Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be interpreted as expressing neighborhood, and which is formalized by a graph. Our restriction on preferences is as follows: each agent can freely rank his immediate neighbors, but then he is indifferent between each neighbor and all other agents that this neighbor "leads to". Hence, agents can be highly perceptive regarding their neighbors, while being insensitive to the differences between these and other agents which are further removed from them. We show quasi-transitivity of the majority relation when the graph expressing the neighborhood relation is a tree. We also discuss a further restriction allowing to extend the result for more general graphs. Finally, we compare the proposed restriction with others in the literature, to conclude that it is independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

Limit Cycles for a class of three dimensional polynomial differential systems

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Large deviation for BSDE with subdifferential operator

In this paper we prove that the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation, which involves a subdifferential operator and associated to a family of reflecting diffusion processes, converges to the solution of a deterministic backward equation and satisfes a large deviation principle.

┴N as an Abstract Elementary Class

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Discriminating groups: a comprehensive overview

Discriminating groups were introduced by G.Baumslag, A.Myasnikov and V.Remeslennikov as an outgrowth of their theory of algebraic geometry over groups. However they have taken on a life of their own and have been an object of a considerable amount of study. In this paper we survey the large array results concerning the class of discriminating groups that have been developed over the past decade.

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

Heteroclinic orbits for a class of Hamiltonian systems on Riemannian manifolds

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Homotopy exponents for large H-Spaces

We show that H-spaces with finitely generated cohomology, as an algebra or as an algebra over the Steenrod algebra, have homotopy exponents at all primes. This provides a positive answer to a question of Stanley.

Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures

We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).

A Schoenflies extension theorem for a class of locally bi-Lipschitz homeomorphisms

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Why do creative industries cluster? An analysis of the determinants of clustering of creative industries

Creative industries tend to concentrate mainly around large- and medium-sized cities, forming creative local production systems. The text analyses the forces behind clustering of creative industries to provide the first empirical explanation of the determinants of creative employment clustering following a multidisciplinary approach based on cultural and creative economics, evolutionary geography and urban economics. A comparative analysis has been performed for Italy and Spain. The results show different patterns of creative employment clustering in both countries. The small role of historical and cultural endowments, the size of the place, the average size of creative industries, the productive diversity and the concentration of human capital and creative class have been found as common factors of clustering in both countries.

Mentoring, educational services, and economic incentives longer-term evidence on risky behaviors from a randomized trial

This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long- term impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards to attend program activities, complete high-school and enroll in post-secondary education on youths' engagement in risky behaviors, such as substance abuse, criminal activity, and teenage childbearing. Outcomes were measured at three different points in time, when youths were in their late-teens, and when they were in their early- and their latetwenties. Overall the program was unsuccessful at reducing risky behaviors. Heterogeneity matters in that perverse effects are concentrated among certain subgroups, such as males, older youths, and youths from sites where youths received higher amount of stipends. We claim that this evidence is consistent with different models of youths' behavioral response to economic incentives. In addition, beneficial effects found in those sites in which QOP youths represented a large fraction of the entering class of 9th graders provides hope for these type of programs when operated in small communities and supports the hypothesis of peer effects.

Why are slip lengths so large in carbon nanotubes?

The enhanced flow in carbon nanotubes is explained using a mathematical model that includes a depletion layer with reduced viscosity near the wall. In the limit of large tubes the model predicts no noticeable enhancement. For smaller tubes the model predicts enhancement that increases as the radius decreases. An analogy between the reduced viscosity and slip-length models shows that the term slip-length is misleading and that on surfaces which are smooth at the nanoscale it may be thought of as a length-scale associated with the size of the depletion region and viscosity ratio. The model therefore provides a physical interpretation of the classical Navier slip condition and explains why `slip-lengths' may be greater than the tube radius.

Projectes d’autoaprenentatge de Biologia Cel·lular a la Llicenciatura de Medicina

Aquest projecte de MQD ha permès realitzar una sèrie d’experiències diverses i valuoses que han apuntat formes alternatives en la docència de la Biologia Cel·lular i l’aprenentatge de l'estudiant de la llicenciatura o del grau de medicina. En base a la valoració qualitativa del grau de satisfacció dels usuaris i en un estudi antitatiu de la seva opinió, considerem que ha estat experiències molt vàlides que afavoreixen que l’alumne participi de forma més activa en la seva formació. La principal dificultat observada ha estat o millor dit serà, l’aplicació de les experiències desenvolupades, de forma obligatòria i generalitzada, a tots els alumnes, sobretot als de 1er curs, donat que es tracta d’un grup molt nombrós (més de 300 alumnes). De totes maneres l’experiència adquirida ha estat molt favorable. Les activitats desenvolupades es continuen aplicant i es continuaran aplicant en el nou pla de medicina. Una aplicació perllongada en cursos successius afavorirà poder extreure’n conclusions de tipus més quantitatiu a més de les apreciacions qualitatives.

Pseudomarkets with priorities in large random assignment economies

I study large random assignment economies with a continuum of agents and a finite number of object types. I consider the existence of weak priorities discriminating among agents with respect to their rights concerning the final assignment. The respect for priorities ex ante (ex-ante stability) usually precludes ex-ante envy-freeness. Therefore I define a new concept of fairness, called no unjustified lower chances: priorities with respect to one object type cannot justify different achievable chances regarding another object type. This concept, which applies to the assignment mechanism rather than to the assignment itself, implies ex-ante envy-freeness among agents of the same priority type. I propose a variation of Hylland and Zeckhauser' (1979) pseudomarket that meets ex-ante stability, no unjustified lower chances and ex-ante efficiency among agents of the same priority type. Assuming enough richness in preferences and priorities, the converse is also true: any random assignment with these properties could be achieved through an equilibrium in a pseudomarket with priorities. If priorities are acyclical (the ordering of agents is the same for each object type), this pseudomarket achieves ex-ante efficient random assignments.