for studying excited states in an interacting system in one dimension. We apply this method to a one-dimensional tight binding problem with power-law decaying hoppings. This model presents a transition as a function of the exponent of the decay. It is shown that the the entire phase diagram, i.e. the delocalized, critical and localized phases in these systems can be studied using this technique. Based on this technique, we develop a strong-bond renormalization group that procedure where we solve the Flow Equations iteratively. This renormalization group approach provides a new framework to study the transition in this system.