The Lottery Blotto Game
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
2013
|
| Resumo |
In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro le that players might have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game. JEL: C72, D74, H56. KEYWORDS: Colonel Blotto game; lottery contest function. |
| Formato |
7 p. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Relação |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-05 |
| Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
| Fonte |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
| Palavras-Chave | #Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica) #Gestió de conflictes #Seguretat nacional #33 - Economia |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
