Semantics-supported cooperative learning for enhanced awareness

Awareness is required for supporting all forms of cooperation. In Computer Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL), awareness can be used for enhancing collaborative opportunities across physical distances and in computer-mediated environments. Shared Knowledge Awareness (SKA) intends to increase the perception about the shared knowledge, students have in a collaborative learning scenario and also concerns the understanding that this group has about it. However, it is very difficult to produce accurate awareness indicators based on informal message exchange among the participants. Therefore, we propose a semantic system for cooperation that makes use of formal methods for knowledge representation based on semantic web technologies. From these semantics-enhanced repository and messages, it could be easier to compute more accurate awareness.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

On the origin of the selectivity of plasmidic H-NS towards horizontally acquired DNA: Linking H-NS oligomerization and cooperative DNA binding

The nucleoid-associated protein H-NS is a global modulator of the expression of genes associated with adaptation to environmental changes. A variant of H-NS expressed in the R27 plasmid was previously shown to selectively modulate the expression of horizontally acquired genes, with minimal effects on core genes that are repressed by the chromosomal form of H-NS. Both H-NS proteins are formed by an oligomerization domain and a DNA-binding domain, which are connected by a linker that is highly flexible in the absence of DNA. We studied DNA binding by means of oligomer-forming chimeric proteins in which domains of the chromosomal and plasmidic variants are exchanged, as well as in monomeric truncated forms containing the DNA-binding domain and variable portions of the linker. Point mutations in the linker were also examined in full-length and truncated H-NS constructs. These experiments show that the linker region contributes to DNA binding affinity and that it is a main component of the distinct DNA binding properties of chromosomal and plasmidic H-NS. We propose that interactions between the linker and DNA limit the flexibility of the connection between H- NS oligomerization and DNA binding and provide an allosteric indirect readout mechanism to detect long- range distortions of DNA, thus enabling discrimination between core and horizontally acquired DNA.

Cooperative motion of intrinsic and actuated semiflexible swimmers

We examine the phenomenon of hydrodynamic-induced cooperativity for pairs of flagellated micro-organism swimmers, of which spermatozoa cells are an example. We consider semiflexible swimmers, where inextensible filaments are driven by an internal intrinsic force and torque-free mechanism (intrinsic swimmers). The velocity gain for swimming cooperatively, which depends on both the geometry and the driving, develops as a result of the near-field coupling of bending and hydrodynamic stresses. We identify the regimes where hydrodynamic cooperativity is advantageous and quantify the change in efficiency. When the filaments' axes are parallel, hydrodynamic interaction induces a directional instability that causes semiflexible swimmers that profit from swimming together to move apart from each other. Biologically, this implies that flagella need to select different synchronized collective states and to compensate for directional instabilities (e.g., by binding) in order to profit from swimming together. By analyzing the cooperative motion of pairs of externally actuated filaments, we assess the impact that stress distribution along the filaments has on their collective displacements.

Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory

This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules. Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.

Review of Robust Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Techniques for Cognitive Radio Networks

Cognitive radio networks sense spectrum occupancy and manage themselvesto operate in unused bands without disturbing licensed users. The detection capability of aradio system can be enhanced if the sensing process is performed jointly by a group of nodesso that the effects of wireless fading and shadowing can be minimized. However, taking acollaborative approach poses new security threats to the system as nodes can report falsesensing data to reach a wrong decision. This paper makes a review of secure cooperativespectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks. The main objective of these protocols is toprovide an accurate resolution about the availability of some spectrum channels, ensuring thecontribution from incapable users as well as malicious ones is discarded. Issues, advantagesand disadvantages of such protocols are investigated and summarized.