Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a continuous policy space

This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We assume that voters have quadratic preferences over policies and that their ideal points are drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. In our equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. We show that this equilibrium exists if the number of voters is large enough relative to the size of the advantage.

Legislació i perspectives de gènere en la construcció de la ciutadania: una comparativa

El projecte realitzat se situa en el marc de la història contemporània i s’ha centrat en l’anàlisi, des d'una perspectiva comparativa, dels discursos de gènere a Irlanda i Catalunya. S’ha estudiat especialment com s’articulen a través de la legislació. El període cronològic establert és molt extens. Comprèn des dels anys 20 fins als anys 70 del segle XX. Aquesta cronologia amplia ha permès observar fenòmens de llarga durada: les reconfiguracions dels discursos de gènere en funció d’altres processos socials pels quals es veuen afectats, com són per exemple, el naixement de un nou estat (l’Estat Franquista en el cas de Catalunya, i l’Estat Irlandès independent), la Transició a la Democràcia en el cas espanyol o el debats per a la entrada a la Unió Europea a Irlanda. En el cas de Catalunya el focus en aquest període ha significat l’anàlisi de la legislació pròpia que s’elabora en determinats períodes però especialment l’anàlisi de la legislació estatal per la qual es regeix en d’altres. El projecte s’ha basat en un extens àmbit temàtic, principalment en l’anàlisi de la legislació (drets polítics i reconeixement del principi d’igualtat, món laboral, família, educació, drets reproductius, educació/reeducació moral), ja que és un instrument essencial en la construcció i imposició de models de masculinitat i feminitat. A més, a través de la legislació s’ha pogut fer més evident la relació dels discursos de gènere amb altres factors com són les transformacions polítiques en cada cas, la construcció de l’Estat o la influència del nacionalisme. Aquest enfocament ha permès també avaluar la importància relativa dels diferents agents que intervenen en la imposició d’una determinada legislació (Estat, Església, societat civil etc).

The Lottery Blotto Game

In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro le that players might have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game. JEL: C72, D74, H56. KEYWORDS: Colonel Blotto game; lottery contest function.

From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

A One-Shot Prisoners Dilemma with Procedural Utility

This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

Discursos de gènere, nacionalisme i respostes col•lectives de les dones a Catalunya i Irlanda

El projecte realitzat se situa en el marc de la història contemporània, i s’ha centrat en primer lloc, en l’anàlisi, des d’una perspectiva comparativa, del desenvolupament dels discursos de gènere a Catalunya durant la Dictadura Franquista i a la Irlanda postcolonial. Mitjançant l’anàlisi del discurs, s’han estudiat els models de feminitat imposats pel Franquisme i les seves bases ideològiques com són el valors catòlics i l’antindividualisme. En el cas irlandès, s’ha analitzat com, a través de determinades institucions gestionades per l’Església Catòlica, es controlaven aquelles dones que es desviaven del model de gènere que propugnava l’Estat Irlandès, molt similar al proposat pel Franquisme i també basat en els catolicisme. De la mateix manera, s’ha estudiat com el feminisme Català i irlandès dels anys 1970 i 1980 van contrarestar aquests models de gènere imposats, a través de l’anàlisi d’un conjunt d’expressions culturals produïdes per ambdós moviments feministes. La perspectiva comparativa del projecte ha permès: El coneixement dels mecanismes culturals de repressió de les dones així com la seva institucionalització. Revelant els paral•lelismes pel que fa a les polítiques de gènere entre els dos casos estudiats malgrat diferències significatives entre els dos contextos (Catalunya es troba sota una dictadura, Irlanda és un Estat democràtic). La importància de l’agència de les dones i les seves diverses estratègies de resistència, especialment a través d’expressions culturals més efímeres o considerades frívoles que, malgrat el poc reconeixement que han obtingut, són molt eficaces en la deconstrucció de discursos de gènere repressius envers les dones. Ha posat de manifest, també, la importància de l’experiència i les pràctiques personals i íntimes com a pràctiques de resistència. Així mateix, ha visibilitzat les dinàmiques pròpies de moviments feministes.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually playthe equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study theconvergence and stability properties of Sj\"ostr\"om's (1994) mechanism, onthe assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibriumusing monotonic learning dynamics and also with fictitious play. Thismechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environmentsusing as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominatedstrategies (only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies isneeded). There are, however, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payoffs maybe very different from those desired by the social choice function. Withmonotonic dynamics we show that many equilibria in all the sets ofequilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that havecompletely mixed initial conditions. The initial conditions that lead tothese equilibria need not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore,even if the dynamics converge to the ``right'' set of equilibria, it stillcan converge to quite a poor outcome in welfare terms. With fictitious play,if the agents have completely mixed prior beliefs, beliefs and play convergeto the outcome the planner wants to implement.

An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency,converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems.The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with thesame axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.